

SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

RAFIQ AHMAD

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Correspondence

All correspondence should be directed to the Managing Editor, *South Asian Studies*, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Quaid-i-Azam Campus, Lahore, Pakistan.

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Human Rights under the Bangladesh Constitution : Pro and Anti-National and International Perceptions

M. HABIB-UR-REHMAN

INTRODUCTION

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 is an edifice internationally applicable to the upholding and preserving of human rights and fundamental freedom. It is a common feature that a Constitution provides fundamental rights for its citizens. The Bangladesh constitution guarantees fundamental rights to its citizens.¹ The study makes analysis of Bangladesh's constitutional provisions in this respect.

CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh specifies no provisions under the caption of human rights. Fundamental rights are provided which amount to conferring human rights on the people of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh as a Republic is a democracy in which fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human person is guaranteed.² Bangladesh which emerged in 1971 as a sovereign and independent state adopted human rights provisions as enshrined in the Universal Declaration. Practically to note, there is nothing new in the concern for human rights. For centuries this has been at the centre of political thinking and political aspirations. Demands for protection against the tyrannical acts of governments, for assurances against arbitrary arrest and inhuman punishments, for freedom of assembly and expression, for the rule of law, for the exercise of political rights through the universal franchise and the secret ballot, have been among the most insistent themes of political activity in many centuries. In

M.Habib-ur-Rehman, Professor, Department of Law, Rajshahi University, Rajshahi, Bangladesh.

many cases such aspirations took the form of the explicit demand for Bill of Rights or similar constitutional safeguards to protect those freedoms.³

To modern states sovereignty as to its indivisibility, inviolability and totality is not unknown. Its emergence ensued practically, for about three centuries.⁴ Nevertheless, question of cohesion and diffusion of state and religion is until now prevalent. State and religion whether to exist separately or side by side — it is still an ongoing issue. Some states adopted constitution whereby religion is kept as a personal affair and elevated secularism as its ideology.⁵ Great Britain, the United States, India and some other states adopted secularism as their ideology. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran and some more states made religion as the bases of the constitutions.

China, Soviet Union (now Russia), Poland discarded religion altogether. In Bangladesh it is noteworthy that the country originally was treated as a secular state but subsequently it adopted Islam as the state religion.⁶

The absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice, together with the principle derived from them, constitute the fundamental principles of state policy.⁷ Other provisions were subordinate to this concept.⁸ Rights of women were protected, specially of those who come from the backward area.⁹

Subject to the fundamental principles of state policy, Bangladesh is regarded as a democracy in which fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and value of the human person is guaranteed.¹⁰

Fundamental rights as enumerated in Articles 26-44 may for easy understanding be dealt with under the generality approach,¹¹ rule of law clause,¹² indispensability aspect,¹³ civil rights tenet¹⁴ and enforcement entity.¹⁵

Bangladesh is facing problems of hunger, poverty and unemployment. It is therefore essential that the poor should be protected. This was done under the provisions of the Constitution.¹⁶

The rule of law clauses covered equality before Law, equality of opportunity in public employment and protection under law in respect of trial and punishment. The concept of providing equal opportunities for all has been universally accepted as it indicates the level of civilization, as is apparent from the embodiment of such clauses in the Constitution of Bangladesh.

In the context of indispensability aspect the fundamental rights are guaranteed under headings of right to protection of law,¹⁷ protection of right to life and personal liberty,¹⁸ safeguard as to arrest and detention,¹⁹ prohibition

of forced labour,²⁰ and protection of home and correspondence²¹ required to be emphasised in the sense that these rights are inalienable for every citizen.

As regards civil rights, freedom of movement,²² freedom of assembly,²³ freedom of association,²⁴ freedom of thought and conscience and of speech,²⁵ freedom of profession or occupation,²⁶ and right to property are protected.²⁷ By and large, the Bangladesh Constitution makes no distinction as to the wealth or status of persons as all people are equal before the law. The same holds true in civil disputes, involving property, legal agreement and business and other arrangements.

When there occurs a threat to the security or economic life of the country or any part thereof by war or external aggression or internal disturbance the President of Bangladesh is empowered to issue a Proclamation of Emergency and thereby fundamental rights are suspended.²⁸ Moreover provisions regarding suspension of fundamental rights during emergency suspends also any proceeding in any court.²⁹

INTERNATIONAL NORMS

International Law regulates the affairs of states dealing with each other. It includes the United Nations as well.³⁰ In its Chapter I the purposes and principles of the United Nations have been reiterated. Its objective is : "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion...."³¹ The General Assembly reaffirmed that : "Promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion³² are its set objectives."

As regards the functions and purposes of the United Nations, the Security Council is entrusted primarily to ensure international peace and security and in discharging such duties it "... shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."³³ In order to achieve these objectives, the regional alliances could also be arranged.³⁴ The Security Council is empowered to promote "... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."³⁵ This discussion indicates that the United Nations and its organisations are deeply committed to protect and enlarge human rights.

In its functions and powers the Economic and Social Council is empowered to make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.³⁶ Also in its International Trusteeship system, it is laid down: "The basic objective of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present charter shall be "... to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language, or religion ..."³⁷ Human rights and fundamental freedoms have been the subject of all the major bodies of the United Nations.

Promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all had been included in the Charter — the historic document establishing the United Nations as one of the organisation's basic purposes. In the early days of the organisation, the Economic and Social Council and its Commission on Human Rights decided that the planned international bill of rights should consist of a declaration of general principles, having moral force, a separate covenant legally binding on those states ratifying it, and measures of implementation. Within a relatively short time the Commission drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — an historic document setting the standards for achieving human rights.

Since its adoption by the Assembly on December 10, 1948, the Declaration had a wide impact throughout the world, inspiring national constitutions and laws as well as conventions on various specific rights. The Declaration did not have the force of law at the time of its adoption, but since then it exerted powerful influence on the development of contemporary international law.

Having proclaimed this Universal Declaration, the United Nations turned to an even more difficult task of transforming these principles into a treaty which should establish legal obligations on the part of each ratifying state. Eventually it was legal that two covenants rather than one were needed: one dealing with civil and political rights, the other with economic, social and cultural rights.

Agreements on the formulation of rights acceptable to all the diverse people, religions, cultures and ideologies in the United Nations did not come about easily. Article by article, the two covenants were drafted — first by the Human Rights Commission and then in the Assembly's Third Committee. On December 16, 1966, the Assembly adopted the International Covenants and the Optional Protocol. Having the required minimum number of 35 ratifications

for each, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights came into effect on January 3, 1976 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 23 March 1976, together with the Optional Protocol which had already received 10 ratifications, the minimum needed for its enforcement.

A state which ratifies the covenant of the Civil and Political Rights undertakes to protect its people by law against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; as it recognizes the right of every human being to life, liberty, security and privacy of person. The covenant prohibits slavery, guarantees the right to a fair trial and protects persons against arbitrary arrest or detention. It recognizes freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, the right of peaceful assembly and of emigration, and freedom of association.

A state which ratifies the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights acknowledges its responsibility to promote better living conditions for its people. It recognizes everyone's right to work, to fair wages, to social security, to adequate standards of living and freedom from hunger, and to health and education. It also undertakes to ensure the right to everyone to form and join trade unions. A major provision of both covenants, however, had not been included in the Declaration. This was the right of all peoples to self-determination and to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.

There are two distinct sets of implementation measures in the covenants. States that have ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are obliged to consider reports submitted by the states parties and to address general comments to these states as well as to the Economic and Social Council.

The Optional Protocol empowers the Human Rights Committee to consider communications from private individuals claiming to be the victims of a violation of a state party to the protocol of any of the rights set forth in the covenant. However, individuals are required to exhaust all available domestic remedies.³⁸ In addition, the UN Commission on Human Rights is authorised to deal with human rights and fundamental freedoms matters itself as well as through its certain sub-commissions. There is also a positive role of the non-governmental organisations against violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms abuses. By affirming the international norms the states promote human rights and fundamental freedoms for everybody and set example which provide inspiration to mankind everywhere.³⁹

NATIONAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL STATEHOOD : JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT

Every state in the modern world is a territorial community in the name of which an agent or agents exercises or exercise sovereignty. By sovereignty is meant the legal competence to issue orders without a need to refer to a higher authority. The orders so issued constitute laws and are binding upon all those who fall within their jurisdiction.⁴⁰

In international customary law, discrimination by any sovereign state against any group of its own nationals is, in principle, a matter exclusively within its own domestic jurisdiction. International customary law limits the protection of the individual by agency other than the state one lives in. Apparent exception to this rule are based on acquiescence by the states, or there are cases of morally explicable but, nevertheless, illegal humanitarian violation.⁴¹ Sovereignty characteristically imbued with indivisibility and inviability criteria impelled emergence of nation state as an outcome of three centuries prior to the nineteenth century. Until the two decades of the nineteenth century there was general agreement that membership of the international community bestowed the so-called fundamental rights on states. Such rights were chiefly enumerated as the right of existence, of self-preservation, of equality, of independence, of territorial supremacy, of holding and acquiring territory, of inter-communication, and of good name and reputation.⁴²

Those who are strong upholders of the concept of the state sovereignty do not tolerate extra-sovereignty jurisdiction in whatever style it steps in to check the state's functionings.

If nation state's sovereignty upholders and extra-sovereignty upholders hold their positions firmly there will be no growth of a common entity which should help overcome constraints against co-existence of the states, their onward development and progress both international and national.

All rights depend upon life, for unless life is secure, no rights are possible. Every state makes some provision for personal safety. In early days, murder was avenged by the family of friends of the murdered person; nowadays murderer is punished by the state itself; by the severe penalties. The idea of a life for a life, in capital punishment, includes both the desire for revenge and the idea for removing one who is dangerous to society. The growing demand for the abolition of capital punishment represents a belief that even a murderer has a right to life. All other rights such as right to property,

right to movement, right to association, right to religion, right to equality before law and so on can not be enforced without securing right to life.

Although constitutionally almost in every state the very fundamental human right, such as right to life is ensured as a result of which the state does not give way to any body else to override its own machinery. It is the saying of the state that it is the best defender of human rights and sole arbiter of the issues thereof while arising out of its nationals within its territory and to some extent outside even.

It is natural for everybody whether legal or political to be self centred and to be authority empowered so that it can enable him to control the community and therewith his counterpart as well. At present the state controlling authority — the government is instituted by its constitution, whatever be the pattern of the constitution — democratic, socialist, communist, imperialist, capitalist or monarchist, constitutional norms exist having its objectives for achieving the welfare of its peoples and thereby of the state as a whole. But power hankering nature of human beings is seldom seen to be ignored by the existing authority. To defend its own authority the government stresses on territorial jurisdiction in any matter before it and brooks no intervention from any quarter.⁴³

An international forum should co-exist with the state authority so that the basic purposes of life on earth are safeguarded. The state, without being made subservient to an outside authority, should be able to manage its own affairs. The international agency as an impartial entity should have some arrangements to point out the glaring violations and infringements of the fundamental rights.

BANGLADESH CONSTITUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

It is a privilege to enact human rights provisions in the light of international machinery — the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, for a state. Bangladesh constitutional provisions on fundamental rights to life, personal liberty, property, protection of law, equality before law, equal opportunity in public employment, prohibition of forced labour, freedom of movement, assembly association, thought and conscience, and of speech, profession or occupation and freedom of religion and protection of home correspond to provisions of the Universal Declaration. In the preamble of the constitution it is pledged that it shall be a fundamental aim of the state to realise through democratic process a socialist society, free from exploitation — a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, equality and justice, political, economic and social rights for all citizens. Fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth

of the human person are guaranteed as fundamental principles of state policy.⁴⁴ But these principles are not justiciable.⁴⁵

The constitution makes no distinction as to the wealth or status of persons. All are equal before the law, and all are equally subject to judgment and punishment when they violate the law. The same holds true for civil disputes, involving property, legal agreements and business arrangements.

In a state whatever is talked about fundamental rights or human rights or anything else, there can be no entity effective more than the state itself. It is the state against which no one's superiority can stand. Rights and obligations for and between citizens and state exist side by side. In reality citizens and state are integral part to each other. In times of crisis of the state every citizen must be above self-interest of any kind. In times of emergency Bangladesh Constitution is aimed at safeguarding the general interests of its people.

If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency existed which threatens the security or economic life of Bangladesh, or any part thereof, is threatened by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency. A Proclamation of Emergency (a) may be revised by a subsequent proclamation; (b) shall be laid before Parliament; (c) shall cease to operate at the expiration of one hundred and twenty days; unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by a resolution of Parliament, provided that if any such proclamation is issued at a time when Parliament stands dissolved or the dissolved Parliament takes place during the period of one hundred and twenty days to the proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which Parliament first meets after its reconstitution, unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the proclamation has been passed by Parliament.

A proclamation of emergency declaring that the security of Bangladesh, or any part thereof is threatened by war or external aggression or by internal disturbance may be made before the actual occurrence of war or any such aggression or disturbance if the President is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof.⁴⁶

While a proclamation of emergency is in operation, there is no restriction on the executive to take action against freedoms of movement, assembly, association, thought, conscience, speech, profession or occupation as well as against right to property.⁴⁷ But when the proclamation of emergency ceases the

extent of the competency of such actions taken against those freedoms and rights will cease therewith.

It is also noticeable that while a proclamation of emergency is in operation the President may by order declare that the right to move any Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the right so specified, shall remain suspended. Such order may extend to the whole of Bangladesh or any part thereof, and that the order shall, as soon as may be possible, be laid before Parliament.⁴⁸

Whatever be the call for emergency proclamation, fundamental rights to life and personal liberty being the very human rights seems unaffected in the sense that no executive action can be taken against such rights although their enforcement measures before any Court shall remain suspended.

Any fundamental rights when infringed the person so affected under Article 102 of the Constitution is entitled to get remedy in the High Court Division.⁴⁹ Remedy for such aggrieved person through the High Court Division is generally known as remedy by way of writ petition. It is also possible to get remedy in the Appellate Division.⁵⁰ There is also an opening for the aggrieved person of whatever category to seek remedy by way of grant from the President. The President of Bangladesh has power to grant pardons, reprieves and respites, and to remit, suspend or commute any sentence passed by the Court, tribunal or other authority.⁵¹

Constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights are practically identical to the universally enshrined human rights. The Bangladesh Constitution seems to have given due honour and dignity to the security and promotion of fundamental rights that give way to the enforcement of human rights. As a least developed country like Bangladesh there are problems practically intrinsic for the people to get the benefit of the judicial remedy in the Supreme Court. It requires that the poor people should be helped to seek justice through free legal aid.

UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONSTRAINTS ASSESSMENT

Protagonists of sovereignty of nation state put the state above any authority even of the international law. The cult of nation state authority upholds the non-interference in its affairs of whatever character by outsider.

The idea that sovereignty can neither be limited nor divided is contrary to modern developments in international society. Sovereignty was and is a very useful instrument to determine the subjects of international law.⁵² It is often said that a man should be able to discover with reasonable certainty what the scope of the obligations which the law of his country imposes upon him might be. It cannot be less important that he should be able to determine whether or not he is required to comply with the prescriptions of a foreign legal system. But the 'balancing of interests' approach does little to help in this respect.⁵³

In the context of national sovereignty concept there is little opening for human rights issues to be practically universal. So long as international machinery will have to depend on territorial sovereignty efficacy there will be no reality to the international practice of human rights matters. Whatever guarantee is provided constitutionally the concerned authority in times of their needs may not be above the motivated unscrupulous practice, the outcome of which may result in violation of human rights. Constraints on the universality of human rights also surface in tricky politics of state authority concerned although such authority wants to show itself as not infringing the human rights norms.

Although states are promoting relations through agreements, pacts, and treaties, nevertheless, they do not hesitate to keep them outside any binding machinery. This happens to almost each and every state whether developing or developed ones. In the case of treaties they show more or less indifference in ratifying the same. There seems a fear for them if the treaty concerned is ratified. As regards the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights the situation is not exceptional to the fact that states are seen even to enact covenants provisions by not to be liberal to ratify the documents. Such attitude too acts as a constraint to the universality of human rights matters.

PRO AND ANTI-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS AND BANGLADESH

Bangladesh in framing its Constitution benefitted from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provisions. It seems that country is in conformity with the norms of the human rights provisions. Nationalism, democracy and socialism are the foundation state policy. In every matter the norms of the fundamental state policy are upheld. Human rights matters are practically ensured.

Every citizen of Bangladesh is called Bangladeshi. A Bangladeshi has right to secure his rights against the counterpart whether individual or government. He is entitled to do it through the government if necessary even outside the territory. Such treatment holds true in human rights matters.

As a fundamental principle of state policy democracy is based on equality of voting power in election. One man one vote democratic criterion ensures the very norms of human rights cum fundamental right.

Socialism as a fundamental principle of state policy invokes economic and social justice. Where there is a guarantee of economic and social justice there is a guarantee of the concerned rights for every person to be secured and promoted. The principle of socialism therefore is treated as a guarantee for upholding rights intended to the securing and enriching of the position of the people particularly the indigenus group. That being so, human rights matters may not appear to remain unattended.

Social justice known by some one as distributive justice is virtually an effective modality for the disadvantaged group to enjoy freedom from interference and pressure of the powerful group. Distributive justice can only be attained in societies where the policy makers and the administration realise and pay attention to the needs of the less fortunate group of society. An understanding of the social and economic restraints of such groups is a prerequisite to the application of distributive justice.⁵⁴ Fundamental principles of state policy are concerned to be accordingly fitted. Taking this into account it is not difficult to acquiesce in a proposition that the Bangladeshi peoples are guaranteed constitutionally to upholding and preserving of economic and social justice and thereby they can have access to security and promotion of human rights.

In effect, constitutional provisions are limited to the territory of the state. Constitutional provisions are intended to administer the country in an orderly fashion paying heed to the sovereignty of the state. Sovereignty enshrined constitutional provisions — the fundamental principles of state policy which protects not only national interests but international as well. Pro-national interests bearing provisions result in internationally practicable human rights matters. That means, the aspect of internationally practicable human rights matters could to be achieved by sovereignty orienting principles of the state policy.

Constitutionally Bangladesh submits to international law and principles as enunciated in the United Nations Charter, and on the basis of the principles of

respect for national sovereignty and equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, peaceful settlement of international disputes the country shall uphold the right of every people freely to determine and build up its own social, economic and political systems by ways and means of its own free choice; and support oppressed peoples throughout the world waging a just struggle against imperialism, colonialism or racialism.⁵⁵ Territorially prescribed provisions as such are not limited to the territory and people of Bangladesh. Their application is extra-territorially which spirited the concern of social, economic and political rights and gave respect to the self-determination of peoples everywhere in the world.

If territoriality of sovereignty doctrine is strictly followed, there is no opening for constitutional provisions to take account of the interests. In this context there seems to be no reservation in saying that under any circumstances territoriality of sovereignty doctrine may have seldom scope to be effective outside the territory. Anyway, constitutional provisions as provided do not appear as infringing the norms of law whether national or international — applicable individually or collectively. Territoriality of sovereignty doctrine as involved in the provisions covers the norms of extra-territoriality doctrine of international law. Territoriality doctrine therefore results in extra-territoriality norms of international principles. The territoriality doctrine, therefore, envisages pro-national interests but it also gives rise to pro-international aspect.

CONCLUSION

There is now a tendency that one always wants to defend himself as not having done so to the event concerned. To defend his case there remains no effort of whatever kind left to defend the matter for his interests. In any case, needs are arising to be careful to deal with every matter — the human rights matter invariably to be seriously considered. Where civil wars are no longer civil, and the carnage they inflict will not let the world remain indifferent. The narrow nationalism that would oppose or disregard the norms of a stable international order and the micro-nationalism that resists healthy economic or political integration can disrupt a peaceful global existence. Nations are too interdependent.⁵⁶ There is no need to contradict human rights to be secured and promoted at every sphere of life. Whatever machineries are there to the preservation and enrichment of human rights, there will be no goal if all such concerns are not effected to their pragmatic ends.

Fundamental human rights and liberties are best guaranteed in a society where the judiciary enjoys freedom from political interference and pressure

and where lawyers are free to take up all cases — even unpopular ones without fear of reprisal.⁵⁷ In order to safeguard and establish human rights to entirely needs arise to urge freedom for lawyers to move against human rights violation at all level.

Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights possesses high and moral authority, nevertheless, it seems to be treated as part of customary international law but in effect, it cannot be said to have naturally the force of law. In spite of certain human rights machineries, the United Nations Charter itself, to some extent, is not lacking in human rights enforcing tools. As to general effect, whereby any issue there causes act of aggression amounting to breach of international peace and security, the matter will come to the notice of the Security Council. It surmises that in regard to human rights issues the Security Council can exercise power to take action.⁵⁸

It is a problem for every developing country to meet the challenge of hunger, poverty and unemployment of its people. Bangladesh situation is too adverse to face. Foreign aid keeps the country running. Job competition is too fierce. For a few positions hundreds even thousands of applicants rush to get. Pressures are common in appointment and selection matters some peculiar technique is adopted to get the chosen one in. It is only an idealism to think of a nepotism and corruptions free society in this situation. Without social security, therefore, there cannot be a security for human rights in any society.

In whatever degree human rights are reiterated to be secured and promoted, it would not be proper to think of a murderer to be escaped on urges of human rights to his case. Despite the jurisdictional conflict between national sovereignty doctrine and international regime there is an urgent need to strengthen human rights matters. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights cannot work universally unless it is accepted as such.

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3. E. Luard in B.G. Ramcharan (ed.), *'Human Rights' Thirty Years after the Universal Declaration*, 1979, Hartman Aijhoff IX.
4. Sir Humphrey Waldock (ed.), *J.L. Brierty's The Law of Nations*, 1963, pp.7-14.

5. Earlier, fundamental principles of state policy ... democracy, socialism and secularism. Secularism criterion was ... the Proclamation (Annul Order, 1977, Proclamation Order No. 1 of 1977).

6. Islam is now declared to be the state religion for Bangladesh without discrimination of other religions.

7. *The Bangladesh Constitution*, Art. 1.

8. Art. 8.

9. Art. 9.

10. Art. 10.

11. Arts. 26,28,30.

12. Arts. 27,29,35.

13. Arts. 31,32,33,34.

14. Arts. 36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43.

15. Art. 44. While fundamental rights are infringed the person so affected can get remedy in the High Court Division. It is also possible to get in any other Court if authorised by the Parliament.

16. Distributive justice may be understood in terms of social justice. The concept of distributive justice in the sphere of law-making can note *inter alia*, the removal of economic inequalities and rectifying the injustice, resulting from dealings or transaction between unequals in society. Law should be used as an instrument of distributive justice to achieve a fair division of wealth among the members of the society based upon the principles — from each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs. Distributive justice comprehends more than achieving lessening of inequalities by differential taxation, giving debt relief of distribution of property owned by one to many who have none by imposing ceiling on holdings, both agricultural and urban, or by direct regulation of contractual transaction by forbidding certain transaction. It also means that those who have been depressed of their property by unconscionable bargains should be restored their property. All such laws may take form of forced redistribution of wealth as a means of achieving a fair division of material resources among the members of the society. For there may be legislative control of unfair agreement. Justice Ranganath Mishra, "Distributive Justice". *The Independence of the Judiciary in India (1990)*, International Commission of Jurists, p. 34; Asma Jahangir, "Distributive Justice". *The Independence of Judges and Lawyers in Pakistan, (1989)*, International Commission of Jurists, pp. 65-70.

17. Art. 31.

18. Art. 32.

19. Art. 33.

20. Art. 34.

21. Art. 43.

22. Art. 32.

23. Art. 37.

24. Art. 38.

25. Art. 39.

26. Art. 40.

27. Art. 42.

28. *Bangladesh Constitution*, para IXA, Emergency Provisions, Arts. 241A, 141B, 141C.

29. Art. 141C.

30. The six main organs are: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice and Secretariat. In addition, there are a number of specialised agencies such as WHO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ICAO, IBRD, IAA, IFC, IA, UPU, ITO, IMCO, LAEA.

31. UN Charter, Art. 1, para 3.

32. *Ibid.*, Art. 13, para (b).

33. *Ibid.*, Art. 24, para 2.

34. Art. 52, para 141.

35. Art. 44, para (c).

36. Art. 62.

37. Art. 76, para (c).

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43. Roscoe Pound in Georges Gurvitch *Sociology of Law*, 1953, p. xv.

44. Art. 11.

45. The Bangladesh Constitution in its Part II (Arts. 8-25) deals with fundamental principles of state policy. The principles of absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice together with the principles derived from them set out in this part shall constitute the fundamental principles of state policy. Accordingly, promotion of local government institution, participation of women in national life, democracy and human rights, principles of ownership, emancipation of peasants and workers, provision of basic necessities, rural development and a cultural revolution, free and compulsory education, public health and morality, equality of opportunity, work as a right and

duty, duties of citizens and public servants, separation of judiciary from the executive, national culture, national movements, promotion of international peace, security and solidarity are also placed as fundamental principles of state policy. These principles shall not be judicially enforceable, p. 46, Art. 141A.

46. Art. 141A

47. According to Article 141B such actions can be taken against the fundamental rights contained in Arts. 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, and 42.

48. Art. 141C.

49. Under the Bangladesh Constitution, Supreme Court is the highest Court in the country. Jurisdictionally, it is divided as High Court Division and Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.

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An Economic Evaluation of Communal Violence in Sri Lanka

MUHAMMAD AYUB MEHAR KHAN

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to rank ethnic groups on the basis of economic and social development in Sri Lanka. Sinhalese, St. Tamils, Indian Tamils and Muslims are those ethnic groups which have included in this study. It is concluded that Sinhalese are socially and economically more developed than Tamils. However, income distribution is not a cause of disparities in social development. It is also concluded that publicly provided services show a large disparity between most privileged and less privileged ethnic groups.

I. INTRODUCTION

Sri Lanka is a striking case of an economy which was well ahead of other developing countries in the 1950's but which did not maintain its position over time. In the 1950's Sri Lanka per capita income was about half of Japan's, or Malaysia's and much higher than Korea's or Thailand. The living standard of its population in terms of life expectancy at birth, school enrollment ratio, literacy and infant mortality rates were among the highest in the developing world. Four decades later, the country's per capita income is less than five per cent that of Japan, less than a fifth that of Malaysia, and well below those of South Korea and Thailand.¹

A cause for the country's problems has been the delay in adjusting to increasingly difficult economic condition. The outbreak of the ethnic conflicts in 1983, as well as growing political violence since 1987 and elections in 1988 are major factors. During the last seven years the country fell into an infinite series of rioting and ethnic discords. These discords and rioting have not been

Muhammad Ayub Mehar Khan, Project Economist, Applied Economics Research Centre, University of Karachi, Karachi.

broken out over night; but, these are consequences of many years cultural development process and economic history of ethnic groups in South Asia. However, it is a controversial debate that what are the reasons of such crises : social, cultural, economic, or political. According to Mr. J. R. J. Vardenhay (Former President of Sri Lanka), "What are the reasons behind Tamil's problem."¹

This is a hard question. The problem is a continuation of a long time history. However, I am hopeful for its solution. (A. Azeem 1991). The assassination of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi (Former Prime Minister of India) and Mr. Vijay (Interior Minister of Sri Lanka) are the consequences of such discords.

The causes and justification of these discords can not be understand without reference to economic status of the ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. In the country, the role of each ethnic group in the economy is largely determined by the ethnic-oriented cultural value system. The importance of the study of the development characteristics of ethnic groups is, therefore, obvious. Such information may be helpful in the planning and reforms for the reduction of disparities between ethnic groups. In the present context, the comparison of development characteristics of ethnic groups in Sri Lanka become more important from the point of view of national unity. The purpose of this study is to rank ethnic groups on the basis of economic and social development.

The paper has been organized as follows : Section II describes a brief history of the ethnic groups in Sri Lanka; Section III describes the collection of data and particulars indicators applied for evolving spatial ranking of the ethnic groups in terms of level of development. In Section IV we discussed the methodology applied for combining the various indicators into one summary measure of the level of development and rescaling the data. In Section V, we highlighted the major implications of analysis. Finally, the appendix to paper described the background tables of the study.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN SRI LANKA

There have been many attempts by scholars to specify ethnicity, ethnic identity and consciousness and we shall not become involved in the redundant exercise here. A great deal has been written on the historical antecedents of ethnic conflicts, and on the political, religious, economic and social circumstances in which many of them have been divided. These accounts include the effects of global process that stem from metropolitan centres upon

sattelite countries, the assumption and the problems of nation making and politics of ethnic and other groups entitlement claims in plural societies.

The two major approaches to the question of ethnicity may be crudely categorized as 'Circumstantialist' and 'Primordialist'. The first regards, ethnicity as a dependent variable created in main by a combination of external interests and strategies, both ecological and political. 'Ethnicity' to social scientists, who approach it this way, is shown to be essentially a political phenomenon. To those who adopt the Primordialist approach, ethnicity derives from and reflects elemental atavistic loyalties and 'Primordial attachments'. Such writers stress that members of ethnic groups give equal attention to past memory and future strategy. They are concerned with what has been called the dynamics of cultural autonomy. (Akbar 1989). In this paper, we adopted 'Primordialist' approach and for simplification a one dimensional ethnicity is defined which may be called racial-ethnicity.

On consideration of ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, we can not ignore to racial history of South Asia (India). The history of India may be divided into three ages. Each age represents one race. *Bheals*, *Drawers* and *Aryans* are these races. *Bheals* are considered as the most ancient peoples of India. Now-a-days, it is commonly known that Sinhalese of Sri Lanka are the representatives of *Bheal* race. While *Aryans* came in India from North since 5000 years ago. Tamils represents to *Drawer* race. Tamils always hated *Aryans*. According to Indian history *Aryans* pushed *Drawers*. (Tamils) to South. Some peoples of Tamils migrated to Sri Lanka (Now they called it St. Tamils). The other Tamils are living in the South Indian province, Tamil Nado (nearer to Sri Lanka). They are called by the Indians as Tamils. Some Indian Tamils also migrated to Sri Lanka during the 18th to 20th century (A. Azeem 1991). The Indian cast system is based on this historical evolution of the racial system. It was similarly rationalized as an attempt by light skinned Aryans invaders to keep themselves racially apart from dark skinned nations (Kalwar 1989).

Tamils lived in the tea plantation areas with the rise of Buddhist Chauvinism. From the 1950's Tamil leaders increasingly held a view of 'Sinhalese Perfidy'. Many issues and causes which were actually national in character were brushed off as 'Southern problems'. Such reactions served to isolate the Tamil community (Wijedara, K. 1989). This isolation of the Tamil community created the demand for a separate independent land for Tamils. The Indian Tamils not only supported St. Tamils, but they pressurized the Indian Government for political help to St. Tamils. On account of these circumstances

the ethnic conflict have become a most sensitive issue of the regional politics of Tamil Nadu (an Indian province). On the basis of this ground, a cold war broke out between Sri Lanka and Indian Government. But, Mr. L. Amartiya (a Tamil leader) played a role as an arbitrator between India and Sri Lanka. As a result of his arbitration, an accord have been signed. According to this, in Tamil majority area of Sri Lanka a provincial council have to be formed and after elections the powers delegated to Tamils elected leaders. However, after formation of Tamil government in Tamil majority area, Tamil demanded an independent state of their own. For controlling them, Indian army entered Sri Lanka on as called by Sri Lankan government and a war broken out between Tamils and the Indian army.

When Indian army assistance was accrued, the Tamil elite living in London, New York, Boston and other cities in Europe and North America became more involved. The military assistance provided by the Indians gave expatriate Tamils the hope that a separate state for the Tamils in Sri Lanka was a 'Historical Possibility' and a respectable cause (Wijedara, K. 1989).

The year 1989 was a particularly bad year for human rights in Sri Lanka. Indeed the process of continuous deterioration of human rights had its beginnings in the early 1980's when the ethnic conflict took a violent term (Jayadeva 1989). *The Ammensty International Report for 1989* noted that 'Thousands of peoples' disappeared, died in custody or were victims of extra judicial executions carried out by security forces and death squads.³

The JVP (Jantha Vimukthi Peramuna) in South, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and EPRLF (Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front) in the North East were those responsible for human rights violation. And these groups were also operating on the assumption that their political opponents had no political rights at all, even the right of life. (Jayadeva, 1989).

All of them viewed history as a chain of events rather than history as an evolutionary process where events are manifestation. We see this as a historical legacy of the way social forces within the Tamil and Sinhalese nations developed and interacted (Rajan, Daya, Sritharn and Rajani, 1990). The outbreak of the ethnic conflict, however, complicated decision making, and the government found it increasingly difficult to translate its views into policy actions.

After the introduction of ethnic environment, we again come to the discussion on ranking and comparison of development characteristic of the

ethnic groups. Here it is stated that the historical evolution justifies the causes of ethnic conflicts.

III. SELECTION OF DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND THE DATA

The forces determining the development characteristics of ethnic groups in any community are varied and complex and react in such a way that any theoretical model becomes unrealistic. However, due to constraint of data and for simplification, of the model we applied the following indicators for development ranking :

1. Income, Inequality and Employment

For comparison of average incomes, we use per household's income. While, gini-coefficient is used for measuring inequality. For computing the gini-coefficient, we use the following formula :

$$G = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n spi (yi + yi - 1) \quad (1)$$

While, spi = share of population of i th income class.

yi = cumulative income share of i th income group.

Unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of unemployed labour force to the total labour force. In labour force we included population of age of 15 years and above. So :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Labour force} = & \text{Total population} - \text{population less than 15 years of age} - \\ & \text{Retired persons} - \text{Full time students} - \text{Persons who do} \\ & \text{nothing and not want doing} - \text{Home ladies.} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Unemployment Rate} = \frac{\text{Total Labour Force} - \text{Employed Labour Force}}{\text{Total Labour Force}} \quad (3)$$

Table 1 and Table 2 show the income, income distribution and unemployment's situations by ethnic groups.

TABLE 1
Average Household's Income in different Income Classes

Ethnic-Group	Lowest 20%	Next 20%	Next 20%	Next 20%	Highest 20%	Gini-Coefficient
Total	7693	13319	19030	26393	48556	0.5649
Sinhalese	7676	13267	19024	26401	48606	0.5652
St. Tamil	8633	13900	19100	26504	48099	0.5575
Indian Tamil	7200	12300	21000	24347	43920	0.5572
Muslim	8500	13292	18000	25000	36280	0.5331

TABLE 2
Income Distribution and Unemployment

Indicators	Rupees Annual				
	Overall	Sinhalese	St. Tamil	Indian Tamil	Muslims
Household Income	22763.00	22558.00	19445.00	21480.00	31606.00
Per Capita Income	4502.00	4507.00	4137.00	3298.00	4661.00
Rate of Unemployment	32.20	33.25	14.33	5.46	23.15
Gini - Coefficient	0.56	0.57	0.56	0.56	0.53

2. Demand for Social Services

Supply of clean water, inside water connection, and house with electricity connection are those services which are included in this analysis. They are reported in Table 3.

TABLE 3
Availability of Social Services

Indicators	Percentage				
	Overall	Sinhalese	St. Tamil	Indian Tamil	Muslims
Electricity in House	26.20	24.82	9.09	14.29	78.85
Electricity in Village	52.60	51.02	52.27	57.14	88.46
Water Connection Payers	4.36	4.06	0.00	14.29	15.38
Availability of Clean Water	5.60	5.30	15.91	28.57	3.85

3. Housing

Besides owners and renters there are several types of accommodation, such as free accommodation provided by employer, or accommodation with friends and relatives. However, for simplification, we assume that all of those households who not have a personal house are defined as renters. House area

(in square feet) also included in the study. From the construction's material point of view, there are many types of houses in Sri Lanka. The following types of material used in house walls :

1. Cement
2. Corrugated sheets
3. Bricks
4. Thatch, mud and wood
5. Other cheaper material

In construction of roofs the following types of material often used :

1. Concrete
2. Flat tiles
3. Rounded tiles
4. Asbestos
5. Corrugated sheets
6. Other kinds of cheaper materials.

Similarly, walls of houses may be plastered or unplastered, so, on the basis of construction's materials, we categorized to houses into eight kinds (Appendix I to Appendix III describe the methodology for housing typology). Housing typology by ethnic groups has shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4
Availability of Social Services

Indicators	<i>Percentage</i>				
	Overall	Sinhalese	St. Tamil	Indian Tamil	Muslims
House Owners	87.70	90.64	13.64	14.29	84.31
House Area (Sq. Ft)	578.00	561.00	242.00	281.00	743.00
Type (A) Houses	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00
Type (B) Houses	2.55	2.79	0.00	0.00	0.00
Type (C) Houses	29.54	29.44	18.92	25.00	50.98
Type (D) Houses	22.30	23.86	8.11	0.00	3.93
Type (E) Houses	22.06	19.97	54.05	75.00	43.14
Type (F) Houses	10.01	10.32	16.22	0.00	1.96
Type (G) Houses	11.04	12.10	0.00	0.00	0.00
Type (H) Houses	2.41	1.43	2.70	0.00	0.00

4. Government Grants and Aids

Table 5 shows the ratio of each ethnic groups by beneficiaries of food stamp, unemployment beneficiaries, housing loan beneficiaries and beneficiaries of other kinds of grants. We included all the kinds of these grants into ranking.

TABLE 5
Government Grants and Aids to Households

Indicators	Percentage				
	Overall	Sinhalese	St. Tamil	Indian Tamil	Muslims
Household Income (Rs./Annual)	22763.00	22558.00	19445.00	21480.00	31606.00
Unemployment Benefit	23.10	24.10	11.40	0.00	13.46
Food Stamp	57.38	59.14	27.27	14.29	42.31
Housing Loan	5.93	6.24	2.27	0.00	1.92
Others Type of Grants	0.94	0.94	0.00	0.00	1.92

5. Other Indicators of Quality of Life

We considered having the drawing room suite, refrigerator, wall clock, radio, black and white television, colour television, sewing machine, petrol lamp, bye-cycle, motor cycle and table clock as other indicators of living standards. Percentages of holders of these assets in each ethnicity are reported in Table 6.

TABLE 6
Domestic Goods and Appliances

Indicators	Percentage				
	Overall	Sinhalese	St. Tamil	Indian Tamil	Muslims
Drawing Room Suite	17.72	17.40	4.50	0.00	36.50
Refrigerator	3.10	3.05	2.27	0.00	7.69
Wall Clock	57.20	56.53	45.45	85.71	78.85
Radio	76.70	77.20	59.09	71.43	76.92
TV, Black and White	15.23	15.09	15.91	28.60	17.30
TV, Colour	4.52	4.06	2.27	0.00	19.23
Sewing Machine	29.33	29.61	15.91	0.00	38.46
Petrol Lamp	18.10	18.94	15.91	14.29	1.92
Bicycle	21.48	22.06	6.82	14.29	21.15
Motorcycle	3.64	3.77	0.00	0.00	3.85
Table Clock	5.73	5.73	2.27	0.00	9.62

Altogether, the total number of development indicators included in this study are twenty-seven. There are three indicators of income and employment, four for municipally provided services, five for housing, four for government grants and aid and eleven for use of domestic appliances.

The study is based on a sample of 1500 households covered in 'General and Households Survey' of rural areas of Sri Lanka carried out by 'Waterloo'⁴ in June 1991 for the water and sanitation project of the World Bank.

The sample was drawn following a multi stage stratified random sampling technique. The first stage of stratification was the districts. The district is an administrative unit in Sri Lanka. Three district's were selected for the survey and total samples was distributed among these three districts equally. In the second stage, within each district the sample was assigned to villages in proportion to their population. Finally, a systematic random sampling was followed.

IV. METHODOLOGY FOR RANKING AND RESCALING THE DATA

The simple numerical procedure in establishing ranks of ethnic groups is the summation across indicators of standardized scores in each indicator. This technique is referred to as the Z-Sum technique and is described as follows :

$$(Z - \text{Sum})_j = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{x_{ij} - x_i}{s_i} \quad 4$$

Where, n = Number of indicators,

x_i = Mean value of i th indicator.

s_i = Standard deviation of i th indicator

x_{ij} = Average value of i th indicator in j th ethnicity.

The highest the Z-Sum for a particular ethnicity the more developed it is in relation to other ethnicities. The basic problem with this technique is that it assign equal weights to all indicators.

Before computation of Z-scores and transforming the data into normalized scale, we rescaled some variables on suitable basis. We want to get all variables in such a form that their higher values show a positively effect. So, we used employment rate instead by unemployment rate and equality co-efficeint instead by inequality co-efficeint.

$$\text{So, } E = 1 - u \quad (5)$$

$$\text{So, } E = 1 - u \quad (5)$$

$$EQ = 1 - gini \quad (6)$$

Where, E = Percentage of employed population out of labour force.

U = Rate of unemployed as defined by equation (3).

EQ = Index of equality in income.

Gini = Gini - coefficient as defined by equation (1).

For capturing the impacts of housing typology of the overall development ranking we converted to housing typology into numeric scale. For this purpose we take some arbitrary weights for each type of housing. We assumed a type, 'A' of house is equal to 3 in numeric form; a type, 'B' of house is equal to 2 and a type 'C' of house is equal to 1. The other lower categories of the houses not included in development ranking. The housing typology by ethnic groups are shown in Table 4.

V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Table 7 gives the magnitude of the Z-Sum for the ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, included in this study. In overall, Muslim is top one and St. Tamil is most backward ethnic group.⁵ However, in the interpretation of the results it is considerable that Muslims are only four per cent of the total sample. So, on the basis of small sample results may be biased. So, in this analysis, we may conclude that Sinhalese are socially and economically more developed than Tamils. The major deterioration in St. Tamils is due to income inequality. In Tamils it is lower than other ethnic groups. So, it imply that income distribution patterns within the Tamils is not a cause of their under development.

TABLE 7
Development Ranking of Ethnic Groups

Ethnicity	Z - SUM _j	Rank
Sinhalese	10.061	2
St. Tamil	16.449	4
Indian Tamil	12.028	3
Muslims	18.416	1

The other important conclusion from this exercise is that all the publicly provided services — water, electricity, governmental grants and aids — show

a large disparity between most privileged and less privileged ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. This assertion is obtained from Appendices.

Based on the evidences presented in this paper, it is quite clear that economic factors have played an important role in affecting national and ethnic consciousness and there is indeed 'national' economic exploitation which is manifested in varying forms and in the varying degrees. It must be realized, however, that there are numerous other factors which have contributed significantly to national consciousness and to movements for national rights in South Asia. An important aspect of the ethnic discords observed by Stanley (1990) is that in such discords poor classes and workers play effective role, while, middle classes and bureaucrats involved to provide a base for (propaganda). Moreover, in such riots, students, peoples of working class and transporters are involved in all the cases. So, it is not a purely economic problem.

In fact, problem of disparities in economic development between ethnic groups in Sri Lanka is also a socio-political rather than purely economic and, therefore, requires political will to resist policies visibly in conflict with their economic structures. Socio-polical factors should not be treated as 'Sensitive' in the field of economic research. Rather socio-political and socio-logical perspectives to economic problems in the disparities of level of development between ethnic groups in Sri Lanka should be highlighted. This would help to classify the true dimensions of the problem and the nature of policy implications which would facilitate the process of development.

The economic outlook for the immediate future will be determined largely by the success with which the government can handle socio-political pressure. There are, fortunately, signs that political violence may be abating. Taking this as a window of opportunity, the government has set out to implement measures to remove constraints to growth, hoping that the future of the country has started to emerge. But, this optimism has to be guarded carefully as the tasks ahead remains, enormous for the government to sustain the political stability and the pace of economic reforms.

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2. Tamils and Sinhalese are two major ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Both the groups are culturally different and have separate historical backgrounds. Tamils want an independent state in North-East part of the country. Due to a demand for Tamils independent state, the ethnic discord of Sri Lanka called by 'Tamil's Problem'.
3. *Amnesty International Report 1990*, p. 218.
4. The data for the study extracted from the survey questionnaire of the 'Waterloo', a Canadian consultancy firm (data were collected for water and sanitation project of World Bank).
5. It is notable that all the three districts — included in this study — belong to South and West of Sri Lanka, where Sinhalese are in majority. It may be possible that in North-East — where Tamils are in majority — results be different.

Housing Typology

SERIAL NUMBER	WALL PLASTERED /UN-PLASTERED	WALL-TYPE	ROOF-TYPE	HOUSE TYPED AS
1	PLASTERED	A	A	A
2	UN-PLASTERED	A	A	A
3	PLASTERED	A	B	B
4	PLASTERED	A	C	B
5	PLASTERED	B	A	B
6	PLASTERED	B	B	B
7	PLASTERED	C	A	B
8	UN-PLASTERED	A	B	B
9	UN-PLASTERED	B	A	B
10	PLASTERED	A	D	C
11	PLASTERED	A	E	C
12	PLASTERED	B	C	C
13	PLASTERED	C	B	C
14	PLASTERED	D	A	C
15	UN-PLASTERED	A	C	C
16	UN-PLASTERED	B	B	C
17	UN-PLASTERED	C	A	C
18	PLASTERED	B	D	D
19	PLASTERED	C	C	D
20	UN-PLASTERED	A	D	D
21	UN-PLASTERED	A	E	D
22	UN-PLASTERED	B	C	D
23	UN-PLASTERED	C	B	D
24	PLASTERED	D	B	D
25	UN-PLASTERED	D	A	D
26	PLASTERED	B	E	E
27	PLASTERED	C	D	E
28	PLASTERED	C	E	E
29	PLASTERED	D	C	E
30	PLASTERED	D	D	E
31	UN-PLASTERED	B	D	E
32	UN-PLASTERED	D	B	E
33	PLASTERED	D	E	F
34	UN-PLASTERED	C	C	F
35	UN-PLASTERED	C	D	F
36	UN-PLASTERED	D	C	F
37	UN-PLASTERED	B	E	G
38	UN-PLASTERED	C	E	G
39	UN-PLASTERED	D	D	H
40	UN-PLASTERED	D	E	H

Typology of House-Wall

SERIAL NUMBER	MATERIAL USED IN CONSTRUCTION OF WALLS	WALL-TYPE
1	CEMENT PLUS ANY OTHER KIND OF MATERIAL	A
2	CORREGATED SHEET PLUS ANY OTHER EXCEPT CEMENT	B
3	BRICKS PLUS ANY OTHER EXCEPT CEMENT AND CORREGATED SHEET	C
4	ANY OTHER MATERIAL EXCEPT CEMENT BRICKS AND CORREGATED SHEET	D

Typology of House - Roof

SERIAL NUMBER	MATERIAL USED IN CONSTRUCTION OF WALLS	WALL-TYPE
1	CONCRATE PLUS ANY OTHER	A
2	FLAT TILES PLUS ANY OTHER EXCEPT CONCRATE	B
3	ROUNDED TILES PLUS ANY OTHER EXCEPT PLAT TILES AND CONCRATE	C
4	ASBESTOS OR CORREGATED SHEET PLUS ANY OTHER EXCEPT CONCRATE, FLATE FILES AND ROUNDED TITLES	D
5	ANY OTHER MATERIAL EXCEPT CONCRATE, FLAT TILES, ROUNDED TILES, ASBESTOS AND CORREGATED SHEET	E

Z - Scores

Serial Number	Indicators	Sinhales	St. Tamils	Indian Tamils	Muslims	Maximum Z-Score
1	House Owners (%)	1.084	-1.007	-0.989	0.912	1.084
2	House Area (Sq. Ft.)	0.506	-1.042	-0.853	1.389	1.389
3	Houshold Income (Annual/Rs.)	-0.261	-0.929	-0.492	1.681	1.681
4	Drawing Room Suite	0.198	-0.713	-1.031	1.546	1.546
5	Refrigerator	-0.072	-0.351	-1.163	1.587	1.587
6	Wall Clock	-0.620	-1.299	1.170	0.749	1.170
7	Radio	0.823	-1.645	0.037	0.785	0.823
8	TV, Black and white	-0.756	-0.606	1.714	-0.352	1.714
9	TV, Colour	-0.309	-0.546	-0.846	1.700	1.700
10	Sewing Machine	0.592	-0.350	-1.444	1.201	1.201
11	Petrol Lamp	0.953	0.485	0.235	-1.674	0.953
12	Bicycle	0.975	-1.510	-0.292	0.827	0.975
13	Motorcycle	0.979	-1.000	-1.000	1.021	1.021
14	Table Clock	0.364	-0.587	-1.211	1.434	1.434
15	Unemployment Benifit (%)	1.387	-0.098	-1.431	0.143	1.387
16	Food Stamp (%)	1.396	-0.506	-1.281	0.391	1.396
17	Housing Loan (%)	1.601	-0.149	-1.150	-0.303	1.601
18	Others Type of Grants (%)	0.283	-0.900	-0.900	1.517	1.517
19	Availability of Clean Water	-0.818	0.252	1.529	-0.964	1.529
20	Electricity in House	-0.250	-0.816	0.629	1.696	1.696
21	Electricity in Village	-0.731	-0.650	-0.332	1.713	1.713
22	Type (1) Houses (%)	1.732	-0.577	-0.577	-0.577	1.732
23	Type (2) Houses (%)	1.732	-0.577	-0.577	-0.577	1.732
24	Type (3) houses (%)	-0.078	-0.732	0.846	1.656	1.656
25	Water Conection Payers (%)	1.717	-0.702	-0.659	-0.356	1.717
26	Employment Ratio	-0.990	-0.352	-0.327	1.670	1.670
27	Income Equility	-1.377	0.457	1.318	-0.398	1.318

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The Origin, Growth and Composition of Muslim Population in Bengal : A Review of Different Explanations

MUHAMMAD MAHBUB ULLAH

INTRODUCTION

Many contradictory explanations are sought by historian and census authors with regard to the origin, growth and composition of Muslim population in Bengal. Due to the prevalence of contradictory explanations, it has become difficult for contemporary writers to bring out an objective explanations of the historical causes of the origin and growth of Muslim population in Bengal. Keeping this problem in view, this article attempts, first, to assimilate and narrate the process of Muslim settlements and their growth and composition in Bengal from historical standpoint, and second, to review and clarify the different explanations of the causes of the sudden growth of Muslim population in Bengal.

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF MUSLIM POPULATION IN BENGAL

Speaking historically, it is an undenying fact that the origin and the growth of Muslim population in Bengal was not a matter of a day or two but the result of a long process of gradual historical growth. History reveals that the first group of Muslims to step on the soil of Bengal were the Arabs who came to the coastal regions of Eastern India including Bengal through their commercial and sea faring activities from the 8th Century A.D.

Muhammad Mahbub Ullah, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Chittagong University, Bangladesh.

However, it is not still definitely known whether these Arab Muslim traders had penetrated into the land of Bengal from the aforesaid century. Stories about a number of Mahisawar and other Muslim Saints coming by sea and propagating religion during the pre-Muslim rule are popular in the country but it is difficult to examine their veracity or to fix the Saints to any definite chronology.¹ On the other hand, the uncharted history of Bengal's folklores and traditions revealed that the first contact of Islam with Bengal took place very early in the 8th and 9th Centuries A.D. through the Arab traders and missionaries. The Arab merchants seem to have collected precious forest products of Chittagong and Assam from the Chittagong Coastal line of the Bay of Bengal as their ships passed back and forth through it from Sandvip to Arakan, on the Asian trade route. It is revealed from history that Chittagong in Bengal became a small colony of Arab Muslim traders in the early *Hijrah* when the Arab traders used to often visit Bengal for reason of their eastern trading and commercial pursuits though the actual political conquest of Bengal by the Muslims took place much later by Ikhtiaruddin Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khilji in the early 13th Century.² From the travelling accounts and writings of Verthema, Barbosa, Caesar Frederick, Ralph Fitch and also of the Portuguese, it is revealed that Satgaon (Chittagong) and Hughli two sea-ports of Bengal coast became the places of influential community of the Muslim merchants and residents and many of them were Arabs. The Arab became a fairly influential community in Bengal in the later part of the 15th Century and this made possible the establishment of an Arab dynasty on the throne, in person of Saiyid Ata-al-Din Hussain Shah (1493-1517 A.D.). Bengal became the place for habitation of Muslims of all nationalities with its political conquest by Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji in 1201 A.D.

It would be unwise and unrealistic to go for explaining the origin, growth and composition of Muslim population in Bengal without taking due consideration of the characteristics of the Muslims of the whole sub-continent of India. This is because of the fact that the Muslim population of Bengal was largely composed, derived and followed from the Muslim community of India as a whole. From the time of Sultan Mahmood Ghazni down to the accession of Emperor Jahangir the Muslims of Hindustan had developed into a partially indianized heterogenous community around the small nucleus of foreign conquerors and immigrants of diverse races, the Arab and the Afghan, the Turk and Turkoman, the Mughals and the Mongoloid Tatar.³

Though the Muslim community of India was in reality a composite community having within its fold representatives of races from all over the Muslim world and native converts especially of Hindus of all grades. In the

17th Century the Muslims from outside Hindustan were predominantly Turks, Afghans and Persians with a sprinkling of Abyssinians and Arabs. The foreigners were divided into two main groups — the Turani and Irani. Broadly speaking, under the heading of Mussalmans, may include two types of people : one, whose ancestors had, as a result of the steady flow of foreign immigration poured down upon the Indian soil and made it their new home; and second, the native converts to Islam who were called *Nau-Muslims*. The Bengal Muslims too, in the context of their composition, have originated from this two basic trends, viz. the foreign settlers and the native converts. These two categories of people gradually became least distinguishable and they comprised, what may be called, the Muslim masses both in the context of India in general and Bengal in particular.

The gradual increase and province-wise uneven distribution of Muslim population in India is shown in India Census of 1921.

TABLE I
Province-wise Distribution of Muslim Population in India, 1921

Province	Number	Percentage
Madras	2,840,488	6.74
Bombay	3,820,153	19.74
Bengal	25,210,802	54.00
U.P.	6,481,032	14.28
Punjab	11,444,321	55.33
Bihar and Orissa	3,690,182	10.85
Central Province and Berar	553,574	4.05
Assam	2,202	28.96
North West Frontier Province	2,062,786	91.62

Source : *Census of India, India Part II, p. 43.*

In Table 1, it is found that Muslim population constituted one fifth of the total population of India and in the context of Bengal, Muslim population became predominant by constituting 54 per cent of the total population of Bengal.

In Bengal, the great majority of the Muslims were peasants, in origin, probably low-caste Hindus, and were bunched in the northern, Central and Eastern districts of the province. They were also half, 47.3 per cent in Central Bengal, 59.8 per cent in Northern Bengal, 69.9 per cent in Eastern Bengal and a mere 13.4 per cent in Western districts.⁴

Divisions among Muslims were reflected in their economic and educational status. The vast majority of Bengali Muslims were peasants. Among the ordinary cultivators, they were almost double the number of Hindus, but among the Landlords there were nearly twice as many Hindus as Muslims.⁵

The Muslims around the world gradually entered this land (in Bengal) as governors, administrators, generals, soldiers, missionaries, teachers, traders, and fortune seekers. The early Arabs who came to Bengal were mostly the traders, *Sufia* and missionaries. Though the early Muslim community of Bengal was mostly composed of foreign immigrants, their century long spread of Islamization by the *Sufia* and missionaries, the volume of Muslim population increased at a faster rate by conversion of natives (mostly Hindus and Buddhists) to Islam. The accounts of the foreign travellers, such as Varthema and Barbosa also give an idea that a large number of Persian merchants lived in the port and cities of Bengal.⁶ The Persian officers became the part of Muslim administration from the beginning of Muslim rule in Bengal. Due to Mughal invasion of Persian territories, it is learnt that many Persians left the country and went to Hindustan and few of them came to Bengal. A considerable number of Persians were introduced in Bengal with the conquest of Bengal by the Mughals. The Nawabs of Murshidabad were Persians and during their time, due to their patronization, a large number of Persians came to Bengal as officers, generals, soldiers, scholars, teachers and physicians.

Another composition of Muslim population in Bengal were the Abyssinians who were introduced in this country mostly as slaves. It is learnt that Barbak Shah had at one time in his service eight thousand Negro slaves, well, mounted and armed, and finding them faithful and attached to him, he promoted several of them to high ranks and responsible offices.⁷ As a result of these promotions their influence increased so much that they had succeeded in establishing a dynasty that ruled Bengal for a few years.

It is conjectured from historical evidence that the Turkoman Muslims must have come to Bengal in large numbers along with its conqueror Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji. Evidence suggested that Khilji must have left behind a considerable force under his chiefs, in the way of his conquest of Bengal, to control over the newly acquired territories of North and West Bengal and to conquest such territories as Jajnapur and others. Gradually these Turkoman Muslims, continued to pour into Bengal with every new governor and chief. The wives and children of the Turkoman soldiers who fell in the

Tibet expedition, reviled the adventurous general Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji, holding him responsible for the loss of their husbands and fathers.⁸

The Afghans came to Bengal as soldiers in the army of the Turkoman generals and rulers. The Habshi Sultan Muzaffar Shah, it is learnt, had a few thousand Afghans in his army. In the reign of Sultan Hussain Shah, a body of Afghan soldiers are found in his service.⁹

With regard to the composition of Mughal population in Bengal, it is learnt that many of the Mughal officers and soldiers were serving and living in this province for two or three generations from the time of Emperor Akbar. Mirza Nathan informs that some officers including the author himself built bungalows in Jessore. It is learnt from *Akbarnama* that Emperor Akbar liberally granted *Jagirs* to the officers and soldiers in Bengal.

Thus it appears from historical evidences that the early Muslim population in Bengal composed of different racial affiliations — Arab, Persian, Turk, Mughal, Afghan, Abyssinian and others — who came to Bengal and settled there at different times. But with the passage of time, the Muslim population in Bengal started composing of local converts. This conversion of native to Islam was the main cause behind the growth of Muslim population into a majority community in Bengal in the later half of the 19th and first half of the 20th Century.

CAUSES OF GROWTH OF MUSLIM MAJORITY IN BENGAL

To understand the growth of Bengali Muslim population over the different historical periods and the causes of its preponderance, it is required to know their structural composition both in relation to their proportion to the immigrant Muslims and the native converts. From historical data, it is observed that Bengal gradually became one of the places for Muslim dominance on the Indian sub-continent much before than it was politically conquered by the Muslims. The fact of Muslim majority in Bengal had agitated the minds of scholars of the country since the observance of the trend of Muslim majority and dominance in Bengal. The growth of Muslim majority in Bengal was a surprising historical fact to the authors of the census reports of India. It appeared from the census figures of 1901 that Delhi, Agra and other places of Northern India which and long been the centers of Muslim rule and culture, the Muslim population is represented by only a fraction of the total population, whereas it appeared that in Bengal, Muslim population is figured by 41 per cent of the total population.¹⁰ This was a contrary finding to the expectation of the census authors and thus the question of the Muslim majority

in Bengal puzzled the English administrators since 1872 when the first regular census was held in India. H. Beverly and H.H. Risely came up to explain the cause of Muslim majority in Bengal by relating the fact of conversion of low caste natives to Islam and their views dominated the minds of the administrators and writers. Beverly wrote :

"But probably the real explanation of immense preponderance of the Mussalman religious element in this portion of the delta (Bengal) is to be found in the conversion to Islam of the immense low castes (the Chandals and Rajbansis), which occupied it."¹¹

Beverly found close resemblance between the Mussalmans and their fellow countrymen, the low caste of the Hindus in support of the contention of his view. He stated in favour of strengthening his argument that there is a close resemblance in identity of physique and similarity of manners and customs between the Mussalmans and their fellow countrymen, the low caste of the Hindus.¹² From an anthropological examination of 185 low class Muslims (mostly jailed of East Bengal), H. Risely showed, on the basis of their nasal index, that the Muslims of Bengal were converted from the Chandals, Pods, Rajbansis and others.¹³

Mr. F. Rubbie objected to the contention of Beverly and H. Risely. He opined that this view as biased and unfounded on the ground that it was intentionally done to lower down the prestige of the Bangali Muslims by relating their genealogy to the lower class Hindus. According to him, Muslim population of Bengal was in a large measure descended from those who came there as teachers, preachers, officials and soldiers from all over the Muslim world during the five and a half centuries of Muslim rule in the area.¹⁴

But from the objective assessment of historical data both the views appeared as extremes. It is historically true and was obvious that the Muslim population in India including Bengal, in its early composition, was absolutely composed of the foreign immigrants of different races and professions. And it was also true and obvious that this early foreign composition could not and did not make Muslim population in Bengal a majority community. The massive conversion of the natives, definitely added the volume of Muslim population and their preponderance in Bengal.¹⁵ In support of historico-situational relevance and also in support of the census data, there is no denying the fact that the local conversion played a very dominant rule in swelling the ranks of the Muslims in Bengal.¹⁶

To what extent conversion was intensively working in making the Muslim community a majority one in Bengal, by surpassing the Hindu community can easily be guessed from the trend of enormous growth of Muslim population found in the census reports from 1872 to 1891. The census reports during British rule, beginning from 1872 revealed very important fact with regard to the Muslim population of Bengal. These reports revealed that there was an enormous increase of the numbers of Bangali Muslims during the period of the British rule in this country. In the Census Report of 1891, C.J.O. Donnel observes, "In 1872 Muhammadans were merely half a million less numerous than the Hindus in Bengal proper. Now (1891 A.D.) they surpass them (Hindus) by million and a half."¹⁷ In 1872 Hindus were 16.8 million and the Muslim were 16.3 million. In 1891, the Hindus recorded 18 million, while the Muslims numbered 19.5 million. Islam has gained 100 persons in Western Bengal — on the average 157 persons in the whole of Bengal proper."¹⁸

It appears from the census figures of India that the rate of the growth of Muslim population was higher than the Hindus in India, higher still in Bengal, and the highest in Eastern Bengal. Beside conversion to Islam, this higher growth rate in Muslim community was also responsible for making the Muslim community a majority one in Bengal in 1891.¹⁹ The factors which were responsible for higher growth rate in the Muslims of Bengal were the early marriage, widow marriage and practice of polygamy. These were responsible for high fecundity and high fertility in the Muslim community. In demographic figures of Bengali Muslims, these factors were quite apparent as shown in the different census reports of Bengal. Mr. J.A. Ves, quoting the census report of 1901, says :

"The Muhammadan population is growing at a relatively much greater rate than the Hindus. This is not due to conversions, of which very few are recorded. The greater fecundity of the Muhammadans is explained by the prevalence of polygamy and widow marriage the lesser inequality between the age of husband and wife (due to early marriage), the greater meritoriousness of dietary and their greater material prosperity."²⁰

J. A. Ves is very much correct in identifying the socio-demographic causes of high growth rate in the Muslim community of Bengal appeared in the census of 1891. But he undermined the role of conversion which acted as a dominant factor in outnumbering the Muslims to the Hindus in Bengal.

Regarding the background of the converted Muslims in Bengal, a considerable portion is found to be represented by mixed blood and converts from the Hindu community. Although the conversion took place intensively

from the lower class, there were conversions from the upper caste Hindus too.²¹ It is evident from history that quite a large number of the Brahmins and Kayasthas were recruited to Muslim society, so that the Bengali Muslims represented a certain portion by the people whose ancestors belonged to the aristocracy of the Hindu community. But the overwhelming portion of the converted Muslims were Hindus and Buddhists who flocked to Islam to escape from the persecution of the Brahminical Hindu society. The authors of the census reports assigned two causes which resulted in the conversion of the non-Muslims to Islam; one was the force and the other was the caste system.

Baverley says :

"The Muhammadans were ever ready to make conquest with the Qur'an as with the sword. Under Sultan Jalaluddin (Jadu), for instance, it is said that the Hindus were persecuted almost to extermination. The exclusive caste system of Hindu again naturally encouraged the conversion of the lower orders from a religion, under which they were no better than despised outcastes, to one which recognized all men as equals."²²

The accusation of forcible conversion is baseless and unwarranted. It is historically unfounded that the Muslims used force to gain converts to higher faith. The real cause of the spread of Islam in Bengal was its great inherent quality which fascinated the Hindus and Buddhists to be converted to gain justice, status and respectability in society from that of degradation and persecution of humanity under casteism.

The problem of conversion to Islam in India is found to be discussed in detail and explained with objectivity by Richard M. Eaton in his paper *Approaches to the Study of Conversion to Islam*. He has elaborately discussed and explained the three basic but inadequate prevailing theories of conversion to Islam in India. These three theories are : the religion of sword theory, the political patronage theory, and the theory of social liberation.²³ By a careful and objective evaluation of these three theories, Eaton has emphasized the theory of social liberation as more conditionally relevant in the explanation of the massive conversion to Islam that took place in Bengal. Contrary to Hindu casteism, Islam was fundamentally based on egalitarianism. This egalitarian approach to life preached by *Sufia* and *Saints* in Bengal attracted the lower class Hindu population in a large scale to convert themselves from Hinduism to Islam to escape social persecution of Hinduism on the one hand and enjoy social liberation of Islam on the other. Thus it appears that conversion played an important role in swelling the Muslim population in Bengal. This process of

swelling of Muslim population was further accentuated by demographic variables.

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10. *Census of India*, 1901, Vol. I, Part. 1, pp. 66-69 and 384.
11. *Census of Bengal, 1872*, p. 132.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Khondker Fuzli Rubbie, *The Origin of the Mussalmans of Bengal*, Messers Thacker Spink & Co., Calcutta, 1895.
15. However it should not mean that the process of native conversion to Islam in Bengal was limited to the lower caste Hindus and Buddhists alone. Conversion also took place from upper castes also. But it was very insignificant compared to the massive conversion of low castes. The figures from different census reports of British Bengal confirm this truth.
16. Professor Abdul Karim recognized this conversion as an important factor in the spread of Islam in Bengal and in this regard he emphasized the role of the Sultan, Muslim Scholars and the *Sayfa* in the growth of Muslim society in Bengal. Abdul Karim, *op.cit.* Chapter III.
17. *Census of Bengal, 1891*, Vol. II, p. 2.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

20. J.A. Ves, *District Gazetteer, Raipur*, 1911, p.2.

21. According to Hindu tradition, Shams-ul-Din Ilyas Shah, the Bengali Sultan, married a beautiful Brahmin widow, who was named Phulmati Begum. The Sultan, had several sons by Hindu wife — N.K. Bhattasali, *Coins and Chronology of the Early Independent Sultans of Bengal*, Cambridge, 1922, p. 83. It is known from poet Mohammad Khan that his great ancestor Mahisawar married a Brahmin girl. By this marriage Mahisawar left behind an illustrious family which produced some distinguished governors and generals of the time of the Ilyas Shahi and Hussain Shahi Sultans. Abdul Karim, "Bangla Prachin Puthir Vivarana," *Bangiya Shahitya Parishad Patrika*, Pt. I. Add., B.S. 1310, p.159.

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Institutional Processes and Practices of Administrative Accountability : Role of the *Jatiyo Sangshad* (Parliament) in Bangladesh

SALAHUDDIN AMINUZZAMAN

INTRODUCTION

Public accountability is at the crux of the ideals and clamour for a responsible government. Nevertheless, the present level of understanding of the concept of accountability is marked by noticeable ambiguities (Trivedi, 1984). The state of the practice of accountability is best described by 'ineffectual enforcement.' Amidst the growing disillusionment of the world, the people have increasingly demanded their rightful share in public decision-making particularly in areas that directly affect them. The situation has drawn keen interest on the part of the academics to study the subject matter beyond the theoretic of the politicians and the formalism of existing structures (Page; 1985).

This paper initiates a modest attempt to examine the concept of public accountability in an institutional approach keeping in view the role of the parliament. More precisely this researcher has examined the pattern of the parliamentary questions and the modalities of the functions of some selected parliamentary committees of the *Jatiyo Sangshad*—the National Parliament of Bangladesh.

The first section of the paper presents a conceptual framework on the dimensions and issues related to public accountability. Section second presents a brief overview on the public administration system and mechanism of

Salahuddin Aminuzzaman, Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.

governance in Bangladesh. Finally, third section of the paper presents the empirical findings of the study.

I

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF ACCOUNTABILITY

In any democratic society, administrative set up in power always commensurate with responsibilities and the holders of public offices are accountable to people for their administrative and political decisions. Public officials exercise legitimate authority and power with them through constitutional and political means. Nevertheless there are lots of questions that are still to be satisfactorily answered as regards to the role of public officials and the means and instruments to regulate and control the increasingly expanding public bureaucracy. Thus problems of administrative accountability of public officials have received substantial attention in the recent literature of public administration (Maheshwari, 1983).

The most comprehensive as well as classic definition of administrative accountability is given by L.D. White. He defined it as "the total sum of the constitutional, statutory, administrative and judicial rules and precedents and the established practices by means of which public officials may be held accountable for their official actions" (White, 1949 : 145)

Public bureaucracy in effect is the main instrument responsible for translating the political will of the executive and the legislative branch into concrete deeds, government bureaucracies wield control over, and have at their disposal, tremendous amount of authority, material, human and temporal resources, and information. These inputs are to be transformed into public goods and services, or put to use in the exercise of the state's power to regulate the manner through which these goods and services are produced. The danger of bureaucracies subverting the political will through their misuse, abuse or even nonuse of their delegated administrative authority has been widely acknowledged. Public bureaucracies' greatest value in the complex and tedious process of governance lies in their inherent capacity for efficiency, continuity, stability and order. Bureaucracies' predictability, however, is also a source of an inherent weakness in a democratic setting where efficiency must be reconciled with the need for responsiveness, negotiations and compromises. The recognition of the potential contradictions between bureaucracies as efficient means and the democratic ends which they must serve has laid to more explicit definition of the rationale for holding them accountable for this power.

Romzek and Dubnick (1987) present an elaborate typological framework of accountability considering source and degree of control as major parameters. (Figure 1) In their typological approach Romzek and Dubnick start with the most common control oriented approach called bureaucratic accountability.

FIGURE 1
Typology of Accountability System

DEGREE OF CONTROL	SOURCE OF CONTROL	
	Internal	External
	High	Bureaucratic
Low	Professional	Institutional/Political

Source : Adapted from Barbara B. Romzek and Melvin J. Dubnick.

Bureaucratic Accountability is defined as the conventional process oriented rule bound approach whereby the members of the public administration are controlled and regulated by set rules, procedures, conventions and past examples. It is characterized by strict supervisor and subordinate relationships within the given hierarchical set up and the standardization of process or outcomes.

Professional Accountability : This type of accountability is "characterized by placement of control over organizational activities in the hands of the employee with the expertise or special skills to get the job done." It emphasizes on the deference to experts internal to the organization whose actions are governed by professional standards inculcated through education and training. This form of accountability relies heavily upon the training of the professional and that individual's interpretation of professional ethics.

Legal Accountability : It is based upon relationship between autonomous groups, the regulators and the regulatee. Prevention of errors is entirely dependent upon the willingness of the individual or the organization to comply with the rules and the threat of sanctions if non compliance is detected.

Institutional Accountability : It is based upon a relationship between the organization and external constituents. This form of control is characterized by responsiveness to a constituency. The degree of control is low, and action is corrective rather than preventive. If the constituents are not happy with actions of their representative they may try to change the representation.

Institutional Accountability is a broader concept than simply the responsibility of elected political representatives to the electorate; it covers any case in which the individual or individuals who control an organization are elected or appointed by a constituent group, with tenure dependent upon maintaining the confidence of that group. Romzek and Dubnick have termed it as 'Political Accountability.'

All four types of accountability therefore depend, at least in part, upon the subjective, and internalized standards of the individuals whose actions are to be controlled. It has long been recognized that bureaucratic accountability is considerably more effective if it rests upon a set of standards and values internal to the organization, its 'corporate values' and culture, communicated through training and indoctrination and reinforced by bureaucratic rules and supervision.

In the most simplest sense to be accountable means to be answerable to a superior or to an authority or to be liable to be called to account for one's conduct and administrative or managerial behaviour and actions. In the context of public administration accountability therefore involves three types of basic questions and each having empirical and normative dimension. These are : (i) To whom are public officials accountable? (ii) In terms of what general goals and standards are they accountable? (iii) By what means are they made accountable?

In terms of what general goals and standard are the public officials accountable? This is an all encompassing question and indicates towards several dimensions of accountability. One most common aspect is the range of broad organization-based goals that are formally mandated. Another involves criteria that apply to all agencies, such as standards of financial accountability, personal honesty and efficiency and adherence to organizational principles and rules. Yet another includes codes that the professionals in particular fields are expected to follow regardless to the organization in which they work. There are different approaches towards the question of what should be the standard of accountability (Jabbara and Dwivedi, 1989). One school of authors advocate that there should be very strict and close control over staff behaviour by administratively superiors and by the legislative bodies using detailed rules. While other group of scholars place substantial reliance on professionalism, with officials having wide discretion that is structured by internalized standard of behaviour and based on technical knowledge and competence and basic social and community values. Yet others argue that bureaucracy should be accountable for : (i) Making laws work as intended with minimum of wastage

and delay, (ii) Exercising lawful, and sensible administrative discretion, (iii) Recommending new policies and programme changes in existing policies as needed, and (iv) Enhancing citizen confidence in the administrative institutions.

Administrative accountability in its simplest functional sense therefore means the check and balance of the public officials and members of bureaucracy through appropriate legitimate means in terms of the followings :


1. Use of public funds and resources.
2. Decisions and administrative actions.
3. Public responsiveness to anticipated public needs.
4. Use of public authority and power.
5. Administrative behaviour/attitude/and dysfunctions.
6. Output and outcomes of any administrative decisions.

II

MACHINERIES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN BANGLADESH

This section of the paper orients the readers with the machineries of the government of Bangladesh. Figure 2 presents the structural-functional made-up of the Government of Bangladesh.

FIGURE 2
Machineries of Government in Bangladesh



PSC = Public Service Commission

C & A G = Comptroller and Auditor General

Constitutional Bodies

Executive : Under the Article 55 of the Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh, the executive authority of the republic vests with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is supported by a Cabinet having the Prime Minister at its Head and comprising also such other Ministers as the Prime Minister may from time to time designate. The Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to Parliament. All executive actions of the Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President.

Ministry : In addition to the President's and Prime Minister's Secretariat, at present there are 34 Ministries comprising of 40 Divisions. All the Ministries and Divisions are collectively known as Secretariat. There is practically no difference between a Ministry and a Division, except that a Ministry may be constituted with one or more Divisions. Thus a Ministry/Division, has been defined to be a self-contained administrative unit responsible for the conduct of business of the Government in a distinct and specified sphere.

A Minister may be assigned the charge of one or more Ministries by the Prime Minister. He is responsible for policy matters concerning his Ministry and for implementation thereof. He is also responsible for conducting the business of his Ministry in the Parliament.

The Secretary is the official head of the Ministry. He is responsible for the administration and discipline and for the proper conduct of the assigned business. He is also the principal accounting officer of the Ministry, its attached departments and sub-ordinate offices. He keeps the Minister in Charge informed of the working of the Ministry.

The Ministry is organized into number of working units called Sections. Group of Sections constitutes a Branch, a number of Branches form a Wing, which is a Sub-Division of a Ministry or Division. An Assistant Secretary is in charge of a Section, while Deputy Secretary and a Joint Secretary are in charge of a Branch and a Wing respectively. In some Ministries there are one or more Additional Secretaries depending on the volume of the work. The Additional Secretaries are made in charge of a Wing similar to the Joint Secretary.

The Secretary is in overall charge of a Ministry. The Additional Secretary and the Joint Secretary are entrusted with a well defined sphere of duty. Within their sphere, they are supposed to assume full responsibility and submit important cases direct to the Minister for orders. Such cases are returned to them through the Secretary. However, the Joint Secretaries, in actual practice, submit cases to the Ministers through the Secretaries.

The Deputy Secretary disposes of all cases in which no major question of policy is involved or which, under the rules or standing orders, he is allowed to dispose of. The Assistant Secretary disposes all cases where there are clear precedents, and no question of deviation from such precedents is involved.

Public administration system in Bangladesh is composed of conventional bureaucracy as well as the officials and staff of the public enterprise. Table 1 shows the distribution of the composition of public bureaucracy in Bangladesh.

TABLE I
Civil Officers and Staff of the Government of Bangladesh
(As of 1st January 1989)

Offices	Sanctioned	Actual	Vacant
Ministries and Divisions	8546	7807	739
Departments and Directorates	696055	634829	61226
Autonomous Bodies	325379	277945	47434
Grand Total	1029980	920581	109399

Source: *Statistics and Research Cell, Public Administration Computer Centre, Organization and Management Wing, Ministry of Establishment, 1989.*

III MODALITIES OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN BANGLADESH

In order to ensure public accountability, the Constitution of Bangladesh prescribes some specific institutional means. Such institutional means include the office of the Ombudsman, administrative tribunals, different constitutional bodies like the Public Service Commission. In reality, however, many of such bodies have hardly come into action. The office of the Ombudsman had never been constituted. The most striking feature of the administrative accountability in Bangladesh originates from the Article 134 of the Constitution. As per this article, all civil officials in Bangladesh are ultimately accountable to the President of the Republic. Article 134 of the Constitution clearly states that "except otherwise provided by the Constitution every person in the service of the Republic shall hold office during the pleasure of the President."

Observers have raised critical questions on the logic, spirit and application of such constitutional provision. Different Civil Service Associations in Bangladesh have always been skeptical about the Constitutional Article 134. Public officials have raised critical questions as to: How democratic is the said article? What is the true spirit of the article? Does it not

provide the political executive an upperhand in regulating the public officials in partisan line? In several public forums the civil officials strongly contested that such constitutional law have been used to curb the 'outsspoken' and 'independent' members of the bureaucracy. Political executives tend to take the advantage of the provision to streamline the bureaucracy in their respective partisan interest.

Parliament : *Jatiyo Sangshad*

The national legislature of Bangladesh is called the *Jatiyo Sangshad*. It is a 300-member single chamber house elected by direct adult franchise. There are 30 women members elected by the members of the Parliament. Every Minister irrespective of elected or not can sit in the Parliament and has right to speak. Non-elected Ministers, however, do not have the voting rights. The normal tenure of the *Jatiyo Sangshad* is of 5 years. An overview of the functioning of the four parliaments under study reveals that all three outgoing *Jatiyo Sangshads* could not survive till the end of their respective tenure, i.e., full five years term. Due to unstable political situations, crises in the ruling party and military coup, first three National Parliaments were dismantled long before their maturity.

One can therefore generally conclude that the Parliament as an institution of political and administrative accountability did not have a smooth sailing in the process of political governance in Bangladesh. Table 2 presents the distribution of the life span of the Parliaments.

TABLE 2
Tenure of Life of the Parliaments

Parliaments	Tenure	Sessions Held	No. of Laws Enacted
First Parliament	134 days	8	154
Second Parliament	206 days	8	65
Third Parliament	75 days	4	38
Fourth Parliament	168 days	7	142

It appears from the above table that none of these Parliaments survived upto the complete tenure. The Second Parliament has the highest survival period which is about 206 days. In practical terms the said Parliament had survived up to only about 12 per cent of its standard tenure. The Third Parliament survived only for 75 days. The second highest survival record is being maintained by the Fourth Parliament. The Fourth Parliament however does not have a popular image. The legitimacy of the existence of this

parliament is being questioned by the major opposition parties. All major political parties boycotted the parliamentary election held under the 'autocratic rule' of General Ershad. Though the regime in power claimed that about 56 per cent of the voters took part in the election, independent observers however have confirmed that hardly 4 to 5 per cent voters actually turned up at the voting booths.

It is also to be noted here that except the First Parliament, rest of the three parliaments in Bangladesh were constituted under Presidential form of Government. Though Bangladesh started with a Constitution that provided a parliamentary form of government, but the drastic constitutional changes of the Awami League government in 1975 brought in an One Party form of government with strong executive President. The Constitution was later reverted to multi-party system in 1978 but the presidential form of government remained as it was.

Parliamentary Questions

Whatever the form of the government, legislative questions become the most continuous and vocal method of the peoples representatives to exercise their scrutiny over the acts of omission and commission of the government as well as public bureaucracy. During the question hour in Parliament any member can ask any question seeking information on any matter. The Minister concerned, replies to these questions with the aid of the bureaucrats in his department. If the answer given does not satisfy the questioner, supplementary questions can also be asked to which Ministers are expected to give satisfactory replies. The main purpose of the question hour is to ventilate public grievances and to draw the attention of the people towards various drawbacks of the government.

According to the rules of procedures of the Parliament of Bangladesh a question must satisfy, along with others, the following conditions (*Bangladesh Parliament, 1988*):

1. It shall not contain arguments, inferences, ironical expressions, imputation, epithets or defamatory statements.
2. It shall not contain an expression of opinion on or the solutions of an abstract legal question or a hypothetical proposition.
3. It shall not refer to the character or conduct of any person except in his official or public capacity nor to the character or conduct which can be challenged only on a substantive basis.

4. It shall not ask for information on any matter under the control of bodies or persons not primarily responsible to the Government except where the Government has financial interests in such bodies or persons.
5. It shall not ask for information on matters under the consideration of a Committee of the house; nor shall it ask about the proceedings of such committees, unless such proceedings have been placed before the House by a report of the Committee.
6. It shall not raise questions of policy too large to be dealt with within the limits of an answer to a question.
7. It should not be trivial, vexatious, vague or meaningless.
8. It shall not ask for information regarding Cabinet discussion and any advice given to the President in relation to any matter in respect of which there is a constitutional, statutory or conventional obligation not to disclose information.
9. It shall not ordinarily ask for information on matters of past history.
10. It shall not ordinarily ask about matters pending before any statutory tribunal or statutory authority performing any judicial or quasi-judicial functions or any commission or court of enquiry appointed to inquire into, or investigate any matter, but may refer to matters concerned with procedure or subject or state of enquiry, if it is not likely to prejudice the consideration of the matter by the tribunal or commission or court of enquiry.
11. It shall not contain any reflection on the conduct of the President or of the Judges of the Supreme Court; or contain any criticism of the decisions of Parliament; or seek information about matters which are secret in the eye of law; or contain any reflection of a decision of a Court of Law or statutory tribunal established in Bangladesh or such remarks as are likely to prejudice a matter which is *subjudice*; or refer discourteously to a friendly foreign country; or amount in substance to a suggestion for a particular course of action.

Empirical Findings

We were primarily interested to see the pattern of questions put during the question and answer sessions of the *Jatiyo Sangshad*. An attempt has also been made to examine the role of some selected parliamentary committees in the process of ensuring public accountability in Bangladesh.

For methodological treatment we took 500 questions from each Parliament as samples. All these questions have been chosen at random from the Questions and Answer books compiled and printed by the Bangladesh Jatiyo Sangshad Secretariat. Sample questions were then classified in to three broad categories : (i) exploratory type; (ii) functional cum operational type; and (iii) accountability cum policy oriented.

Exploratory questions have been defined as those questions which are mere informative by nature and meets apparently the general inquisitiveness of the member of the Parliament concerned.

Functional cum Operational questions have been defined as those which attempt to identify the mode and process of operation of a specific government organization. Mere operational and functional matters are addressed by this category of parliamentary questions.

Accountability cum Policy Oriented questions have been defined as those questions which attempted to put explanatory answers from the government on specific public issues. These questions have raised more of *why than what*. These category of questions also includes the explanations on broad policy issues and indication on macro level domestic as well external matters of policy interest.

Table 3 presents the distribution of the nature and type of the sample questions that have been placed by the MPs irrespective of their party affiliation.

TABLE 3
Distribution of Types of Parliamentary Questions

Types of Questions	First Parliament		Second Parliament		Third Parliament		Fourth Parliament		Mean
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Exploratory	251	(50.20)	287	(57.40)	301	(60.20)	274	(54.80)	55.65
Functional cum/ Operational	201	(40.20)	179	(35.80)	153	(34.60)	133	(26.60)	34.30
Accountability cum/ Policy Oriented	48	(9.60)	34	(6.80)	26	(5.20)	93	(18.60)	10.50
Total	500	(100.00)	500	(100.00)	500	(100.00)	500	(100.00)	

An analysis of the parliamentary questions put by the MPs of all these four Parliaments under study reveals the following features :

- (i) On an average about 55.65 per cent of these questions are mere exploratory by nature; 34.30 per cent of the questions dealt with the day to day functional matters of the public bureaucracy. While only 10.05 per cent questions have raised some aspects of accountability of the public bureaucracy as well as policy issues related to the government actions.
- (ii) Further disaggregated distribution of the data also reveal that :
 - (a) The MPs of the third Parliament were more concerned with mere exploratory questions, while on the other hand the MPs of the first Parliament seem to have shown relatively less interest in those questions as compared to the other successive two Parliaments.
 - (b) As far as functional and operational type of questions are concerned, the MPs of first Parliament has shown relatively more interest as compared with others. Members of the fourth Parliament are found to be remarkably less concerned about these type of questions.
 - (c) In terms of policy issues cum accountability types of questions, though the fourth Parliament is considered 'illegitimate' and lacks popular support and credibility, MPs of this Parliament have shown their active concern. As high as 18.9 per cent of their questions dealt with accountability as well as policy issues. While in comparison such questions for the other parliaments never exceeded the 9.6 per cent limit.

A critical analysis of the Table 3 indicates some broad generalizations :

1. Parliamentary questions have not been very much pointed to the critical issues and problems that affect public life. Most of the questions have been too general and exploratory cum informative by nature. There have been practically no elements of accountability in those questions.
2. Though the fourth Parliament did not have popular support base and being considered as 'illegitimate' by the major opposition parties, the MPs of the said Parliament appeared to have taken their business altogether quite seriously. About 60 per cent of the MPs of the fourth Parliament are fresh and have no parliamentary experience whatsoever. Being the first timer they actively took part in the

business of the Parliament. One can say that the MPs of the fourth Parliament seemed to have played the 'copy book' role as members of Parliament. Possible reasons for such activism and interest could be explained as :

- (i) The MPs wanted to legitimize their role by being active and participative and thereby have tried to establish some sort of credibility to their respective constituencies.
- (ii) Being the first timer, inexperienced and relatively younger by age, most of these MPs were fairly open and enthusiastic in their process of learning the different aspects of parliamentary practices and behaviour.

Parliamentary Committees

In modern days public administration has become fairly technical and cumbersome. The National Parliament have neither the time nor even the specialized skills to overview the detail works of the various ministries and departments of the government. Thus the parliamentary committees have been evolved to act as watch-dog on public administration and government functioning. According to the constitutional provision (Article 76), the *Jatiyo Sangshad* appoints from its members some standing committees. Following are some of selected important committees that have direct bearings on the activities of the public administration system in Bangladesh.

1. Public Accounts Committee (PAC)
2. Committee On Estimates (COE)
3. Committee On Public Undertakings (COPU)
4. Committee On Government Assurances (COGA)

In addition to the above committees, according to the Constitutional provision Article 76, the Parliament also appoints several ministerial cum function specific parliamentary committees. Currently there are as many as 35 different ministerial cum function specific committees. However, for the purpose of this study the role of the following standing committees have been examined closely.

Public Accounts Committee

This is a fifteen-member committee that acts as the watch-dog of public accounts. It examines the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General. PAC

ensures that the "public expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it, and every appropriation has been made in accordance with provisions."

Committee On Estimates

This ten-member committee examines the estimates of different public offices. The function of the committee is to report "what economies, improvements in organization, efficiency or administrative reform, consistent with policy underlying the estimates, may be effected; suggest alternative policies in order to bring about efficiency and economy in administration, and examine whether the money is well laid within the limits of the policy implied in the estimates."

Committee On Public Undertaking

This committee also consists of ten members, and specifically examines the report and accounts submitted by the *COGA* on public undertakings. It examines the performance of the public undertakings and suggest for their functional improvements.

Committee On Government Assurances

This is a eight-member committee that scrutinizes the assurances, promises, undertakings, given by a Minister from time to time, on the floor of the house and report on the extent to which such assurances promises have been implemented.

TABLE 4
Distribution of Formation of the Selected Parliamentary Committee

	No. of times Committee ...				No. of Reports Prepared			
	1st Par.	2nd Par.	3rd Par.	4th Par.	1st Par.	2nd Par.	3rd Par.	4th Par.
PAC	1	2	-	1	-	1	-	2
COE	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
COPU	1	2	-	1	-	2	-	-
COGA	1	2	-	1	-	-	-	1
				Total	0	3	0	5

Note : (-) means the committee was not constituted or prepared any report.

The Table 4 presents the mode of activities of the selected parliamentary committees. It is clearly revealed from the table that during the tenure of 2.8 years term of the second Parliament all these committees except the committee of estimates were constituted twice. On the other hand first and fourth Parliament constituted these committees only for once. Surprisingly the third Parliament which had a life of 1.5 years did not at all constitute any of these vital committees that ensure public accountability.

All these parliamentary committees with the total effort of 125 MPs could only produce 8 reports over the almost nine years in office. A further analysis of the table also indicates that, out of 8 reports produced by the parliamentary committees only three have been prepared during the second Parliament, surprisingly the first parliament could not produce any report. While the third Parliament never constituted any of these respective committees. Interestingly, the so-called 'illegitimate' fourth Parliament, produced as many as 5 reports; 2 on public accounts, one each on committees of estimates, committees on public undertakings and committee of governmental assurance.

Based on the mode and extent of the function of the selected parliamentary committees in Bangladesh, one may tend to conclude that these committees did not work as effectively as it has been expected to be. What could be the possible reasons for such low profile activities of the parliamentary committees? We put this questions to some selected members of the Parliament. Following is the summary of their observations :

- (a) There are in general a noticeable lack of general interest, awareness and experience on the part of the members of Parliament on the different aspects of the parliamentary processes, rule and behaviour.
- (b) Party in power as well as the government showed least interest to the activities as well as the findings of these committees.
- (c) Most of these committees lack adequate formal authority.
- (d) These committees did not have resources and adequate supporting staff to carry out their routine activities.
- (e) Due to the installation of the residential form of government, these committees become more of a token as well as cosmetic bodies.

It has also formally been recorded in the reports of some of these committees that the committees did not receive enough institutional support to work as a viable body. Some of the committees' reports also indicated their

inabilities to work independently and effectively due to lack of information, appropriate logistic and administrative support from the ministries.

In summary, one may therefore broadly conclude that in general the *Jatiyo Sangshad* as a body could not play an effective watch-dog role to ensure public accountability in Bangladesh. The mode of the parliamentary questions were found to be merely informative and exploratory, sometimes too general and overlooked the critical dimensions of organization, management and behaviour of public administration system in Bangladesh. Different parliamentary committees also worked more in a casual fashion.

The above observations are not quite surprising for a country like Bangladesh. Since her independence, Bangladesh has undergone series of political ups and downs. Political instability and repeated interventions of the army never allowed the creation of a condition for smooth development of democratic governance in Bangladesh. During the last 19 years of her political history Bangladesh remained either under Martial Law or some form of guided democracy. Continuation of such authoritarian rule disturbed the pace and process of democratic governance.

A critical analysis of the political history would also indicate that the civil-military bureaucracy alliance did not allow the popularly elected democratic government to flourish. Even if a truly elected civil government assumes the political power in Bangladesh, under the current mode of alliance, it would need active support from the said alliance to remain in power.

Bureaucratic Accountability : An Interim Approach

Like many of the Third World countries, due to the inherent weak political institutions and turbulent political environment, public bureaucracy in Bangladesh almost always got an upperhand in the process of governance. Political leaders could never be able to effectively challenge the supremacy of the public bureaucracy. Public bureaucracy, being a *necessary evil*, thus to a great extent enjoyed some sort of 'free reign.' Although, there were some minor cosmetic change initiatives to curb the mammoth institution of bureaucracy but such initiatives faded away along with the down fall of the regime which initiated those reforms.

Considering the political reality and the administrative milieu of Bangladesh, this researcher thus proposes a composite approach which combines professional accountability and bureaucratic accountability. Attempts should be made to design appropriate professional and functional modes through which bureaucracy could be made self-accountable. One such

innovation could be the introduction of performance auditing along with the conventional financial auditing. Bureaucracy could be made somehow functionally accountable to the members of the public by developing administrative process manuals, rules and checklists.

It would indeed be very difficult to curb the dominance of the public bureaucracy overnight. Extent and level of political governance and strengths of the democratic institution which are the most critical preconditions for ensuring administrative accountability are still missing in Bangladesh. Given her political heritage, Bangladesh at this stage should now concentrate more on the development of the political institutions and modes and processes of democratic governance. As a strategic option political executives should not right away intervene or confront the sensitive aspects of administrative accountability in a radical fashion. Until and unless viable political institutions are developed, people in Bangladesh will have to temporarily make such political sacrifice and accept the mode of functional accountability of the public administration system which would perhaps partially ensure public sector efficiency and productivity.

The Ershad government fell and the new government under Begum Khalida Zia was formed. General Ershad was elected, but has not been able to play his role in the current political life. The latest efforts by Begum Zia were to make the country to bring it under the parliamentary system of government. The constitution was amended to change the Presidential System into one which conforms to really parliamentary pattern in form and spirit. It would be interesting to examine this subject in the light of new explosive and charged circumstances under a truly parliamentary democratic system. It would be happier development if the concept of the accountability is strengthened under the new set-up. The trend is more in this direction. But the political interference should not be considered as evidence of reinforcing the concept of administrative accountability. There is a strong need to keep the political actions within constitutional and other legal limits. A balance in the concept of accountability of the political leaders and the bureaucrats is vital if democracy is to function successfully.

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Impoverished Targets of Export Growth : A Note on SAARC Member Countries

DAVID LAW and TOSEEF AZID

Professor H. W. Singer concluded after reviewing the current book of Professor P. N. Mathur, *Why Developing Countries Fail to Develop*, that poverty becomes a necessary condition of export promotion. Professor Mathur's hypothesis is that every contemporary developing economy is trying to augment its foreign exchange earnings. For the fulfilment of this objective, the only way out for them is to make massive efforts in the graduation of their exports. One fundamental constituent for their striving is cheap labour. This is the only element that permits them to exchange the manufactured goods produced by instrumentality of imported techniques, machinery, and some times even raw materials, back to the countries from where the techniques, machinery and raw materials are imported. Nevertheless the quality of the products of developing countries cannot be considered superior to the products of developed countries. The matter of fact is their average industrial wage rate is very low comparable to these countries, consequently the prices of the wage goods (breads and cereals) are badly low. (These developing countries are regulating themselves only by means of enormous subsidies given to agricultural sector.) India's average industrial wage rate in U. S. dollars is of the order of 5 to 8 per cent of the U.S. figure, according to the UNIDO Global Report, 1987. This made feasible only by the low price of bread and cereals in India which is approximately one third of that U.S. according to "U.N. International Comparisons of the Real Product 1982" (Kravis et al., 1982).

The occurrence of inflation during last three decades points out that the industrial wage rate moves in step with food prices. Large scales improvement finally requires reduced cost of production of export goods, which implies

David Law (Senior Lecturer), and Toseef Azid (Postgraduate Student), Department of Economics and Agricultural Economics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom.

flourishing food subsidies directly or indirectly and/or devaluation so that export price may be lowered while keeping local price enough to cover past production cost in local currency. This later options has been long-winded practised by Latin American countries over the last three decades resultant in persistent inflation.

For the detail discussion of Professor Mathur's model see Mathur, P.N. (1983, 1989 and 1991a).

The main intention of this attempt is to scrutinise the behaviour of SAARC member countries in the peripheral of Professor Mathur's model. Following we are going to elucidate layers of techniques and transfer of technology, afterwards magnitude of the issue germane to the average industrial wage rate and exchange rate/U. S. dollar of the SAARC member countries considered (except Bhutan and Maldives, due to the non-availability of data or inadequacy of structure) and at the end a conclusion is going to be presented.

LAYERS OF TECHNIQUES AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY

In this real world, a layer of techniques is working simultaneously with distinct productive efficiencies. Every modernistic technique is more efficient than the preceding one. Those techniques that have highest, average and zero pseudo quasi-rent (pseudo quasi-rent is the difference between prevailing price and variable cost per unit of output) are conceived as 'Best', 'Average' and 'Marginal' techniques. Marginal techniques are on the verge of obsolescence. In this fluid economic milieu, best practice of today is the average of tomorrow and average of today is the marginal of tomorrow. So the actuality of layers of techniques has vigorous effects on the fabrication of an economy.

In view of Professor Mathur, we should not ponder the fixed capital in the analysis of *pseudo quasi-rent*. Because once it installed, it fetches its scrap value (fixed capital is not a meccano set). However, while fixed capital embodies the technological mutation, working capital is malleable and can be easily transferred from one technology to the immediate, being renewable in each cycle. When such vintages of capital are existing, the price determines on the foundation of variable cost per unit of output. This price system is called *Fix Price System* (Hicks, 1965; Morishima, 1976). So in this mutable economic milieu, the marginal technique (on the verge of obsolescence) determines the price (*Flex Price System* is not prevalent) and earned zero *pseudo quasi-rent*. Those techniques that accrued negative *pseudo quasi-rent* turn obsolete.

The recapitulation of Professor Mathur is that in several cases the technology transferred to the developing countries is of the older vintage, which is on the way out in the developed countries itself. This imported technology in the developing world has certain implications. To meet the accessory foreign exchange requirements, the industrialising developing countries would be exporting the output of those manufacturing industries to the developed world. This predicament imposes obvious constraints to the price and wage structure of these countries has to be less than that in the developed world, if they chosen to grow by means of technology transfer, and pay for its extra foreign exchange requirements by means of the export of its manufactures produced by means of this transfer.

MEASUREMENT OF THE ENIGMA

During the last decade, nearly all the SAARC member countries were in attempt to enlarge their foreign exchange through the export of their industrial product, especially textile fibers, yarn and clothing. Table 1 exactly expressed this notion, e.g., in their merchandise exports the share of primary commodities except in Sri Lanka is less than the textile fibers, yarn and clothing in 1988. The share of primary commodities declined from 1980-1988 in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, whereas in Nepal the expansion is not notable. Though, in Bangladesh this share inflated from 12.5 per cent to 17.5 per cent.

TABLE I
Relative Share of Selected Categories of Merchandise Exports in SAARC
Member Countries 1970 - 1988.

Country	Primary			Textile Fibers and Clothing		
	1970	1980	1988	1970	1980	1988
Bangladesh	9.8 ^f	12.5	17.0 ^g	73.3 ^f	74.5	67.9 ^f
India	41.6	35.7	24.5 ^e	26.7	25.5	24.9 ^e
Nepal	-	21.5	22.5 ^e	43.7	39.0	51.9 ^h
Pakistan	11.3	23.9	14.4 ^e	74.6	26.5	71.2 ^e
Sri Lanka	73.3	47.8	37.1 ^e	2.9	12.9	35.1 ^e
	<i>f</i> 1975	<i>g</i> 1987	<i>e</i> 1988	<i>h</i> 1986		

Source: Asian Development Bank, *Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries*, Vol. XXII, July 1991; National Sources.

Table 2 is exhibiting the tendency of foreign exchange earnings from the export of textile fibers, yarn and clothing in million of U.S. Dollars. Every understudy country earned more in 1987 or 1988 than that in 1980. Rate of change in percentage of this export earning is delineating the attempts of these countries that they performed in the enhancement of their foreign exchange

earnings. This rate (from 1980 to 1988, 1987 for Bangladesh⁽¹⁾) is varying from 47 per cent in Bangladesh to 282 per cent in Sri Lanka.

TABLE 2
Export Earnings from Textile Fibers, Yarn and Clothing,
1970-1988

(Million U.S. Dollars)

Country	1970	1980	1988	1988/1980
Bangladesh	221.7 ^f	551.6	811.1 ^R	47%
India	537.4	1915.2	3281.0 ^C	71%
Nepal	8.1 ^f	36.5	100.8 ^C	176%
Pakistan	518.7	1362.2	3193.1 ^C	134%
Sri Lanka	9.6	134.5	513.8 ^C	282%
	<i>f</i> 1975	<i>g</i> 1987	<i>c</i> 1988	

Source: Asian Development Bank, *Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries*, Vol. XXII, July 1991; National Sources.

These findings propound that they attained their objective, and enhanced the export earnings. As pointed out by Professor Mathur that the developing countries can only realise this by means of two ways, i.e., through devaluation or keeping low wage rate. Inasmuch as in the industrial sector, the different vintages of capital are existing at the national as well as international level. Therefore, the cost resolute the price, i.e., fix price system is prevailing. Consequently the above suggested alternatives are effective in compliance the low price of export commodities in the developing countries. In the following, we will examine and see the inclination of SAARC member countries concerning to the above mentioned enigma.

TABLE 3
Exchange Rate/U.S. Dollar

Year	Bangladesh Takka/U.S.\$	India Rupees/U.S.\$	Nepal Rupees/U.S.\$	Pakistan Rupees/U.S.\$	Sri Lanka Rupees/U.S.\$
1980	16.25	7.930	12.00	9.900	18.000
1981	19.85	9.099	13.20	9.900	20.550
1982	24.07	9.634	14.30	12.840	21.320
1983	25.00	10.493	15.20	13.500	25.000
1984	26.00	12.451	18.00	13.360	26.280
1985	31.00	12.166	20.70	15.980	27.408
1986	30.80	13.122	22.00	17.250	28.520
1987	31.20	12.877	21.60	17.450	30.763
1988	32.27	14.949	25.20	18.650	33.033
1989	32.27	17.035	28.60	21.420	40.000
1990	35.79	18.073	30.40	21.900	40.240
Rate of Change					
1980 - 1990	120.0%	127.9%	153.0%	121.0%	123.5%

Source: Asian Development Bank, *Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries*, Vol. XXII, July 1991; National Sources

Table 3 offers us an evidence about the episode of devaluation. We could not observe that any country devalued its currency less than 100 per cent. Hence, without any hesitation, we can express that these countries enhanced their export earnings on the expense of devaluation. It is worth to note that the process of devaluation is continuous in all the above countries from 1980 to 1990. The one part of the puzzle is going to be cleared that after devaluation may be the export of industrialised goods increased but simultaneously the value of primary goods is also decreased. As we know that the SAARC member countries are main exporters of the primary commodities. By doing so, they are earning less from the export of their primary commodities. This is the one reason the share of the primary commodities is also abbreviating in these countries.

TABLE 4
Correlation Coefficient of Exchange Rate among the SAARC Member Countries

Country	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan
India	0.909			
Nepal	0.926	0.989		
Pakistan	0.947	0.966	0.983	
Sri Lanka	0.901	0.988	0.983	0.970

Correlation coefficient of exchange rate throws the light on the unanimity of their behaviour and policy in this aspect. We could not find the coefficient during the last decade less than 0.9, which implies that the higher significant correlation in the process of devaluation. Table 5 elucidating the variations in the exchange rate during the last decade. This is varying from 21.57 per cent in Bangladesh and 30.88 per cent in Nepal, whereas coefficient in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka is near about 26 per cent. These variations are signal for the policy makers for the rectification of their policy.

TABLE 5
Coefficient of Variations in the Exchange Rate (1980 to 1990)

Country	Coefficient of Variations
Bangladesh	21.57
India	25.61
Nepal	30.88
Pakistan	26.45
Sri Lanka	25.95

Another scope of the doctrine of Professor Mathur (1991a) is that the wage rate is testifying the vintage of capital or layers of techniques having by the countries. Table 6 is delineating the daily average industrial wage rate of these countries in terms of U.S. Dollar. How much the daily average wage rate in this region is lower than United States is out of question. Even the average daily wage rate of India (that is higher than the other countries of the region in international prices) is nether than one third of United States average industrial wage rate.

TABLE 6
Average Daily Industrial Wage Rate (U.S.\$) in SAARC Member
Countries and in United States (1980 - 1985)

Year	Bangladesh	India	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	United States (per hour)
1980	1.80	2.45	1.99	1.53	6.66
1981	1.55	2.26	2.11	1.37	7.25
1982	1.29	2.16	1.82	1.30	7.68
1983	1.24	2.23	1.86	1.28	8.02
1984	1.20	2.14	1.78	1.56	8.32
1985	-	2.03	1.85	1.63	8.57

Source : International Labour Office, Geneva, *Year Book of Labour Statistics* (51st Issue), 1992

In a country where average technological status is superior than others, the average industrial wage rate will also be higher in that country compare to other and *vice-versa*. By following this hypothesis, we made the ranking of SAARC member countries (according to their technological status). Table 7 is expressing this behaviour.

TABLE 7
Ranking Among the SAARC Member Countries
According to Best and Least Efficient Technology

Year	Bangladesh	India	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
1980	3	1	2	4
1981	3	1	2	4
1982	4	1	2	3
1983	4	1	2	3
1984	4	1	2	3

Among the above countries, India has the superior technological status (on average), whereas least efficient technological status is moving from Sri Lanka to Bangladesh. While in 1981 and 1982 the Sri Lanka viewed as the

user of worse practice technology (on average), afterwards Bangladesh became the user of least efficient technology (on average). The ranking of India and Pakistan did not change during this period. (However, in this ranking we did not consider the status of Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. According to the U.N. classification these three countries and Bangladesh are classified as least developed countries in the Asia and Pacific Region). (*Economic Survey of Asia and Pacific Region*, U. N. Publications, 1991).

Is the enhancement of export earnings in these countries is only on the price of devaluation or the labour force are also suffered and have some contribution in this phenomenon? For the answer of this question, correlation coefficient between the exchange rate and the wage rate is calculated. The calculated coefficient between these two variables is expressing that the direction between them is negative. It is clearly insinuated that the increase in the export earning is not only the turnout of devaluation but also the output of the diminishing wage rate.

TABLE 8
Coefficient of Variations of Average Wage Rate

Country	Coefficient of Variations
Bangladesh	17.94
India	6.40
Pakistan	6.53
Sri Lanka	9.19

The coefficient of variation in the wage rate (in terms of U.S. Dollar) is elucidating that Bangladesh has the highest variations. This is also supporting the declining status of its average technology among the SAARC member countries. Bangladesh adopted both policy alternatives on the same level. This phenomenon is observed from the coefficient of variations of exchange rate and wage rate. The value of these coefficients is 21.57 and 19.94 respectively. Though one mien of this policy is very interesting that the coefficient of variation of exchange rate is minimum and coefficient of wage rate is maximum comparable to others. Which implies that during the last decade Bangladesh has given the more intonation on the reduction of wage rate than devaluation (in this region). Whereas the wage rate almost fallen in India and Pakistan but the declining rate is not very high, due to this the variations in this rate are not very high. Nevertheless, the minimum variations are in India than others. The whole discussion consummated that the industrial labour force is suffered more in Bangladesh than other counties during this period and less

in India, but on the whole in this region the suffering class is the industrial labour force.

TABLE 9
Correlation Coefficient Wage Rate Among the
SAARC Member Countries

Country	Bangladesh	India	Pakistan
India	0.932		
Pakistan	0.765	0.619	
Sri Lanka	0.977	0.953	0.615

By examining the Table 9, it can be analysed that the policy about the wage rate is not too much dissimilar from the policy of devaluation. However, only Pakistan's wage rate policy is not highly correlated with the others. The coefficient is positive and varying from 0.615 to 0.765. Whereas the correlation coefficients of others are not less than 0.9. This is also expressing the unanimity of their policy in respect of low wage rate and we can examine from Table 10 that how these countries are competing with each other by devaluating their currency as well as keeping industrial low wage rate, for the enhancement of their foreign exchange earnings.

TABLE 10
Correlation Coefficient between Exchange Rate and Average Daily
Wage Rate (in terms of U.S.\$)

Country	Coefficient of Variations
Bangladesh	-0.998
India	-0.804
Pakistan	-0.913
Sri Lanka	-0.856

It perceived from Table 10 that these countries are using both alternatives concurrently. The increase in the price of their imports of fuel, machinery and raw materials is also the output of devaluation. The cost of these factors is out of control (generally assuming as given). On the other side in this situation the interest rate can not move in that direction that is effective in reducing the cost. In all these circumstances the only factor that can be controlled is the labour cost. It is the only device that can be used for the reduction of per unit cost of industrial output. Now the only compensation for the labourer class is to keep the prices of wage goods as low as the labourer class can endure. The

wage rate is how much lower than the U.S. wage rate it is out of fantasy. The above debate also demands that the goods required as inputs in the production of the export commodity and which are produced within the country should be cheap valued in the international prices. Further, with so low wages, the goods required for consumption of the wage labour could also be cheap in international currency, otherwise even endurance of human beings at the low wage will be hard (Kravis et al. 1982). For an explication of this phenomenon we are considering the case of Pakistan. In the selection of country we keep one consideration that is associated to the tendency of average industrial wage rate. As it is observed that the correlation coefficient of average industrial wage rate (among the countries) for Pakistan to some extent is different from the others.

TABLE 11
Correlation Coefficient between Average Daily Wage Rate and
Average Retail Prices of some Selected Wage Goods in
Pakistan from 1981 - 1986 (U.S.\$)

Wage Goods	Correlation Coefficient
Beef (Cow/Buffalo with bone)/Kg.	0.6
Mutton (Av. Qty.)/Kg.	0.6
Onion/Kg.	0.5
Rock Salt (Powder)/Kg.	0.6
Gur/Kg.	0.8
Latha (Coarse)/Mtr.	0.5
Kerosene Oil/(1/2 Ltr.)	0.6
Chappal Spang	0.5
Bulb (60 Wts.)	0.5
Pulses <i>Masoor</i> /Kg.	0.6
Garlic/Kg.	0.8

Table 11 is elucidating that how the average retail prices of essential wage goods are correlated with the average industrial wage rate at the international prices. We selected beef (cow/buffalo with bone), mutton (Av. Qty.), onion, rock salt (powder), *gur*, *latha* (coares), kerosene oil, chappal spang, pulses *masoor* and garlic as wage goods for our analytical purpose. Among all of them *gur* and garlic have the highest coefficient and the value of coefficient is 0.8. However, among the above mentioned wage goods no one has the coefficient less than 0.5. It implies that with the changing in the average industrial wage rate approximately the prices of wage goods are also moving in the same direction. In this illustration we did not select the wheat

and sugar because of the subsidy provided for these two goods persistently during the understudy period by the Government of Pakistan. This direct subsidy is increased from 2,373 (Rs. Million) in 1979-80 to 3,822 (Rs. Million) in 1985-86. Therefore, this tendency of wage rate and prices of wage goods depicting that for the enhancement of export earnings there is necessary to depress the prices of wage goods beside the low wage rate, and the subsidy from the government is also useful in maintaining this trends.

CONCLUSION

The above analysis presents that the policy of developing world including SAARC member countries for export promotion, ultimately propelling the countries towards adversity and poverty and this is becoming the indispensable predicament of the export promotion. This is because of technological transfer have been that of near obsolete techniques to the developing countries. The economic necessities that imposed in shape of compulsory exports to pay up for the privilege and the debts incurred in the process, compelled these countries to export at any cost. To make that feasible the wage rates had to be depressed sufficiently, in turn forcing the prices of wage goods to a low level. This implies that modernisation in such cases will not be able to go on in all the sectors.

Thus we see that the technique of development through technical transfers is not likely to lead to the graduation of the developing countries into 'Developed' world, if it implies a compulsion to export. In such a case, if the transfer provides an opportunity for the industrialised countries to transfer their technologies becoming obsolete in their countries to the developing countries, the wage rate in these countries should be depressed for the competition and this export promotion policy ultimately leads the country towards more and more poverty.

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Jami'at-al-'Ulama'-i-Hind : A Case Study with Special Reference to Khilafat Movement, Non-Co-operation and Communal Roits (1920 — 1922)

PARVEEN ROZINA

INTRODUCTION

Jimi'at-al-'Ulama'-i-Hind, as its very name signifies, was a religio-political party, consisting mostly of *Ulama*, formed in 1919 during the high of Khilafat Movement. Its establishment was a result of the realization of *Ulama* to have a separate organization of their own, through which they could be able to express their views and take their stands on issues while providing guidance to the Muslims of British India in their religious matters and preparing them for the struggle of independence of the sub-continent from the foreign rule. Although the Jami'at kept its membership open and welcomed *Ulama* of all *Fiqhi* schools and shades of opinion, but practically it came to be dominated by the Deobandi *Ulama*.¹

DEOBANDI ULAMA

The Darul Ulum Deoband was started in 1867 for imparting religious education to Muslims according to the traditions of Islam and keeping them aloof from the negative influences of alien British culture. The Darul Ulum was, from its very inception, headed by such eminent *Ulama* as Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotwi, Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and Maulana Mahmud Hasan, who stood not only for the strict observance to *Shari'at* but they also up head strong anti-British policies. These *Ulama* traced their lineage to the reformist thought of Shah Wali Allah about religion, society and were in

Parveen Rozina, Senior Research Fellow, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad.

favour of Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi and Shah Ismail Shaheed's *Jihad*-oriented struggle against infidel rulers. They also appreciated socio-religious *Fara'izi* movement of Haji Shari'at Allah of Bengal. However after the failure of 1857 Revolution, Maulana Nanotwi and Maulana Gangohi had become cautious enough to keep the Darul Ulum as a purely academic institution and avoided to directly indulge in politics. However, Maulana Gangohi was in favour of cooperating with the Hindus in 'worldly matters' provided it did not violate any basic principle of Islam.² He had even signed the religious decrees published by Maulana Muhammad Saheb of Ludhiana in 1888, urging the Muslims to ally themselves with the Indian National Congress formed in 1885.³

Maulana Mahmud Hasan

In 1905, when Maulana Mahmud Hasan assumed charge as Head Teacher at Deoband, he shunned the policy of non-involvement of Darul Ulum in politics pursued by his predecessors. Under his guidance the Deoband *Madrasah* turned to an institution representing orthodox religious thought on the one hand and a training centre of Muslim youth for the struggle to free the country from the British yoke on the other. Maulana Mahmud Hasan was a freedom fighter of his own kind and carried on his *Jihad* during that period till his death in 1920.

He was active for the independence of India through Military strength during a time — when even the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League (formed in 1906) did not have the courage to declare independence of the sub-continent as their final goal. It was only Maulana Mahmud Hasan who prepared a scheme of liberating India from the British with the help of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan and deputed his disciples to make the tribal area of N.W.F.P. as their headquarters for the purpose.⁴ This scheme of Maulana Mahmud Hasan has come to be known as 'Silk Letters Movement' in the history of the freedom of the sub-continent.

The movement was started with the aim to liberate India from the British and to establish an Islamic state. The methods adopted were to organize Muslims through the aegis of *Jami'at-ul-Ansar* within India and form a government in exile in some adjoining Muslim country. This government was to attack India from the north-west frontier with the help of Pathans of Tribal areas and Afghanistan after getting military support from the Islamic countries. It was to disrupt the government administration through its organization within the country.⁵ His students of Deoband *Madrasah* went everywhere in the country and also visited the tribal areas, Afghanistan and Central Asia. The

Turkish Khalifah, who at that time was at war with the British could also be approached to help India break the shackles of slavery.⁶ The persons who actively participated in this organization and movement were :

(1) Hazrat Shaikhul Hind; (2) Maulana Ubaid Allah Sindhi; (3) Haji Tarangzai (Charsadda); (4) Maulana Saif-ur-Rehman (Qandhar); (5) Maulana Mansur Ansari (real name Muhammad Miyan, Deoband); (6) Maulana Uzair Gul (Peshawar); (7) Maulana Ahmad Ullah (Panipat); (8) Maulana Zahur Muhammad (Saharanpur); (9) Shaikh Abdur Rahim Sindhi; (10) Maulana Abus Siraj Ghulam Muhammad; (11) Maulana Muhammad Sadiq (Karachi); (12) Maulana Fazl-e-Rabbi (Peshawar); (13) Maulana Muhammad Akbar (Yaghistan); (14) Maulana Fazl-e-Mahmud (Peshawar); (15) Maulana Taj Mahmud Amroti (Sakhar); (16) Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Charsadda); (17) Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari; (18) Maulana Muhammad Ahmad (Chakwal); and (19) Shah Abdur Rahim Raipuri and many others.⁷

The World War I had started in 1914 and the British Government was keeping a vigilant eye on this political programme and 'rebellious activities' of Maulana Mahmud Hasan in India and was trying to arrest him but he himself secretly left for *Haj* in 1915 for Hijaz, then a province of Khilafat-e-Ustmania, and sent Maulana Ubaid Allah Sindhi to Afghanistan for seeking military help from the Turkish and Afghan governments. During his stay in Hijaz, Maulana Mahmud Hasan had secret parleys with Turkish governor Ghalib Pasha about his plan.⁸

He advised the Muslim leadership of the sub-continent to secure cooperation of Hindu majority for launching a combined movement for independence. A similar line of action was given to Maulana Ubaid Ullah Sindhi by the Afghan ministers to be followed for the freedom of India.⁹

They gave military help to Sharif Husain of Mecca who succeeded in breaking away from Turkey in 1916. He also arrested Maulana Mahmud Hasan alongwith his party at the British desire, who then deported them to Malta.¹⁰ A similar fate befell Maulana Ubaid Ullah Sindhi and his comrades in Afghanistan where British had been successful in bribing the Amir. Maulana Sindhi was imprisoned by Habibullah Khan at the British behest and was released after his assassination in 1919 and then he made his way in 1922 to Russia and Turkey.¹¹ A 'Silk Letter' was caught by the intelligence officials on the report of an informer and all the associates of Maulana Mahmud Hasan working in India were apprehended.¹² Thus failed the 'Silk Letters Movement' of Maulana Mahmud Hasan which has been called the last armed struggle for the freedom of India.

KHILAFAT-E-USMANIA

It has been described earlier that Jami'at was organized by the *Ulama* who had assembled in November 1919 during a meeting of the Khilafat Committee. In 17th Century Khilafat-e-Usmania expanded in three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. It stretched in the North from Vienna to Yeman in Southern Arabia and in the East from Persia to the Straits of Gibraltar in the West.¹³ It occupied some strategically important areas which attracted the attention of European Christian powers who were anxious either for occupying them in their national interests or were keen to align with Turkey to carry out their international policies. This situation had involved Turkey in successive wars with her hostile European neighbours. Turkey had already become weak due to her internal political crises and Turkey's inability in administering properly vast areas, slowly lost hold on her occupations.

In 1699, after the treaty of Karlowitz, Turkey had to surrender Hungary and Transylvania to Austria, the Ukraine and Podollia to the Poland and Azaf to Russia. Then during 18th Century Turkey had to fight two wars with Austria as a result of which her frontier was further contracted to the Danube and Sava. In 19th Century after three successive wars with Russia, Turkey was further weakened, though she was able to inflict defeat on Russia during 1853-56 war with the help of Britain and France, her first victory after 1739.¹⁴

It had become difficult for Turkey to keep its far flung areas under its effective control in spite of reforms in government at home. European powers were continuously manoeuvring for further break up of the Ottoman Empire. The massacres of 1861 in Labanon brought French intervention who gave Labanon its own regime. They were helping the Christian rebels in Armenia and Crete to revolt against Turkey. In 1877, Greece declared war on her but was defeated.¹⁵

At Berlin in 1878, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were declared independent and Bulgaria was also made autonomous. Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by Austria and Cyprus by Britain. Russia had taken over strategic frontier areas in Europe and Asia. In 1881 the European powers obliged the Ottomans to give Greece an extension of territory, including Thessaly. In the same year France occupied Tunis, making it a protectorate. In the year 1884 Britain took Egypt in her control. As late as 1906 Britain forced Ottomans recognition of an administrative boundary line between the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Aqaba. Though no other territory was lost between 1881 and 1908 but in 1885 autonomous Bulgaria annexed Easter Rumelia.¹⁶

In the first decade of twentieth century, Young Turks, some being in exile in Europe and others underground within the Empire, were planning to overthrow Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Discontented army units had also helped in the success of revolution which brought a 'more liberal, constitutional regime' in power.¹⁷ Young Turks also were, soon after their assuming power in 1889, faced with the grave problem of defence of the Empire's integrity and frontiers. In addition to Albanian risings and active discontent of all minorities, two attacks from the outside confronted the Young Turk regime. In 1911, Italy invaded the Ottoman province of Tripoli (present day Libya).¹⁸ Then, a league of Balkan states, in October 1912, seeing Turkey engaged in war, took the occasion as appropriate to attack her remaining territories in Europe.¹⁹ By the treaty of London of May 30, 1913, she had to cede to Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro all its European territory except Istanbul. The Island of Crete was lost as well. Though Edirne was regained in a second Balkan war, the Turks were still suffered heavy losses.²⁰ They had already lost Tripoli and the Dodecanes Islands, including Rhodes, to Italy, shortly after, Turkey became involved in World War I of 1914—1918.

KHILAFAT AND INDIAN MUSLIMS

Muslims of the sub-continent had a special sentimental attachment to Turkey as it was the last independent Muslim country and custodian of *Haramain Sharifain*. In spite of being British subjects, they recognized the Sultan of Turkey as their *Khalifah*, though only symbolically, and *Khutbah* was read in his name in *Juma* and *Eid* prayers in mosques throughout the length and breadth of the country.²¹ When Indian Muslims observed that European countries, big or small, are involving Turkey in wars one after the other, they were highly perturbed but they could do nothing positive to help her as they were themselves in British chains. They were not allowed to wage a *Jihad* on Turkish side as they were not free to do so. When Russia invaded it in 1877 and occupied some of its areas, Deoband *Ulama* had come out to help Turkey and Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotwi alongwith his colleagues and students sent about two lac rupees. Later, in 1897, when war broke out between Greece and Turkey, *Ulama* collected funds to give monetary assistance to Turkey and then celebrated her victory over Greece. Muslims knew that Western powers had prepared secret plans for dividing Turkish areas in 1909 and started to implement them in 1911-1912 with Italy occupying Tripoli and Balkan states rebelling against her authority.²²

When Balkan wars were being fought, Maulana Mahmud Hasan used to recite daily a *Hadith* about *Jihad*. In these wars Britain did not come to the

help of Turkey as Muslim India had expected her to do. Muslims viewed it as a deliberate British plan to destroy Islam.²³ The amount Maulana Mahmud Hasan collected about one and a half lac rupees sent to Turkey.²⁴ A medical mission headed by Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari was also sent to Turkey.²⁵

During this period emerged some Muslim journalist leaders, who made the protection of Khilafat as their mission and outrightly presented it through their articles in newspapers as well as speeches. Prominent among them were Maulana Muhammad Ali Johar, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Hasrat Mohani and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan. Maulana Muhammad Ali Johar had brought out *Comrade* and *Hamdard*, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad *Al-Hilal* and *Al-Balagh*, Maulana Hasrat Mohani *Urdu-e-Mu'alla* and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan *Zamindar*. They largely contributed in creating political consciousness among Muslims of the sub-continent about their status as a world community and their position in India.²⁶

When World War I was being fought, the British government had to recruit Muslim soldiers for the war from India. In order to dispel their doubts and misgivings, she had repeatedly promised Muslims that it would her utmost to protect their Holy cities of Mecca and Medina and would justly treat Turkey, would not deprive her of her capital and other areas. But the British and her Allies were not sincere at heart and even prior to signing the armistice they had started dissection of the parts of Turkey.

Turkey alongwith Germany, was defeated by the Allies and the Turkish government signed the armistice of Mudrds on October 30, 1918 with the Allies. They Treaty of Sevres was signed between the Allies and Turkey on August 10, 1920. Through it were ceded Turkish areas of Eastern Thrace, Gallipoli, Symarna and the Aegean islands to Greece and the Straits and the Dardanelles were given in international control.²⁷

In the absence of Maulana Mahmud Hasan, who was still detained in Malta, it was Maulana Abdul Bari Farangi Mahalli who came forward to provide guidance to *Ulama* and the Muslim masses. He formed an association of *Khuddam-e-Ka'bah* for the protection of Khilafat and Holy places of Muslims while working within legal limits. *Khuddam-e-Ka'bah* was later on turned into Khilafat Committee and Farangi Mahall had become a centre of activities during this period. Maulana Muhammad Ali was also a disciple of Maulana Abdul Bari and till that time when Maulana Muhammad Ali took the burden of Khilafat on his own shoulders, it was Maulana Abdul Bari who was most active among the *Ulama* for the cause of Khilafat.

Muslims of every point of view and school of thought considered Khilafat as a purely religious matter. As a result of this attitude, *Ulama* belonging to varied *Madrasas* apart from Deoband like Farangi Mahall, Nadvat-ul-*Ulama*, Bareilly, Badayun and Amritsar were unanimous on the issue of Khilafat. The *Sufi Masha'ikh* had also abandoned their seclusion and had become active by joining the *Ulama* in this struggle.

The *Ulama* active for the cause of Khilafat were : Maulana Muhmud Hasan, Mufti Kifayat Allah, Maulana Sana Allah Amritsari, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, Maulana Muhammad Sajjad Bihari, Maulana Abdul Bari Farangi Mahalli, Maulana Sayyid Sulaiman Nadavi, Maulana Inayat Allah Farangi Mahalli, Maulana Salamat Allah Farangi Mahalli, Maulana Abdul Majid Badayuni, Maulana Sayyid Muhammad Fakher Iahabadi, Maulana Ahmad Saeed Dihlavi, Maulana Sayyid Daud Ghaznavi, Maulana Azad Subhani, Maulana Habibur Rahman Ludhianawi, Maulana Abu'l Qasim Saif Banarsi.²⁸ A substantial majority of these *Ulama* belonged to Darul Ulum Deoband.

Political and religious leaders who were members of Indian National Congress and All-India Muslim League or were independents, were also cooperating with *Ulama*. Noteworthy among them were Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, Maulana Abu'l Kalam Azad, Maulana Muhammad Ali, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew, Mushir Husain Qidwai, Zafarul Mulk Alawi, Mr. Mazharul Haq, Dr. Sayyid Mahmud, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Agha Safdar.²⁹ Some Aligarh intellectuals were also sided with them. Maulana Shibli Nu'mani, Allama Muhammad Iqbal, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and other poets were busy writing impressive poems reminding Muslims of their glorious past and present degradation and calling them for the duties of the hour.³⁰

INDIAN SITUATION

The British had yielded to Hindu pressure and revoked the partition of Bengal in 1911 without caring for the interests of the Muslims. Muslim sentiments were again shocked when a part of Machhli Bazar mosque in Kanpur was demolished. They held a protest meeting on August 13, 1913 presided over by Maulana Azad Subhani. Police opened fire on the audience as a result of which several of them were killed and injured.³¹ The entire Muslim India started agitation against this brutality.

HINDU MUSLIM UNITY

With the passage of time, Hindu and Muslim leaders had fully realized that their unity was most essential for carrying the struggle for freedom to a success. Deoband *Ulama* had already favoured this unity. In 1913 Muslim League also passed a resolution in favour of achieving a system of self-government suitable to India³² and thus had come considerably closer to the Congress. Then onwards, both the parties began holding their annual sessions in the same cities on same dates. They used to present similar points of view about the political problem of India.³³

Ulama and newspapers also played a prominent role in creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation among Hindus and Muslims. Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was a great exponent of it, and was called 'the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity.' managed Lucknow Pact between the Congress and the League to be signed on December 19, 1916.³⁴

In order to curb their growing protest the British government issued in 1918 the Rowlatt Report, which stated that India was menaced by revolutionary and terrorist conspiracies, that these were immediately dangerous, particularly in Bengal and required instant action. The authorities jailed large numbers of people for sedition and conspiracy.³⁵

Mr. Gandhi started *Satyagraha* on April 6, 1919 as a protest against the repressive laws. Strikes were observed on his appeal in Delhi and other cities. The government was embarrassed and in order to crush the agitation, police and military contingents opened fire on strikers. Hindu Muslim unity was at its peak those days. To show the strength of their unity the Muslims even raised Swami Shradhananda, the Arya Samaj Leader, on the *Mimbar* of Jamia Mosque of Delhi for addressing the audience.³⁶

Satyagraha was being observed by people enthusiastically in a peaceful manner when an unhappy incident occurred at Amritsar. That turned the agitators to resort to violence. Two prominent Congress leaders were arrested by the authorities which highly enraged the public and resulted in serious clashes with army. Some people were killed and thereupon riots started which engulfed other cities as well.³⁷

JALLIANWALA BAGH MASSACRE

On April 13, 1919 General Dyer ordered his troops to open fire on a peaceful crowd gathered at Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar for a meeting that had defied government orders. Some 379 Indians were killed and 1200 wounded.

Not content with repression, Dyer ordered Indians to crawl³⁸ in this brutal firing on their hands and knees through certain streets. Martial Law was also imposed on Amritsar and many towns to prevent further protests.

The Government was alarmed at the agitation being carried out for the cause of Khilafat and against the repressive laws. The government, in order to pacify Indians, agreed to change the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909.

The reforms promised in the Montague Declaration of 1917 were enacted at the end of 1919, came into operation in 1920, and were known as Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.

These Reforms established a measure of provincial autonomy by transferring authority in provincial matters to the Provincial Governments and also freeing them from the control of the Centre to certain extent. 'Dyarchy' was established in the sphere of administration by transferring certain subjects to Indian Ministers responsible to the Legislature whilst vital subjects such as Defence, Law and Order, Revenue and Finance were reserved to the Governor and his Executive Councillors responsible to the Secretary of State for India and to the Parliament.³⁹ The existing Central Legislative Council was reconstituted as a bi-cameral Legislature directly elected by a non-official majority, but the Central Council continued to be entirely responsible to the Secretary of State and to the Parliament.

Muslims were also greatly disappointed by the hostile attitude of the government towards their education. M.A.O. College, Aligarh, founded by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan for their education was not being given the status of a university. On Muslim leaders' appeals, the government first put the condition of collecting a sum of rupees three lakhs and when funds were provided, it discouraged Muslims by not making the university an autonomous body and also disallowed affiliation of outside institutions to it.⁴⁰

An All-India Muslim Conference was convened at Lucknow on September 21, 1919 to impress upon the Britain and her Allies to decide the future of Turkey keeping in view the sentiments of the Indian Muslims. *Ulama* and political leaders, in spite of having different points of view, participated in it from all the corners of India. It was sponsored by All-India Muslim League.

Most of the important resolutions approved related to the preservation of the integrity of Khilafat-e-Umania. Allied occupation of Turkish areas was strongly condemned and their return to Turkey was stressed.⁴¹ 'Khilafat Day' was also observed throughout the sub-continent on October 17, 1919. All Muslims and Hindus closed their business on that day and prayed for the safety

of Turkish Sultanate and the Khilafat. 'Khilafat Day' meetings held in the cities of Gorakhpur, Azamgarh, Lucknow, Benaras, Aligarh, Delhi and Bombay were widely reported in the press.⁴²

FORMATION OF JAMI'AT

As has been described earlier that Jami'at-al-'Ulama'-i-Hind was founded in November 1919 at Delhi as a result of consultations of *Ulama* to have an organization of their own after the meeting of Khilafat Conference. Maulana Mahmud Hasan, still being in detention in Malta, Mufti Kifayatullah and Maulana Abdul Bari Farangi Mahalli were in the forefront in organizing the *Ulama* for the purpose.⁴³ Mufti Kifayatullah and Maulana Ahmad Saeed Dihlawi were unanimously nominated its temporary President and Secretary respectively.⁴⁴

The Jami'at carried mostly organization work in the first session. The constitution of Jami'at was presented before the session which was drafted by Mufti Kifayatullah and Maulana Muhammad Akram Khan who were deputed for this task in the earlier meeting of November 24, 1919 after the formation of Jamiat. It was decided to get it printed and circulated among the *Ulama* and after soliciting their opinion, should be placed before the coming session for its approval. As Jami'at leaders were strong advocates of Hindu Muslim unity and considered it necessary for the fight for independence, they put a clause in its constitution to that effect :

"To establish good and friendly relations with the non-Muslims of the country to the extent permitted by the *Shari'at-i-Islamiyyah*.⁴⁶ The objectives as well as rules and regulations of the JUH were amended subsequently in 1923 and 1939, but its basic organizational structure remained unchanged."⁴⁷

After some preliminary meetings, a meeting of Central Khilafat Conference was held on December 31, 1919 at Amritsar presided over by Maulana Shaukat Ali. Ali Bretheren were released from jail and they directly came to participate in the meeting which was extremely important from many respects. Leaders of the Congress, the Muslim League, Jami'at-al-'Ulama'-i-Hind and Khilafat Conference attended the meeting. Jami'at-al-'Ulama'-i-Hind had recently been formed. In the modern history of India this meeting was politically a unique example of All-India unity. This meeting decided to create a Khilafat fund and raise amount to the tune of one million rupees. Maulana Muhammad Ali, while addressing the meeting, declared that if the government interfered in their religious matters, they would be compelled to act upon their

religious commandments. This meeting also decided to send a deputation of Khilafat Conference to London to apprise the British government about the sentiments of Indian Muslims about Khilafat and Turkey.⁴⁸

Some of the prominent Hindu leaders who attended this Khilafat Conference included Mr. Gandhi, Pundit Motilal Nehru and Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviya.

The following important resolutions were passed :⁴⁹

- (a) Indian Muslims should boycott the victory celebrations and hold protest meetings to express their hatred on the atrocities committed by British on Holy shrines in Iran and Turkey.
- (b) Indian Muslims should non-cooperate with the government.
- (c) If Britain does not decide in favour of Turkey, and foreign commodities should be boycotted with.
- (d) Mr. Gandhi and other Hindu leaders who have participated in the Khilafat movement should be thanked.

It was in this meeting that the head office of Central Khilafat Committee was established in Bombay on the request of Seth Chhutani and branches were opened in most of the big cities and towns.

A deputation of Khilafat Committee headed by Dr. Ansari met the Viceroy on January 19, 1920. This deputation was consisted of Mr. Gandhi, Seth Chhutani, Maulana Sanaullah Amritsari, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Mufti Kifayatullah, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Mr. Sayyid Hasan (Editor *Independent*, Allahabad), Maulana Abdul Bari Farangi Mahalli, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, Maulana Muhammad Ali, Maulana Abdul Majid Badayuni, Sayyid Zahur Ahmad, Maulana Fakher Allahabadi, Maulana Sayyid Sulaiman Nadawi, Aga Muhammad Ashraf Qizilbash, Maharaja Mahmudabad. Though Pundit Motilal Nehru and Mr. Muhamamd Ali Jinnah could not reach in time, they telegraphically informed the Viceroy about their consensus with the deputation.⁵⁰ The deputation predominantly represented the *Ulama*. However the Viceroy turned a deaf ear to its demands.

The second meeting of Khilafat Conference was held at Bombay on February 15, 1920 and was presided over by Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Bhurgari. The meeting finalized the matter of sending the deputation to London. It included Mr. Muhamamd Ali, Maulana Sayyid Sulaiman Nadawi, Mr. Sayyid Hasan and Mr. Hasan Muhammad Hayat. Mr. Mushir Husain Qidwai and Mr. Abdul Qasim who were already in London, joined the

deputation there. The deputation met the Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Fischer and Prime Minister Mr. Lloyd-George on March 2, 1920 and March 17, 1920 respectively. But they did not made any commitment with the deputation.⁵¹

Indian Muslims had seriously felt that they had been betrayed by the Britain and her Allies after World War I. They had been continuously protesting against the dismemberment of Khilafat-e-Umania but of no avail.

Even before the Treaty of Sevres they had decided to launch Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movements on a mass scale to get their demand about Khilafat accepted by the Britain and her Allies.⁵²

Then the terms dictated to Turkey in the Treaty of Sevres were published in India on May 14, 1920. These terms were fatal to Turkey and against the expectations of Indian Muslims. These amounted not only to complete dismemberment of Khilafat-e-Umania but Turkish homeland itself.⁵³ Muslims were severely shocked, their sentiments were inflamed and they planned to accelerate their protest.

Maulana Mahmud Hasan had, after his release from Malta, reached Bombay in June 1920. During his internment, Khilafat Committee and Jami'at were formed and were active for the protection of Khilafat. He had stayed there for two days during which he had addressed a meeting of the Khilafat Committee convened to accord welcome to him.⁵⁴

Maulana Shaukat Ali had recorded his speech in the meeting which was published in the newspaper *Madina*, Bignore in its issue of July 9, 1920. Maulana had clearly directed Muslims 'to non-cooperate with the enemies of Islam and especially (1) to return Government's honours and titles, (2) to boycott new councils, (3) to use only home made goods and products, and (4) not to admit their children in Government schools and colleges.⁵⁵

Maulana Abdul Bari Farangi Mahalli and Mr. Gandhi had also visited Maulana Mahmud Hasan during his stay in Bombay and they had talks on the current political situation of the country.⁵⁶ It is under-standable that they had discussed launching of a non-cooperation movement against the British government.

MIGRATION TO AFGHANISTAN

After Treaty of Sevres, the British and their Allies, breaking all promises made with Indian Muslims during World War I, started amputating parts of Turkey like Smyrna, Thrace and Anatolia. This created great unrest among the people, as their expectations from the British that she would treat Turkey

favourably were dashed to the ground. They considered that in India their lives as Muslims have been rendered impossible.

Then Muslim soldiers who had fought in the War against Turkey were discharged from service and rendered jobless, they became disgusted with the government. Jami'at and Khilafat leadership had already declared that those Muslims who do not find such conditions in India to freely pass a life according to the tenets of Islam should migrate to a Muslim country.⁵⁷

Muslims took it as a religious obligation and thousands of them started migrating from Sind, Punjab and N.W.F.P. to Afghanistan in August 1920. They sold their lands, houses, jewellery, household utensils and other belongings at throw-away prices and left their homes and hearths in India. Afghan government had promised that refugees would be properly rehabilitated there and land would be given to them for cultivation. But when migrants turned in thousands, the government was embarrassed as it found difficult to accommodate each and every person. It closed its frontier and started sending refugees back. The refugees had reached there with great difficulty after crossing the mountainous region of N.W.F.P. Many of them had perished on the way and the rest who were lucky to return after deadly journey back, had no homes and property.⁵⁸ The dreams of a prosperous life there were shattered. Thus ended the tragic *Hijrat* movement.

As a result of this combined movement, Hindus and Muslims alike, surrendered their titles and boycotted councils. Courts were abandoned and in their place *Panchayats* were constituted for deciding cases. Government schools, colleges and even universities were left by students and national institutions were opened in almost all the big cities and towns. Imported cloth was burnt and *Khaddar* was used. Spinning wheel was introduced under the instructions of Mr. Gandhi. A large number of citizens left the government service. Picketing was made on alcohol shops. Elections held in November 1920 under Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 were totally boycotted by the Congress.⁵⁹

Khilafat Deputation visiting Britain returned to India in October 1920 unsuccessful. Mr. Gandhi and Maulana Muhammad Ali started a tour of India in order to inform the masses about the British treachery and "give a direction to the agitation that was fast developing."⁶⁰ It was decided to strictly act upon the programme of non-cooperation with the government. A 'Black Day' was also observed throughout the sub-continent to let the government know their reaction on the Treaty.

The second annual session of Jami'at was held in Delhi from November 19 to 20, 1920 when Maulana Mahmud Hasan, who had returned to India after his release from Malta, was made its permanent President, Mufti Kifayatullah, Vice President and Maulana Ahmad Saeed, Secretary.⁶¹ Maulana Mahmud Hasan was to preside but due to his serious illness Mufti Kifayatullah was asked to take his place. His presidential address, however, was read by Maulana Murtaza Hasan. Main points of his speech were :⁶²

1. To non-cooperate with the British.
2. To seek Hindu cooperation for Khilafat Movement.
3. To hold protest meetings unitedly till the time your demands are acceded to and freedom achieved.

After the demise of Maulana Mahmud Hasan on November 20, 1920, the other two leaders were reassigned their previous offices temporarily which were subsequently regularized in the meeting of the organizing body on September 6, 1921 at Lucknow.⁶³

KARACHI CONSPIRACY CASE

A meeting of Khilafat Conference was held at Karachi on September 19, 1921 under the presidentship of Maulana Muhammad Ali, who in his presidential address declared that service of Muslims in the British army for fighting against a Muslim country is prohibited according to the tenets of Islam. Maulana Shaukat Ali, Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, and Swami Shankar Acharya also spoke on the occasion and expressed similar views. Jami'at was represented by Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, Maulana Nisar Ahmad and Pir Ghulam Majaddid, who supported the ideas of Maulana Muhammad Ali and other leaders in their speeches. The British government prosecuted all of the leaders on charges of conspiracy and sentenced them to two years' imprisonment.⁶⁴

The third annual session of Jami'at was held at Lahore from November 18 to 20, 1921. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was in the chair. Before this session prominent leaders of Khilafat Committee, Jami'at and some other freedom fighters had been imprisoned and the *Farwa* of non-cooperation had also been banned by the government. Resolutions were passed for using local cloth and boycott of foreign cloth was stressed upon. Resolutions were also passed confirming the resolutions of Khilafat Conference held at Karachi.

⁶¹Which had been the cause of arrest and incarceration of Maulana Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali and others, was part of the decided and

open commandments of Islam, which were in force since the last 1300 years and so often declared in India, and Mussalmans could never cease to declare it. The Jami'at-al-'Ulama' (sic.) invited Musalmans to perform their duties at this critical juncture and make their best efforts to declare and announce this Commandment of God!

Resolutions were also passed, protesting against the proscription of the *Fatwa* of the *Ulama* (sic.) by the Government of Delhi and other Governments and declaring it sinful and *Haraam* for Mussalmans to serve in Police and Army under the present Government and asking every Mussalman to boldly request soldiers and Muslim Policemen to immediately leave service under the Government. The *Ulama* asked the assembled Mussalmans to serve their Allah and the Prophet (Peace be upon him) and to protect the Holy Qur'an and help the Turks in their struggle against non-Muslims. They were asked to boldly repeat the *Ulamas' Fatwa* from every platform and to request every Policeman and Soldier they met to leave Government service even at the risk of being imprisoned.⁶⁵

Here communal movements such as *Shuddhi* and *Sanghatan* movement against Muslims and *Chauri Chaura* incident are being referred to in connection with the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movements. As a result of these communal movements, the British were successful in creating differences between the two communities and after *Chauri Chaura* mishap Mr. Gandhi called off the Non-Cooperation Movement which gave a set-back to Khilafat Movement also.

Although the Khilafat Movement continued till March 1924 but then the Turkish National Assembly under the guidance of Kemal Ataturk, abolished the very institution of Caliphate and pro-claimed Turkey a Republic.⁶⁶ As a natural consequence the movement for Khilafat started in India died down.

It has been recorded that : "It was perhaps the biggest mass movement that had been ever launched before. It was the only movement in which the Hindus and the Muslims joined forces against the British. According to an estimate, during the months of December 1921 and January 1922 only, some 30,000 people belonging to both the communities went to jail."⁶⁷

COMMUNAL RIOTS

The period between 1920-1924 was marked by communal riots in India and the Jami'at was as much communal in its outlook as could be the Muslim

League or any other Muslim party.⁶⁸ The following incidents can throw some light on these riots :

- (a) Riots at *Chauri Chaura*.
- (b) *Mopla* Uprising in Malabar.
- (c) *Shuddhi* and *Sanghatan* Movements.
- (d) Riots between Hindus and Muslims (on the issues of playing musical instruments in front of mosques and slaughter of cows).

The years 1920-1922 were of immense importance both, for the *Jami'at* and its movement. The *Jami'at* was formed after the end of the World War I with the prime aim of liberating India; to protect the *Khilafat* and give a religious guidance to the Muslims. The most distressing phenomenon for the Muslims was the impending dismemberment of the Ottoman Caliphate and the threat to the Muslim sacred places. In order to struggle and prevent such an eventuality, the *Ulama* formed their own organisation, i.e., *Jami'at-ul-'Ulama'-i-Hind*.

Jami'at in collaboration with the All-India *Khilafat* Committee, the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League conducted the historic *Khilafat* and *Non-Cooperation* Movements and issued a *Fatwa* about the non-cooperation which was signed by four hundred and seventy four *Ulama*. This *Fatwa* stipulated that the employment in which the enemy was assisted or cooperated and which in any way implied even the murder of one's own brethren is totally forbidden (*Haram*). Cooperation with the British Government; its service or getting others inducted into its employment or recruitment is all forbidden (*Haram*).

On August 8, 1921 the Government confiscated the unanimous *Fatwa* and its brief, but the *Jami'at* continued its repeated publication and thus violated the law for which the leaders were rounded up from various places and were proceeded against. In this way the *Jami'at* participated with great vigour in the non-cooperation and boycott movements. To achieve the common goal of liberating India the *Jami'at* fully cooperated with the Indian National Congress.

Keeping the above mentioned common goal apart, the *Jami'at* always maintained its separate identity as an influential party. After the failure of the *Khilafat* Movement *Jami'at* functioned to protect Muslim communal interests and its stand on political issues was similar to that taken by other Muslim

parties. In the communal riots of 'Malabar' and *Chauri Chaura* and others places the Jami'at sided with the Muslims to safeguard their rights.

The most important thing however, remains that the Jami'at never compromised on religious matters. To counteract *Shuddi* and *Sanghatan* movements the Jami'at started its own institutions of *Tanzim* and *Tabligh*. They not only took into service the preachers but set up branches all over the country. In this way the Jami'at succeeded in checking the advances of the *Shuddi* and *Sanghatan* movements. Similarly, the Jami'at held its own stand on the issue of 'cow slaughter.'

The role of the Jamiat during the period 1920-1922 therefore, was pivotal in providing religious guidance and tried to unite Muslims to fight for the protection and acquisition of their religious and political rights.

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Post Simla Pakistan-India Relations — A Decade of Cooperation and Conflict

MUHAMMAD ARIF

INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the pattern of relations between the two countries after 1971 War, and factors which influenced these relations. The consequences of war and universal detente forced Pakistan and India to move towards normalization. In July 1972, Simla Agreement was signed, which both countries recognized as a satisfactory basis for relationship. The succeeding years, manifested dual patterns of conciliation and confrontation in Pakistan-India relations.

The positive developments during 1972-1982, included withdrawal of forces from occupied territory, the return of POWs, revival of commercial relations, resumption of air and rail road traffic alongwith postal and telecommunication services. Above all, diplomatic ties were restored. On November 1, 1982, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zia-ul-Haq agreed to the establishment of a permanent Joint Commission to discuss economic, educational, cultural and technical cooperation. Since 1981, informal discussion on 'No War Pact' or 'Treaty of Friendship' have continued. The two states started cooperating bilaterally as well as multilaterally under the SAARC.

The movement towards normalization of relations has not been without interruption and set-backs. Although the major problems created by the 1971 War were resolved during the period under study, but Pakistan-India relations were often marred by divergence in their perspective on a number of issues.

Among the major contentious issues included the Kashmir dispute, difference in the security perceptions of the two countries, nuclear question,

Dr. Muhammad Arif, Assistant Professor, Government College, Bhalwal.

the crisis in Afghanistan and the U.S. decision to approve Pakistani purchase of advanced F-16 aircraft. The grant of some \$ 3.2 billion in aid and military credit to Islamabad, plunged the Pakistan-India relations into a situation of estrangement of not open hostility.

Relations of the two countries have been characterized by historical antagonism, mutual distrust and sharp differences in their perspectives on international and regional problems. The roots of these differences can be traced in the centuries old rivalry based on ideological differences between the Hindus and Muslims.

The Hindus strongly opposed the partition of the subcontinent. The Congress accepted the creation of Pakistan reluctantly. Many of its leaders doubted the viability of Pakistan and expected that once the passions subsided, Pakistan would come back to the fold of India. Expression of such sentiments, aroused feeling among many Pakistanis that Indians are not reconciled to the division of the subcontinent and favour reunification of the two countries even if it is achieved by force. This legacy adversely affected the relations of the two countries after independence.

Bloodbath that accompanied the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 had deepened the hate and distrust between the two countries. Pakistan suffered greatly from the Boundry Commission's unjust decision. Bharat withheld Pakistan's share of military stores. It refused to transfer Pakistan's agreed and allotted share of cash balance at a critical time, hoping thereby to cripple its administration and economy. Bharat stopped the supply of essential goods like coal to Pakistan. It encouraged the Pukhtunistan Movement, and forcibly occupied the major part of the Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir which, according to the principle of the division of the subcontinent, should have gone to Pakistan. Bharat's seizure of Hyderabad and Junagadh was perceived by Pakistani leadership as warning that the same might happen to Pakistan. Soon after independence Bharat took the drastic action of withholding the Indus waters to Pakistan and created a grave crisis for its irrigation system. Later the dispute of the Indus water was settled due to the efforts of the World Bank. However, it had serious psychological effects on the Pak-India relations at a time when bitter feelings had sprung from other causes. All these events increased hate and distrust between the two countries.

The fear of India led Pakistan to join the western alliances in 1953-1955. Pakistan's membership in the SEATO and CENTO was constantly criticized by India. That was against her foreign policy objective of weakening and

isolating Pakistan. This is one of the main causes of poor relations between the two neighbours.

Relations between India and Pakistan had been bitter due mainly over the dispute of Kashmir. Both countries have fought four wars since independence (1947-1948, April 1965, September 1965 and December 1971). Two of these (1947-1948 and September 1965) were directly sparked off by events in Kashmir. First battle over that territory in 1947-1948 ended with U.N. efforts that brought about a ceasefire. However, the dispute over Kashmir continued. After the ceasefire in the Runn of Kutchch in 1965, the fighting broke out between Pakistan and India in Kashmir again. The war ended on September 23, 1965 through USSR's good offices that brought about the Tashkent Declaration signed by the two countries, under the Soviet auspices on January 10, 1966.¹ All that it did was that both the states withdrew their armed forces to their 5th August position. Their relations could not even be restored to the level of August 5, 1965.

The most critical period in Pakistan-India relations was during the East Pakistan crisis and Indian intervention. The crisis arose out of the breakdown of the constitutional process in Pakistan after the general elections in December 1970. In March 1971, the political situation in Pakistan culminated in the civil war between East and West Pakistan. India used the crisis in East Pakistan as a chance of the century to humble her traditional adversary and played a key role in changing the character and direction of the civil strife in East Pakistan. The influx of refugees from East Pakistan to India made the situation worse. Indian extended political and diplomatic support to the secessionist movement and helped to set up Bangladesh Government in exile in Calcutta. The Indian Border Security Forces and the Army were actively involved in recruitment, training and provision of equipment to Mukti Bahini. India signed on August 9, 1971, a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with USSR to acquire a shield of protection against the possibility of the Sino-American intervention in the subcontinent during the fourth-coming war between Pakistan and India. After several Mukti Bahini operations, India attacked East Pakistan in the last week of November, 1971. On December 3, Pakistan launched a counter offensive on the West Pak-India Border to release pressure on East Pakistan. This strategy did not work. On December 16, 1971, Pakistani troops in East Pakistan formally surrendered to India and Pakistan was dismembered.² More than 93000 Pakistanis were held as POWs in India. It was a climax of hatred and enmity between the two countries.

SIMLA AGREEMENT

In the beginning of 1972, Pakistan-India relations faced two types of problems. First, the problems created by the 1971 War, and second, the continuing dispute of Kashmir. Not only that the problems were made more complex but the historical perspective for their solution earlier manifested also persisted. Major issues of immediate concern were — evacuation of territory, prisoners of war, recognition of Bangladesh, human problems relating to Biharis and Bengalis and the ever present Jammu and Kashmir question. Soon after the war both the countries expressed their willingness to work for a durable peace in the region. The Pakistani and the Indian approaches to solve the problems were, however divergent. India insisted on a simultaneous settlement of all Indo-Pakistan disputes including Kashmir. Pakistan on the other hand, advocated a step by step approach which meant leaving aside the Kashmir-question for more opportune moment. The immediate question for her were the withdrawal of forces from the areas occupied during the recent war and the release of Pakistani POWs.³

A beginning towards a settlement was made when President Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed a peace agreement at Simla in July 1972. Both the countries recognized this agreement as a historic landmark in their mutual relations. According to the agreement the two countries resolved to put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have marred their relations and to work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relations and the establishment of a durable peace in the subcontinent. They agreed to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiation or by other peaceful means mutually agreed upon by them. The two countries also agreed to work for normalization of relations and cooperation in the economic, cultural and scientific fields. They were to withdraw their forces to their respective international borders. It had been stipulated in the agreement that withdrawal would be completed within thirty days of the coming into force of the accord. The repatriation of Prisoners of War and a final settlement of Kashmir issue were left to be negotiated in the subsequent meetings.⁴ A process was initiated which paved the way for withdrawal of troops, return of POWs and normalization of relations between Pakistan and India.

The withdrawal of the armed forces was, however, delayed on account of India's insistence that it was linked with the demarcation of line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. Dispute also arose on the question of Thako Chak. Pakistan strove to resolve these points. After a meeting of special emissaries in Delhi during August 1972 and by India's agreement to compensate Pakistan

along the line of control in return of Thako Chak, the withdrawal of forces was completed in December 1972.⁵

The most delicate issue between India and Pakistan was that of Pakistan's 93000 POWs. India took the stand that they had surrendered to the Joint Command of India and Bangladesh and hence they could not be released without the prior agreement of Bangladesh. Bangladesh insisted on discussing the issue only on the basis of equal sovereignty and declared to put 195 POWs on trial for war crimes. Meanwhile Bangladesh applied for the membership of U.N. in August 1972. The People's Republic of China vetoed the request. The General Assembly linked the issue of repatriation of POWs with the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations. In April 1973, India and Bangladesh agreed to delink the humanitarian question of POWs from recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan. In August 1973, an agreement was reached between India and Pakistan which provided that India would repatriate all except 195 POWs and all civilian internees to Pakistan. The future of 195 POWs was to be decided at a meeting between the representatives of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. All the Bengalis living in Pakistan were to be repatriated to Bangladesh and a large number of non-Bengalis living in Bangladesh were to be repatriated to Pakistan.

The first batch of Pakistan's POW came home on December 19, 1973. Pakistan recognized Bangladesh on the eve of the 2nd Islamic Summit Conference held at Lahore in February 1974. Consequently, a conference of the representatives of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan was held in Delhi. It was agreed at this conference to release the 195 POWs unconditionally. Thus last batch of POWs arrived in Pakistan on April 30, 1974.⁶

In the subsequent years Pakistan and India made some progress towards normalization of relations. They restored economic, diplomatic, and communication relations. Meaningful cooperation between the two countries in these fields remained limited because of the lack of progress in resolving political issues.

KASHMIR DISPUTE

Kashmir has been the major dispute between India and Pakistan since 1947. The issue was referred to the United Nations by India. It was decided by the Security Council, and agreed to by India and Pakistan, that the Kashmiris, through plebiscite would decide whether to join Pakistan or India. The 1971 War did not bring about any change in their stand on this issue. In the past

Pakistan and always emphasized the need of solving the major problem of Kashmir before taking up other issues.

India, hither to, had uniformly stood for settling the smaller differences first. Now, to cash in on her recent victory she pressed for ending all irritating issues between the two countries in one sweep and with a single 'package' solution. She wanted to secure the final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir problem on the basis of the new ceasefire line.⁷ Finally at Simla the line of Actual Control in Jammu and Kashmir resulting from the ceasefire (of December 17, 1971) was accepted and it "shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side," and it was agreed that the representatives of the two governments would meet preparatory to the next summit meeting to discuss, among other things, "a final settlement of Kashmir."

After signing of the agreement, however, differences arose on the interpretation of the provisions relating to the Kashmir issue. From Pakistan's point of view, Simla Agreement admits the existence of the Jammu and Kashmir as disputed territory. While India asserted that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and the question had to be settled related to the territory under occupation of Pakistan. According to the Indians, under the agreement the Kashmir issue could not be taken up at the U.N. It could only be discussed at the bilateral level and thus, mere mention of Kashmir outside the framework of the Simla Agreement constitutes a violation of the treaty. On the other hand Pakistan has always maintained that nothing in the Simla Agreement prevents it from raising the issue at international forum. Prime Minister of Pakistan argued that the U.N. Charter, which both sides had accepted as the guiding framework for their relations allowed each party recourse to the world organization.⁸

Pakistan-India relations deteriorated again when Indira-Abdullah Accord on Kashmir in February 1975 was criticised by Pakistan. According to the Accord accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was reaffirmed by both parties. After this Sh. Abdullah assumed the office of the Chief Minister of State and the Plebiscite Front was dissolved.⁹ This agreement is a shameful deal and an attempt to barter away the right of self-determination of Kashmiris. It was a violation of the U.N. Charter and its Resolutions on Kashmir. The agreement also constitutes a blatant violation of the Simla Accord. A complete country wide strike was observed in Pakistan on February 28, 1975 to condemn the Indira-Abdullah deal.¹⁰ On 10 March Prime Minister Bhutto protesting against the illegal and unconstitutional agreement with

Sh. Abdullah, proposed a settlement of the dispute within the framework of the Simla Agreement. Mrs. Gandhi had replied that the agreement was purely an internal matter of India.¹¹

Afterwards, Pakistan stressed time and again for settlement of the Kashmir dispute and made it clear to India that the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir was inseparably linked with the ideals of Pakistanis. Pakistan continued to refer the Kashmir dispute to the U.N. every year. In December 1978, criticising Pakistan for frequently raising the question of self-determination of the Kashmiris, the Indian Foreign Minister warned that Pakistan was 'playing with fire' and the Kashmir was inseparably linked with India.¹²

After Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan's agreement with U.S. for purchase of F-16 aircraft was strongly criticised by India that would constitute a threat to her security. Pakistan quickly responding to the Indian sensitivities toward the US-Pakistan package deal offered India to sign a 'No War Pact' in September 1981. Indira Gandhi called it a trap.¹³ No War Pact offer was originally mooted by India in 1948, and had repeated it several times. Pakistan's attitude was that No War Pact should follow the resolution of Kashmir dispute. Now Pakistan delinked the Kashmir issue from the No War Pact offer. But Pakistan reaffirmed its stand on Kashmir issue stating that it could be settled by granting the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir. Insistence on the solution of Kashmir would put an end to the No War Pact offer even before it could be actively considered.¹⁴ India has become extremely sensitive over any reference to Kashmir either at the regional level or at international forum.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY PROBLEMS

Till 1971, the Kashmir problem remained on the top of the list of disputes between India and Pakistan. After 1971 War it was relegated to the bottom. Defence and security problems, nuclear issue and the armament had shifted the focus a little away from Kashmir during the period under study.

Indian leaders are of the view that India must play a dominant role in South Asia because of its size, population, technological advancement and military power. Pakistan's military debacle in 1971 and the establishment of Bangladesh with India's intervention confirmed India's political and military preponderance in South Asia. India wanted to give permanence to that power structure. Indian Government began to present itself as a commanding power in a forceful manner in order to be recognized as a regional power.

The small states of the region especially Pakistan should accept India's dominant position and accordingly harmonize their foreign policies with India's regional and international priorities. It, therefore, continued with its efforts to strengthen herself by obtaining weapons of all kind from the Soviet Union and the western countries. It also accelerated the pace of its defence production. A number of Indian scholars and policy makers agree that regional peace and security could be ensured only if the small states of South Asia accept Indian dominant position.¹⁵ Pakistan responded to the political and security environment and the power structure in South Asia in the post 1971 period by adopting a three pronged strategy.

The first was meant to deal with the problems related to the outcome of 1971 War. These included the return of Prisoners of War and withdrawal of the forces to the respective international frontiers of the two states. A process to solve these problems was set in motion in July 1972 when Simla Agreement was signed between Pakistan and India. Secondly, Pakistan re-established its links to the Islamic World. The Shah of Iran assured Pakistan to stand by it for maintaining integrity. Pakistan hosted the Second Islamic Summit Conference in 1974. The Islamic Conference institutionalized Pakistan's role as a key Muslim state.¹⁶ These efforts were accompanied by steps to seal with the long term defence and security issues. Arms embargo imposed on Pakistan by the U.S. was lifted as a result of Pakistan's efforts. The numerical strength of army was increased by fresh recruitments. Modern weapons were obtained from different sources. However, Pakistan was not aiming at attaining parity with India in armament; rather it wanted to muster enough military and diplomatic strength so that it would discourage Indian from using its military preponderance against Pakistan.

India views Pakistan as a major obstacle to the realization to its long cherished ambition of its dominance in South Asia. Therefore, India is extremely critical of the reinvigoration of Pakistan, especially its ties with USA in the economic and security fields. India argues that the supply of the American weapons is a threat to peace in the region and the security of India.¹⁷

Therefore, the major thrust of India's diplomacy is aimed to achieve discontinuation of the US-Pakistan security ties. During the period under study India purchased arms valued almost two and a half times more than Pakistan's arms import for the same period. India's indigenous arms production is massive and far higher than that of Pakistan. A comparison of India and Pakistan's military strength indicates that Pakistan is in no position to generate insecurity for India. India enjoys a clear advantage over Pakistan in

military strength. The balance of power in South Asia has always remained heavily tilted in favour of India.¹⁸

India's nuclear explosion in May 1974 was also a part of its design in achieving domination in South Asia and a higher status in the world, although India has tried to reassure the world that her nuclear explosion was entirely for peaceful purposes. Pakistan reacted strongly to the Indian nuclear explosion. Pakistan's Government described the Indian nuclear capability as "a threat to Pakistan's Security."¹⁹ The government adopted a three point strategy to counter what it described as India's nuclear threat.

First, Pakistan tried to seek 'nuclear umbrella' from the U.N. and the major powers. China expressed to give absolute support to Pakistan against nuclear threat.

Secondly, Pakistan put forward a proposal at the U.N. General Assembly that South Asia should be declared a 'Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.' Pakistan's proposal met with strong Indian opposition. India maintained that South Asia could not be considered as a distinct region for the purpose of creating a denuclearised zone, and it insisted that such an initiative must come from all the states of the region.²⁰ Since 1974, the Pakistani proposal had been endorsed by the General Assembly every year. While opposing Pakistan's NWFZ proposal, India emphasised the Indian Ocean Peace Zone concept. Pakistan supported the exclusion of the great powers from the Indian Ocean but it is against the hegemonial designs of India to make the Indian Ocean an area of its exclusive influence.²¹

Both India and Pakistan refused to sign the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But their reasons for doing so are different and reflect an attitude which characterises the Indio-Pakistan relationship. India's objection to the NPT is based on its highly discriminatory nature. She wants to keep its nuclear option open. However Pakistan is prepared to sign the treaty provided India signs it as well.²²

Thirdly, the programme for peaceful use of nuclear technology was expanded by Pakistan. But Pakistan's modest peaceful nuclear programme for its energy needs, became the target of world media, led by India. Indian leadership and the media keeps on harping on the theme that Pakistan has either manufactured a bomb or it will do so in the near future.²³ This propaganda aims at the mobilization of anti-nuclear group in U.S. against America's economic assistance and military sale to Pakistan.

AFGHANISTAN'S CRISIS AND PAK-INDIA RELATIONS

Different reactions regarding the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the various developments, particularly the U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, have further increased the tension between India and Pakistan.

Soviet action in Afghanistan brought about a qualitative change in Pakistan's security environment. The continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan brought the USSR to the Pak-Afghan borders. Pakistan realized that it had to face hostile powers on both sides of its frontiers. The presence of the three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan alongwith the resistance activities of the Afghan freedom fighters further added to the country's security anxieties.²⁴

On diplomatic level Pakistan called for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. United Nations, Non-Alignment and OIC endorsed Pakistan's stand.²⁵ Pakistan also participated in the U.N. sponsored indirect talks aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Afghanistan problem. Pakistan reinforced its security by securing economic, military and diplomatic support from the West, especially from the U.S.A.²⁶

India abstained from criticism of the Soviet aggression, rather it endorsed the Soviet explanation of military intervention. India adopted three pronged strategy on Afghanistan. First it endeavoured to condone the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan by arguing that the Soviet action was taken to counteract the Western interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Secondly, India extended diplomatic support to the Afghan Government and it offered cooperation in economic, educational and cultural fields as well.²⁷ Thirdly it worked on diplomatic front with a view to face U.S.A. to stop economic aid to Pakistan.

India considered new Pak-American security ties as a greater threat to peace and security to South Asia than the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.²⁸ It is interesting to note that Soviet arms supply to India and India's own production of arms were never considered threat to peace and stability by India. In fact India feared that, in case of another Indo-Pak conflict, Pakistan would use the newly acquired military weapons against India.

To remove India's apprehension and promote greater cooperation in South Asia, Pakistan in September 1981 offered 'No War Pact' proposal to India. Mrs. Indira Gandhi took this offer first as a 'trap'.²⁹ Then in response to

this proposal, India put forward in January 1982 a counter proposal for signing a treaty of peace friendship and cooperation.³⁰

India's apologetic stance on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan rendered India out of step with most of the Third World states which were very critical of the Soviet aggression. India's response made it impossible to formulate a joint South Asia strategy on Afghanistan. This policy won India the Soviet gratitude but it seriously and adversely affected India's ability to make any significant contribution to the policy aimed at the resolution of the Afghanistan crisis.

MINORITY, TRADE AND OTHER ISSUES

Some other issues have also profoundly affected Pakistan-India relations. As regard the minorities, both India and Pakistan agreed in 1950 that they should ensure the minorities in their respective states, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour.³¹ Pakistan fulfilled the terms of the agreement and the Hindu minority in Pakistan lived peacefully. But the Muslims in India are being persecuted. They are living under constant fear, in acute poverty and misery. Although, India claims to be a secular state, yet its minorities, particularly Muslims continue to be victims of violence resulting from the religious, ethnic, linguistic and economic bias of the Hindu majority. The graph of atrocities of Hindus has persistently moved upward and anti-Muslim riots have continuously increased. This is quite clear from the fact that anti-Muslim riots numbered 240 in 1972 and 304 in 1979 further increased to 470 in 1982.³² Anti-Muslim riots are a regular feature. According to a London based Indian Muslim Relief Commission's estimation from 1948 to 1981, 200,000 Muslims died in anti-Muslim riots in India.³³

Indian Muslims continue to be looked up by the extremist Hindu elements belonging to Jansingh, RSS and Vishwa Hindu Parishad as pro-Pakistan and anti-Hindu.³⁴ Muslims suffer discriminated in education, employment and business. As a result most of them have to make living by working in various cottage industries. Even these are not allowed to flourish by rioters.

Pakistan's Government has not forcefully raised the issue of the Indian Muslims after 1971, as it did from 1947-1971. But India alleged that Pakistan's concern over India's communal riots amount to interference in its internal affairs.³⁵ While Pakistan denies Indian allegations and it stressed that its concern could not be termed as an interference in India's domestic affairs. This has added further tension in Pak-India relations.

Hostile propaganda and intervention has also created tension in the Pakistan India relations, although both countries are committed to abide by the Simla Agreement of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. They pledged to take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. But India's behaviour has been contrary to the letter and spirit of the Simla Accord. Major issues of propaganda during the period under study were two nation theory, Kashmir, U.S. arms supply to Pakistan, Pakistan nuclear programme and its offer of No War Pact.

India's interventionist behaviour is a part of its foreign policy strategy which aims at creating a Delhi centered South Asian regional system.³⁶ This situation has greatly impeded the efforts toward the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Pakistan's trade relations with India were re-established after an interruption of about ten years in 1974, in pursuance of Article 3 of the Simla Agreement which provided that trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible, and in this connection delegations from the two countries met from time to time to work out the necessary details.

A trade protocol was signed in November 1974. Both the States agreed to remove trade embargo, to do commercial exchange in convertible currencies, and to grant most favoured nation treatment to each other. Pakistan would supply cotton, cotton products and rice to India, and jute manufactured goods, while iron, railway equipment and tea would be supplied by India to Pakistan.³⁷ At first the trade was to be arranged only on government to government basis but later on the private sector was also to be allowed to participate. However, Pakistan reverted to trade through public sector in 1979 after the expiry of the three years trade agreement. Due to constant adverse balance of trade, against Pakistan over the last three years, Pakistan adopted this course of action.³⁸

On multilateral level Pakistan-India used the platform of SAARC which was established for promoting cooperation in socio-economic and scientific fields among the countries of the region.³⁹

Initially, when the idea of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was mooted by Bangladesh in the eighties, Pakistan and India's reaction to the proposal was that of being cautious.⁴⁰ India's fear was that this might result in her smaller neighbours' collaboration with each other to increase their leverage in their bilateral disputes with New Delhi.⁴¹ On the

other hand, Pakistan's apprehension was that India being the largest country in the region, would endeavour to ultimately dominate the organization.⁴²

Pakistan and India after initial hesitation supported the idea of SAARC. However, it was mutually agreed that all the decisions in the Association should be taken on the basis of unanimity, and bilateral and contentious issues should be kept out of the deliberation of SAARC.⁴³

The period under study witnessed considerable activity of SAARC — the first three meetings of the Foreign Secretaries took place in Colombo (April 21-23, 1981) and in Kathmando (November 12-4, 1981) and in Islamabad (August 7-9, 1982). In these meetings nine working groups were set up for detailed and indepth studies on the possible areas of cooperation. Among these were included agriculture, rural development, tele-communication, meteorology, health, population, postal service, technology, sports, arts and culture.⁴⁴

In March 1983 the 4th Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries at Dacca approved the integrated programme of action prepared by bigger committee. Organizational aspect of SAARC was endorsed in the first Foreign Minister's conference in Delhi on August 1-2, 1983.⁴⁵ It was in December 1985 that the head of the states and governments of South Asian countries held their first meeting at Dacca. They approved the Charter of the SAARC and laid down institutional arrangements for the organization.

The role of the SAARC in the context of its declared objectives is "to contribute mutual trust, and to promote and strengthen collective self reliance". Annual summit, exchange of cultural delegations, discussions and seminars were emphasised but those were the subjects which could be called as of less importance. India and Pakistan differences and Indian desire to establish its hegemony were sufficient grounds to make the new set-up as of less significance.

The wide range of issues discussed indicate the divergence of views between Pakistan and India. Although after the Simla Agreement, there was considerable effort to improve and normalise relations but this Agreement failed to create atmosphere for establishing cordial relations. What could be said is the best has been the non-recurrence of open war between the two countries.

The major source of antagonism between the two countries is India's ambitious foreign policy whereby it aims at making Delhi a centre of the South Asian regional system, with India as the supreme power. The smaller states of

South Asia should do what they are told. Such an Indian dominated South Asia power model comes in conflicts with the nationalist aspirations of smaller states of South Asia. Pakistan supports a model wherein every state share equal power and decisions are taken jointly.

This sharp divergence is the root cause of the distrust and tension between the two countries. As long as India is not seeking friends but satellites among its neighbours the expectation for good relations between the two countries will remain a distant dream.

The people of the subcontinent keenly desire peace and prosperity in the region, the year for food, better living conditions and education. The relations based on hostility and conflict do not promote the prospects of realizing these aspirations. The Government of Pakistan has consistently taken initiative and pursued policies which are intended to reduce tension and likely to create climate conducive for solution of problems through peaceful negotiations. But the Indian Government's response has been nothing but negative. Real peace and prosperity could be achieved through only the positive policies of both the countries.

Despite the meeting at level of Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan in January 1994, there is not much hope of any major development. But there is a ray of hope. There are people in India who keenly desire peace and prosperity in the region. By developing a cordiality with this segment of public opinion, possibilities could be explored to lesson tension and create goodwill to ultimately build prospects of durable peace in South Asia. This is not an easy line. But we should not be totally dismayed, as, in the behaviour of nations, there is always a chance for reconciliation. The history is replete with such developments. This is what encourages scholars to look forward for better relationship between Pakistan and India in days to come.

The efforts, however sincerely made, would be futile if the Kashmir problem remains unresolved. Kashmir holds a key to the better relations. It is this vital issue which needs to be resolved according to the wishes of the Kashmiri peoples as promised to them in the resolutions of the United Nations. There is no other way that leads to permanent peace between these two nations.

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The Institution of Cooperation and the Process of Development in Punjab during the British Colonial Raj

KHALID MUSTAFA

Abstract

The paper delineates the need for the institution of cooperation in the Punjab before its partitions in 1947. The manner in which the institution of cooperation was evolved and used as an instrument of governmental social and economic policy is documented. The conclusion of the paper is that the experience in the Punjab hardly amounted to a test of appropriateness of the institution of cooperation as a development agents. The uniform poverty and hierarchical social structure of rural Punjab underlined the need for some alternative institutional device to promote development.

INTRODUCTION

The institution of cooperation is frequently regarded in many countries as an important instrument for economic, social and cultural development. Cooperatives are often created to improve the lot of persons of limited resources and opportunities as well as encouraging their spirit of initiative. They are promoted to increase personal and national capital resources by the encouragement of thrift, by elimination of usury and by the sound use of credit. The establishment of cooperatives may also contribute an increased measure of democratic control of economic activity and an equitable distribution of productivity gains.

The present paper describes the institution of cooperation and studies performance of this institution in the Punjab and its impact on the rural society and economy. The paper provides a critical analysis of the development, achievements and setbacks of the institution of cooperation in the Punjab

Khalid Mustafa, Assistant Professor, Department of Cooperation and Credit, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad.

before its division in 1947 into the present Indian and Pakistani Punjab. The study includes specifically the operational performance of cooperatives as autonomous organizations and the governmental sponsorship of cooperative organization as an instrument of development.

CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Background

Money-lender (known variously as *Mahajan*, *Sahukar*, *Bania*) had been part of the socio-economic structure in rural India since long before the inception of British rule. Agriculture was a highly uncertain occupation because Indian peasants were dependent on variable monsoons. Also due to primitive methods of cultivation, agriculture did not yield enough returns to enable agriculturists to meet their normal day-to-day needs, not to speak of leaving a surplus for investment. Famine conditions arising out of failure of rains left the village money-lender as the only recourse for the poor villager. The money-lender enabled the peasants to meet their immediate contingencies and was considered by village folk a useful man who often gave credit when it was most needed. The money-lender in India became so powerful that he was commonly described as the capitalist of the concern who practically met all expenditure, paid the rent and took all the profit from the borrower. The effect of money-lending was acute in all parts of India. In Bengal for instance *zamindar* was literally a mere rent charger whereas the peasant was reduced to the status of field labourer barely earning his livelihood.¹

The establishment of British rule in India tended to increase the demand and facilities for borrowing so that increasing indebtedness was accompanied with improvements in agricultural methods and organization. British rule generally brought with it a degree of peace, order and security in India. This, together with the removal of a number of positive checks to population growth resulted in a rapid increase in the population and increased pressure on the land. With the increase in population, new land, often less fertile, was brought into use. At the same time it became necessary to cultivate the 'old' land more intensively. These changes necessitated more expenditure on land, especially in areas dependent upon irrigation. The gradual infiltration of European methods of cultivation increased to demand for capital. Hence the peasants needed to borrow both in order to make capital investments and more often, to carry on ordinary cultivation.

Prior to British rule, the power to borrow was generally limited by the political, economic and legal lack of security; land would hardly be considered

acceptable security for a loan. Under British rule, the price of land rose considerably owing to increased political security, increased security of tenure, increased demand for holdings and the extension of valuable commercial crops. Moreover, whereas it was previously not customary for a creditor to seize the land of his debtor, under the new laws and the systematic execution of the decrees of the court land could now be mortgaged, and if not redeemed at the appointed time became the property of the creditor. The money-lender eagerly accepted land as security, and if his loan was not repaid, he either became the absolute owner of the mortgaged land or defacto owner of the labour and produce of his debtor, who under British rule could not escape from his bargain. Thus increased security meant more loans and greater indebtedness. The growth of law and order led to competition for land instead of tenants while the institution of civil government tended to act as a vehicle to deprive the cultivator of this holding and of the profits of cultivation. Thus the verbal contracts of the past and the easy relations with a hardly more literate money-lender gave way to a formal, though one-sided account-keeping which tended to reduce the more important party to slavery or indigenous.

For a long time the policy of the British Government in India remained one of non-intervention with the forces which perpetuated the problem of rural indebtedness even further. However the famous Deccan roits led the British government to inquire into and adjust disputes which arose between the cultivators and the money-lenders.

Various commissions of enquiry were set-up by the British administration to examine the whole problem of rural finance and to suggest measures to promote revival of Indian agriculture. Among recommendations of these commissions was one proposal that the government enter the business of credit supply through the introduction of the institution of cooperation.

The idea for using cooperation as a means of combating the problem of rural indebtedness was however conceived by Raiffeisen in Germany. The British administration moved deeply by the success of Raiffeisen experiment deputed a civil servant Mr. Nicholson, who made a detailed study of the German and other European cooperative movements in 1895-1897. He suggested the establishment of cooperative credit societies on the pattern envisaged by Raiffeisen in Germany. Nicholson emphasized that it was not only credit that was needed, but also the inculcation of habits of thrift and 'self-help'. The best way to do this, Nicholson urged, was to 'Find Raiffeisen.'

The driving force for the provision of a legislative basis to the institution of cooperation in India was provided by Lord Curzon. He appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Law, which investigated the whole matter during 1901-1903. The report of the committee made definite recommendations and served as the basis of the cooperative credit societies Act of 1904.

The Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1904 provided for the founding of cooperative credit societies on the basis of personal knowledge and credit of those who lived in intimate contact with each other. Each society was to consist solely of persons living in one particular village or locality and to be limited to quite small numbers, in order that members really should know each other's position and character. The expenses of administration were to be minimized and the ideal of 'self-help' maintained by appointing the officials from amongst the members, on a voluntary and gratuitous basis.²

A special government official, called the Registrar of cooperative credit societies, was appointed in each province to organize and control the development of the institution of cooperation, but the principle was adopted that as soon as possible, the societies should be placed on an entirely independent footing.

The Cooperative Credit Societies Act 1904, provided for the registration of credit societies. Subsequently however the Cooperative Societies Act 1912 was passed and this Act authorized the formation of District Unions of primary societies and of central banks (on an unlimited liability basis). These two acts remained a model for the cooperative legislation in the pre-partition Punjab.

Material and Method

The research embodies an analysis of available documentations — historical records on cooperatives, academic literature, government reports, investigations and policy statements, and the analytical and empirical work of other social scientists who have investigated relevant aspects of cooperatives development in the Punjab. In addition, a systematic content analysis is made of the governmental data sources contained in the *Annual Reports* on the working of cooperatives covering the period 1904-1947.

Hypothesis

A general hypothesis of present research is that innovative institutions (e.g., cooperatives) intended to bring development and improve their members' socio-economic conditions are themselves conditioned by the socio-

political milieu into which they are inserted and, as a consequence their achievements may not be in accord with their intentions. The paper seeks to describe the mechanism by which this conditioning occurred and the effects it had on the functioning and objectives of the institution of cooperation in Punjab.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Assessment of Institutional Performance

The various types of societies which started taking root in the Punjab after the passage of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, included (a) Primary credit societies based sometimes on unlimited, sometimes limited, liability (b) Primary non-credit societies (agricultural and non-agricultural), (c) Central organization, for both general and credit purposes and (d) the apex cooperative institutions viz, the Punjab Cooperative Bank, and the Punjab Cooperative Union.

A primary agricultural society, in particular credit society, could be started by not less than ten members, and was typically located at the village level. The society comprised villagers who were allowed to join because of their personal character (credit worthiness) and to the extent of their existing property. In theory, the societies were to be founded primarily by the deposits and share capital of local members. Loans were to be disbursed to those most needy, with interest rates and repayment schedules fixed by the members themselves. Mutual trust in members' ability to repay was the only security for a loan. This was reinforced by the principle of unlimited liability, i.e., every member was to be financially obliged to the full extent of his property to make good the debt of the society.

The primary society elected a managing committee from amongst its members, and then one of them, usually a literate member of the committee, was chosen to be the secretary. It was considered essential that the members of the managing committee in general and the secretary in particular should have a knowledge of, and belief, in cooperative principles and methods. Theoretically, the managing committee undertook the tasks of financing, admitting new members, advancing loans and ensuring effective recovery of credit from members.

The relevant statistics on the progress of the institution of cooperation in Punjab from 1910 through 1946 are presented in Tables 1 through 3. It may be noted that by and large the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, and the general increase in agricultural prices on account of the First World War, helped

the rapid expansion of the institution. In the five-year period 1915-20, the number of societies more than doubled, with an equally impressive rise in the membership and total working capital. The expansion continued through the post-war years and by 1926, the number of societies more than doubled with further impressive increases in the membership and working capital. In addition, the base of cooperation was widened with the opening of societies in fields besides credit. The steady expansion continued from 1927 through 1928. Nevertheless with the onset of world-wide depression in 1929, there was a stagnation of the institution, as is evident from the statistics presented in Tables I through 3.

The progress of the institution of cooperation in Punjab is revealed further by the analysis of the performance of societies in terms of their growth, membership, coverage granted to rural population, their asset position and the expansion of cooperatives into fields other than credit. The growth of primary societies, both agricultural and non-agricultural for the years, 1910 through 1945 is given in Table 1 and Table 2. It can be seen from the data presented in Table 1, that the total number of primary societies in Punjab rose from 699 (with 693 as agricultural and only 6 as non-agricultural societies) in 1910 to 23476 in 1938 (with 19057 as agricultural and 4419 as non-agricultural societies). Thus, about 81 per cent of primary societies in Punjab in 1938 were agricultural and only 19 per cent were urban societies, indicating that the institution of cooperation in the Punjab remained primarily agriculturally oriented up to the end of the third decade of the present century. This position, however slightly changed in subsequent years. Thus out of a total of 27054 primary societies in 1945, some 77 per cent were classified as agricultural and 23 per cent as non-agricultural societies. There was a sharp expansion in the number of primary non-agricultural societies after the first quarter in the 1930s. This may be attributed to the severe strain imposed on the agriculture sector by the 'Depression' and consequent liquidation of considerable numbers of agricultural societies. The growth of non-agricultural societies, e.g., cooperative marketing societies, sale societies, commission shops, etc., after the 1940s was probably the result of war conditions, as old trade channels were not performing well, and the institution of cooperation was entrusted a role to restore general economic conditions by entering into non-agricultural spheres.³

TABLE I
Progress of the Institution of Cooperation in the Punjab

Year	Number of Societies		Total Membership (in '000)		Working Capital (Rs. million)	
	Agri. Coop. Societies	Non-Agri. Coop. Societies	Agri. Coop. Societies	Non-Agri. Coop. Societies	Agri. Coop. Societies	Non-Agri. Coop. Societies
1910	693	6	37	0.6	1.54	0.03
1915	3267	30	154	2.4	13.70	0.20
1920	6831	240	183	14.9	17.80	0.60
1922	8620	401	239	18	25.00	1.20
1923	8853	444	223	10	26.40	1.70
1924	9491	607	254	24	29.40	3.30
1925	11408	968	305	32	36.10	3.80
1926	12617	1797	345	55	43.90	5.90
1927	14148	2273	402	73	53.60	8.10
1928	15299	2616	453	88	63.40	10.00
1929	16473	2835	504	99	73.20	13.00
1930	17222	2952	540	104	81.00	14.50
1931	17541	3037	509	110	84.90	13.90
1932	17590	3120	570	110	83.90	13.90
1933	17726	3240	573	114	84.00	14.30
1934	17936	3340	584	123	86.00	14.50
1935	18215	3549	604	131	86.40	14.90
1936	18559	3820	632	145	86.70	15.90
1937	18846	4163	657	164	84.00	16.20
1938	19057	4419	690	177	82.60	17.20

Source : Wace, F. W (1939).

Nevertheless amongst the primary agricultural societies, the cooperatives generally remained confined to the sphere of credit. Thus out of 26873 primary agricultural societies in 1945 as many as 17603 (about 66 per cent) were agricultural credit societies, as in Table 2. Evidently this high proportion of agricultural credit societies underlines the importance which was assigned to the problem of agricultural credit.⁴

TABLE 2
Agricultural Credit and Non-Credit Cooperatives in the Punjab

Primary Societies	1940	1944	1945
<i>(a) Agricultural Credit Societies</i>			
1. Number	18592	12213	17603
2. Membership (in '000')	615	587	589
3. Working Capital (Rs. million)	74.10	64.70	68.90
<i>(b) Agricultural Non-Credit Societies</i>			
1. Number	7346	8609	9270
2. Membership (in '000')	420	500	640
3. Working Capital (Rs. million)	6.30	12.20	14.20

Source : Annual Reports of the Department of Cooperation, Punjab.

The data on the growth of membership in societies presented in Table 1 show that the two groups (agricultural and non-agricultural) had some 37,000 and 600 members respectively in 1910, whereas by 1945 the two groups (agricultural and non-agricultural) had some 0.86 million and 0.26 million members respectively representing 76 per cent and 24 per cent of the total membership, which indicates that the rural population in Punjab had greater attraction towards the institution of cooperation. Nevertheless, as against the recommendation of the Committee on Cooperation (1915)⁵ the average size of membership in a society remained small and indeed declined from 53 in 1910 to 43 in 1945.

On the other hand, the institution of cooperation in Punjab covered only 15 per cent of the rural population in 1936-1937. Even in subsequent years this position did not change considerably. Thus in 1945, a little under 19 per cent of the rural population came under the fold of this institution in Punjab. As against the all-India level, this was not too bad, since only 12.7 per cent of the rural population in India was embraced by the institution of cooperation by 1945. Further, in Punjab nearly 50 per cent of the total villages had a cooperative of one kind or another in 1936. It was estimated that in 1945, one society in Punjab served around 1.3 villages.⁶

The primary societies in Punjab obtained their working capital from the following sources : (a) share capital paid up by the members, (b) a Reserve Fund created out of profits, (c) deposits from the members and loans from (d) Central Banks, (e) non-members, (f) government and (g) other societies. Funds from the first three sources formed the owned and those from the last four formed the borrowed capital of societies.

The relevant statistics on the working capital of societies are presented in Tables 1 through 3. It can be seen that the working capital in societies kept pace with an expansion in membership. Nevertheless the data presented do not reveal if working capital in societies was generated from within the internal (owned) sources or by borrowings from external sources. It has been estimated that owned funds constituted about 36 per cent of the working capital of societies in 1926 and about 41 per cent in 1934. Thus some 64 per cent of working capital in societies in 1926 and some 59 per cent in 1934 were from borrowings from banks or other sources. This implies that the institution of cooperation relied principally on external funds and had failed to secure adequate capital from its own members. Indeed, only 3 per cent of the working capital in societies was generated in the form of members deposits in 1947.⁷

As already noted, primary agricultural credit societies had outnumbered all other types of societies in Punjab during the period under reference. The primary agricultural credit societies provided credit to their members for 'production purposes' and to meet other 'domestic occasion.' The complete statistics on the loans advanced and recovered by societies in Punjab are not available for the whole period (1904-1947); nevertheless the position may be judged from the loans advanced by societies from the data presented in Table 3. These loans amounted to Rs. 17.7 million in 1925, and out of these only some 34 per cent were recovered by societies. The recovery of loans for the period 1924-1938 generally ranged between 13 and 38 per cent, with a considerable degree of fluctuation. The data presented in Table 3 reveal that while total advances to members increased between 1924 through 1928, thereafter a decline set in. In fact, loans issued to members touched a peak in 1928 and so did recovery, but the loans outstanding against members fell slowly after touching a peak in 1930. It may further be seen from Table 3 that there was a tendency for recoveries to fall after the on-set of the depression (i.e., 1928). The causes of low recovery shall be discussed later, but it can safely be argued that the problems in recovery of loans advanced by societies to their members undermined the institution of cooperation in Punjab during the period under reference.

TABLE 3
Progress of Agricultural Cooperative Credit Societies in the Punjab

(Rs. Million)

Year	Total Loans Held	Share Capital	Members Deposits	Loans Issued to Members	Loans Recovered from Members (principal only)	Loans Outstanding against Members
1924	18.50	5.10	2.10	15.80	9.40	31.40
1925	22.90	5.80	2.40	17.70	11.30	32.60
1926	29.80	6.70	2.70	22.00	12.80	46.40
1927	35.20	7.80	3.00	23.20	15.30	54.50
1928	40.90	8.80	3.00	24.10	15.50	62.90
1929	45.10	9.50	3.30	21.50	14.70	69.10
1930	45.60	10.10	3.50	12.90	11.20	74.30
1931	42.00	10.60	3.40	8.00	10.00	69.10
1932	39.10	11.00	3.50	7.90	9.40	67.40
1933	37.30	11.10	3.30	9.10	9.70	66.80
1934	36.70	11.10	3.40	9.60	9.80	66.40
1935	36.00	11.00	3.30	9.70	9.80	65.80
1936	33.80	10.50	3.40	9.70	10.50	63.00
1937	32.80	10.40	3.40	10.70	11.20	62.00

Source : Wace, F. B. (1939)

The other types of primary agricultural non-credit societies which started gaining roots in Punjab after the passage of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, included the cooperatives for consolidation of holdings, Better Farming Societies, Cattle Breeding Societies, Sales Societies, and Commission Shops. All these societies were established for some specific purposes arising from the doctrine of necessity. Nevertheless they were generally small in number and in size.

In addition, central organizations were established in Punjab. For instance the Punjab Cooperative Union was established in 1920, primarily to impart education in cooperation to the members and the management of primary societies. The Central Cooperative Banks were also established in Punjab after 1912; registered on the basis of limited liability and were generally located at the district level. The Central Cooperative Banks were later affiliated to form the Punjab Cooperative Bank, established in 1924. The Punjab Cooperative Bank mobilized funds from the cities, and channelled them back to the institution of cooperation at lower levels. In short, a three-tier structure was established, whereby the primary societies were located at the village level, Central Cooperative Banks were established at the district level and the Punjab Cooperative Bank was organized at the apex level of the movement.

CRITICAL APPRAISAL : FACTORS DETERMINING LIMITED SUCCESS

The optimum development of the institution of cooperation in Punjab was inhibited due to a host of complex extrinsic factors. The more complex extrinsic factors included poverty and malnutrition, widespread indebtedness, a high percentage of illiteracy, lack of business experience, inadequate transportation and storage facilities, exploitation by money-lenders.

The institution sought to improve the socio-economic status of peasant farmers by providing them with credit at reasonable rates of interest, but in the absence of essential complementary farming inputs *viz* consolidated holdings, better supply of irrigation water, improved farm inputs and technical knowledge, the peasants could not and did not make productive use of credit. Thus despite the provision of reasonable amounts of cooperative credit, agricultural productivity remained low and the economic conditions of many peasants were alarmingly poor.⁸ The widespread illiteracy and lack of business experience contributed to the poor performance of the institution of cooperation. It was generally difficult for the cooperative and the cooperators to find a literate villager to serve as secretary of the management committee of

a society. There were reported villages which were even without a single literate man, but even of a suitable secretary for managing the cooperative's affairs could be found, the illiteracy of the ordinary members in societies made it difficult to educate them in cooperative practices.⁹

The essence of the philosophy of cooperation was to improve the economic status of its members through the 'self-help' approach. The recognition of their needs by the prospective beneficiaries should have come as a first priority. The realization that cooperation offered a way to meet these needs was the second step. The third stage was to take measures required to make the institution to function successfully. The lack of spontaneity in the institution of cooperation was its greatest inherent weakness, and this was unavoidable in the given circumstances. The institution, with the exception of few genuinely cooperatives cases, was not seen strictly as 'cooperative', rather it was a government policy. The greatest obstacle on the way towards the goal of 'self-reliance' was the habit of looking towards the government to do the things which could and ought to have been done by peasants themselves.¹⁰

The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India in its report, (1928) stressed the need for strengthening official control of the institution, but recognised that the genuine cooperative control was the ultimate objective. Nevertheless, the powers granted to the Registrar by the government were extensive, no institution could be organized without his sanction, and while appeals against his decisions were possible, in practice few dared to do so. In many cases illiterate members did not know that they enjoyed the right of appeal and it was reported that a strong tendency existed whereby his suggestions were taken as orders, which obviously did not lead to the development of 'self-reliance' and sense of responsibility amongst cooperators.

In addition particular credit societies made poor progress in terms of extending coverage of the institution of cooperation to large numbers of farm families. The Banking Enquiry Committee (1931) argued that the people in general had a preference for the loans available from money-lenders.¹¹ There is a considerable element of truth in this opinion as loans advanced by societies were generally granted for 'specified purposes', and the amounts loaned were frequently insufficient. Moreover, loans received from cooperatives had to be repaid by members on some 'specified' time. On the other hand, loans received from money-lenders were generally flexible in their use and more readily available than those from the credit societies. Moreover reliance on money-lenders was strengthened by the fact that often they combined in themselves the role of landlords, merchants and village headmen. It is

conceivable that this factor in itself would have placed an obstacle in the way of curtailing the power of money-lenders even if outside finances had been available at the required level and required time.

The particular credit societies made poor progress in recovering the loan granted to their members. The reason for poor repayment of loans, and consequently the limited effectiveness of the institution of cooperation was that the major part of the funds were taken by those who were in charge of the management of primary societies and these particular members were reluctant to repay their loans. In the light of available evidence it is difficult to question the validity of the first part. Nor is it difficult to appreciate the phenomenon of the unequal distribution of loans if we keep in mind the fact that the available funds were far too inadequate to meet all the credit requirements of their members, and that the rural life was already characterized by marked differences in the socio-economic circumstances of the different classes of household. The fact that this latter aspect of the problem was not adequately recognized underlines the lack of realism of some basic assumptions behind the institution of cooperation. As to the second part, some of the influential members deliberately withheld the repayment of their overdues, and this could be well imagined under the given conditions. Poverty was a common feature, and this was associated with mass illiteracy. In this context it was convenient for influential members of the societies to withhold the repayment of loans, since they invariably controlled cooperative affairs.¹²

From the perspective of coverage of the farm population and fulfilment of their credit needs the problem of the institution of cooperation was essentially either to (a) incorporate the money-lenders in the primary societies and to ensure that they could not abuse their powers or (b) to eliminate them by effective competition. With regard to the first point efforts were far too insignificant — in one respect even contradictory — to be effective in inducing the traditional sources to surrender their profitable business. The alternative solution involved procuring a flow of finance from outside sources, given the homogeneity of borrowers in terms of low income and inadequacy of working capital. The establishment of Central Cooperative Banks under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912 was a sound decision in this respect, but as a federation of the primary societies lower down, these in turn showed precisely the same financial weaknesses. The Reserve Bank of India also insisted that until the problem of rural indebtedness was solved and cultivators were made credit worthy it could not provide any financial accommodation. Nor could the cooperatives look to the government for much more than supervision, administration and advice. Thus, in the absence of sufficient funds and lack of

advice, the institution of cooperation could not develop, fast and remained in low profile.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE INSTITUTION OF COOPERATION

The greatest achievement often credited to the institution of cooperation was that it helped break the money-lenders' monopoly and thereby reduced interest rates. The local money-lender was in the habit of charging anything from 30 to 60 per cent per annum from the peasant cultivators of the class of which cooperatives were usually composed, although in some localities he charged much less (say 8 to 9 per cent) to customers whose credit was good. Hence cooperatives charged as a rule between 6 and 25 per cent for their loans. Obviously one of the more beneficial results of this practice was a reduction in the rates charged by the money-lenders.¹³

The practice of charging relatively lower rates on cooperative loans instilled a new spirit of hope, thrift and mutual help among the cooperators. Not only were the members of credit societies saved from a very heavy burden of exorbitant interest charges and in some cases entirely freed from debt but non-members were also able to obtain loans at greatly reduced rates owing to the reduction in rates charged by the money-lenders in the areas served by cooperative credit societies.

And finally, cooperatives helped in transforming villages and their people by rendering all manner of contributions to the well-being of the community. The cooperatives brought together on equal footing people of different castes and creeds in an enterprise which aimed at the mutual benefits of its members and encouraged a feeling of community of interest in the villages.

CONCLUSION

The institution of cooperation in the Punjab, as in any other part of India, was initiated by the government primarily as a defensive weapon against the problem of rural indebtedness. The institution was considered as an instrument of government policy and not, as the original ideology would suggest, voluntary and spontaneous groupings of farmers.

From its very inception in 1904 and up to 1947 the institution of cooperation remained largely restricted to the field of credit. The limited attempts made to extend its scope of 'cooperation' to fields other than credit witnessed a varying degree of success; but, on the whole the institution of cooperation was essentially understood and rightly so, as a 'credit institution.'

Even in this sphere, the bulk of the finance available to the institution came from the government, and this made many primary agricultural credit societies in Punjab an extension of the government's welfare and expenditure policy rather worthwhile self-sustaining institutions in themselves. But number of problems of 'cooperation', classified as organizational, financial and functional overshadowed the limited achievements of the institution in the Punjab in the period just before the withdrawal of the colonial rule of the British.

In all fairness, the idea of lessening the burdan of the peasant and making him more productive and in theory providing him more comfort and prosperity was noble and right ideas. But the money-lenders maintained their strong-hold and the policy had only a limited success against their extraverted system. In India, the political climate was as such that it occupied the attention of the government more and welfare policy was given only secondary importance. The social structure also stood in the way of its successful functioning. What little has been achieved, against such heavy odds, shows the importance of the concept. But after independence in 1947, it appears that the people failed to keep in view this experience while adopting the philosophy in all spheres of life.

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8. Hough (1950); Qureshi (1947); *Government of India Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India (1928)*; Darling (1925); Calvert (1936).
9. This confirms that many more members in societies were illiterate. They did not even know what cooperation is actually meant; *Government of India Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture (1928)*, pp. 469-470.
10. *Government of India Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture, (1928)* pp. 448-50.
11. *Government of India Report on the Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee (1931)*, pp. 150-51.
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Shaping South Asia's Future through Educational Cooperation

RAFIQUE AHMAD

Although SAARC officially came into existence nearly nine years ago, its concept was actually floated in late 1970s by the then President of Bangladesh, General Zia-ur-Rehman. The roots of the concept could be traced to the emergence in the post-war period of several regional economic groupings with a view to accelerating the pace of economic growth and promoting trade among the member countries. The formation of the original European Economic Community in 1958 and its subsequent spectacular success in the shape of European Union have provided an exemplary model for similar endeavours.

The concept of regional economic alliance is of particular importance to the low-income third world. Emergent nations of today not only want economic development but also want to attain it rapidly. However their experiences of efforts during the past three decades have shown that the dream cannot be realised easily, mainly for two reasons. First, taken individually, they possess inadequate development means, such as natural resources, trained manpower, capital, large markets, smart organisers, and growth-encouraging socio-political and educational framework. Second, this world is dominated by powerful interests which direct its economic and political affairs to their own advantage and thus, wittingly or not, contribute towards maintaining, or even widening, income gaps between more advanced and less advanced countries.

It is against this background that the idea of close economic association between developing nations has gained increasing importance in many regions of the world. Such association, whatever form it takes, can put greater development resources at the disposal of participating counties, enlarge their

markets, and strengthen their position in the international political and economic bargains.

As pointed out earlier, even advanced countries have found the idea of economic cooperation or integration as highly beneficial for (i) making full use of fast-occurring technological innovations, (ii) enlarging or capturing world markets, (iii) coping with periodic recessions, and (iv) attaining still higher standards of living. Economic grouping is obviously emerging as a powerful tool of quick growth. NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Area) consisting of USA, Canada and Mexico, is the most recent example of regional economic cooperation.

Asia has also witnessed the Mergence of a number of subregional economic alliances like Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Asia Pacific Economic Association (APEC), and Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO). Two more economic groups are on the anvil, namely Sinic Common Market of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan and Growth Triangle of Singapore and some adjoining Malaysian and Indonesian areas.

So far as SAARC is concerned, it must however be admitted that it has not made much headway in spite of possessing vast potential for cooperation and development. The main reason is the lack of progress in the settlement of outstanding political and territorial disputes. Consequently, trade within SAARC countries has not developed much, being only 5 per cent of their overall foreign trade (except for Nepal and Bhutan). Although SAARC countries comprise 20 per cent of world's population, they account for only 2 per cent of the world GNP. Per capita income levels continue to be below US\$500, ranking among the world's lowest.

There is however now growing realisation that, pending political settlements, mutual cooperation at micro level can be initiated. Consequently an Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) has been initiated through twelve technical committees dealing with a broad spectrum of issues like agriculture, communication, environment, health and population activities, meteorology, prevention of drug trafficking and drug abuse, rural development, science and technology, tourism, transport, women in development and last but not least education and culture.

Though it is claimed that about six hundred activities and meetings have taken place under the Integrated Programme of Action, they have not resulted in any significant regional programmes of research and technological

cooperation. It seems that there is a general lack of awareness about the tremendous benefits which SAARC countries can achieve through pooling their economic, technical, educational and managerial resources. It is this awareness which needs to be generated by academic circles.

Educationists of all categories, and scientists in particular, can contribute to awareness generation in South Asia in various ways, including the following :

- (a) Promotion of interaction between research and training institutions.
- (b) Undertaking of studies about complex relationship between regional processes and global developments.
- (c) Adoption of international technological innovations keeping in mind our needs and ambitions.
- (d) Organization of workshops, seminars, and conferences on cooperation, stimulating themes and issues.
- (e) Formation of bodies of enlightened scholars and parliamentarians to create pressures for the solution of socio-political problems.
- (f) Initiation of joint efforts in the fields of energy, human resource development, education, health, and science and technology.

It is with this hope of awareness-generation that I offer compliments to distinguished SAARC participants on behalf of the Punjab University's Centre for South Asian Studies which stands committed to the promotion of regional cooperation in South Asia and has actively participated in many SAARC related conferences and projects.

Book Review

Bruce Graham, *Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics : The Origin and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh*, Combridge University Press, New York, Pages 281, Price Rs. 1160.00.

Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Indian People's Party) is known to be the most robust of the first generation of Hindu fundamentalist parties in modern Indian politics. Formed in 1951, it soon became the most aggressive and determined of the Hindu fundamentalist groups and parties which were attempting to win power through constitutional means. It brought into the political arena its burning vision of an India which should turn to its origin by transforming it into an organic Hindu nation.

Like Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the founders of Bharatiya Jana Sangh were inspired by Madhve Sadashiv Golwalkar. He was a contemporary of Allama Iqbal and like him believed that the basis of nationhood is not territory, racial unity, language or culture. Nations are based on religion. Golwalkar wrote in 1939 : "The foreign races in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea other than those of the glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e., of the Hindu nation and must lose their separate existence to merge in the Hindu race, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment, not even citizen's rights. We are an old nation; let us deal, as old nations ought to and do deal, with the foreign races, who have chosen to live in our country."

The book under review is a comprehensive study of the Jana Sangh through the two decades of its early history. The author, Bruce Graham, is a Professor of Politics at the University of Sussex. His published work includes *The French Socialists and Tripartism 1944-1947*. With P.D. Reeves and J.M. Goodman, he co-edited *A Handbook to Elections in Uttar Pradesh 1920-1951*. Graham's interest in Jana Sangh dates back to 1962, when, as a Research Fellow in the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Australian National

University, he began to gather material on the Jana Sangh's formative years. He says that an increasing preoccupation with the Hindu nationalism and puzzlement at the Jana Sangh's inability to attract a mass following led eventually to the writing of the book under discussion.

Graham traces the origin of the Jana Sangh to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to New Delhi in 1951, in the wake of communal violence in Indian and East Pakistan. In Delhi, Liaquat Ali Khan signed an agreement, known as the Delhi Pact, with Pandit Nehru. When the general principle of the Pact was being discussed, a member of the Nehru's Cabinet, Shyama Prasad Mukerjee remarked that Pakistan was not going to abide by the provisions of the Pact. He therefore demanded the insertion of a clause which should ensure that any country which should fail to implement the provisions of the Pact should be forced to do so. Nehru rejected the demand and Mukerjee abandoned Nehru and took a different course of action.

After his resignation from the Cabinet, setting up of a new all India political party became an obsession with Mukerjee. He sought the cooperation of other Hindu extremists. The idea matured and the party was set up on October 21, 1951 in New Delhi. It was called Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Mukerjee was appointed its President.

Jana Sangh's first manifesto adopted a liberal approach regarding economic and social issues. It called for reforms to enhance the independence of producers and to restrict the state's role in the regulation of economic life. The manifesto also demanded the administrative decentralization. It promised special aid to the backward sections of the people and stated the party's belief in the equal rights of all Indian citizens 'irrespective of caste, creed or community'.

This is the liberal and traditional part of the programme. The rest of it, unfortunately, is neither liberal nor rational. And it is the irrational party which gave the Jana Sangh its distinct identity. It demanded firm policies in dealing with Pakistan and declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India. Mukerjee elaborated his party's distinct character in an article published in the *Statesman* of Delhi in December, 1951. He wrote: "There is one fundamental feature of our party's programme which differentiates it from others. This relates to post-partition problems affecting the peace and welfare of the country at large. The Jana Sangh feels that the partition of India was the biggest tragedy that could fall on the country. . . . The Jana Sangh believes that the future welfare of the people of India and Pakistan demands a reunited India, and it will work towards this end, keeping this as its goal and aim."

It is notable that the majority of Hindus rejected this dream of a reunited India. So the Jana Sangh failed to play any important role in the Indian politics. It miserably failed to attract mass following. In a bid to replace the Indian National Congress, it won significant share of the popular vote in the northern states in the general elections of 1957 as well as 1967. But it could not sustain its rate of growth in the following decades. Mrs. Indra Gandhi tried and succeeded to suppress it during the emergency years of 1975 - 1977. After the emergency was lifted, Jana Sangh joined hands with some like-minded groups and parties. Consequently the Janta Party came into being. The Jana Sangh was formally dissolved in April 1977.

Bruce Graham has taken great pains to solve the puzzle that why did the Jana Sangh fail to become a major force in the politics of post-independence of India, despite its claim to be the true representative of the national aspirations of the Hindus? He says that the simple answer is that : "The party failed to transcend the limitations of its origins. its close initial ties with the Hindi-speaking heartland were, in the long run, a serious disadvantage; from the outset, the party was preoccupied with northern issues such as the promotion of Hindi, the defence of refugee interests, and energetic resistance to Pakistan. In addition, its interpretation of Hinduism was restricted and exclusive; its doctrines were inspired by an active version of Hindu nationalism and, indirectly, by the values of Brahmanism rather than the devotional and quietist values of popular Hinduism."

Graham's book provides a useful background which helps in understanding the contemporary political and cultural Indian scenario. The real intentions of the party are made known. The Indian political life is basically traditional and only for the sake of convenience and for the purpose of winning the support of the West, it has kept its face of secularism that it is not.

RAZY JAVED

Statements

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION

SEMINAR ON COMMUNICABLE DISEASES CONTROL THROUGH PRIMARY HEALTH CARE APPROACH

Islamabad, Pakistan : January 20 - 21, 1993

The Seminar on Communicable Diseases Control Through Primary Health Care Approach under the Technical Committee on Health and Population Activities was hosted by Pakistan at Islamabad on 20 and 21 January 1993. The objectives of the Seminar were the following :

1. To learn about different kinds of primary health care infrastructure existing in SAARC countries.
2. To share the experiences of experts within SAARC countries.
3. To share National Programme experiences towards control of communicable diseases through Primary Health Care;
4. To share research findings and to stimulate additional research studies based on findings presented.
5. To promote application of these research findings in developing social action policies in the field of health care to reduce communicable diseases through Primary Health Care.

Four scientific sessions were held during the two-day Seminar and recommendations were brought forward, discussed and agreed upon. Some of the recommendations are :

1. Assessment of the community needs before organization, planning and implementation of Communicable Disease Control (CDC) programmes.
2. Emphasis on 'Female Education for Health' as part of campaign against CDC through Primary Health Care (PHC).

- 3 Reorganization and decentralization of the district health management and delivery system for better decision making for Communicable Disease Control (CDC) through Primary Health Care (PHC).
- 4 Redesignation and Training of different PHC workers into multipurpose public health workers with clear-cut job description.
- 5 Follow-up of the training and evaluation of a given programme should be in-built before its commencement.
- 6 Strengthening of disease surveillance system and immediate identification, rapid reporting with prompt action for control measures.
- 7 Dropouts and missed opportunities in EPI programmes to be reduced by reorientation of health functionaries and motivation of mothers.
- 8 Study the feasibility of introduction of Hepatitis B vaccination as part of EPI in SAARC countries.
- 9 Acquiring and sharing the capabilities and technology for the production of EPI vaccines among SAARC countries.
- 10 Effective dissemination of information on appropriate domiciliary management of communicable diseases.
- 11 Emphasis on advocacy, motivation and health education for the control of HIV disease in SAARC countries.
- 12 Strengthening microscopy up to peripheral levels according to the countries resources for diagnosing tuberculosis, malaria, etc.
- 13 Encourage Non-Government Organizations'(NGOs,) participation in control of CDC through PHC.
- 14 Exchange of expertise amongst SAARC Countries through seminars and workshops should be more frequent.

SAARC DOCUMENTATION EXPERT COMMITTEE MEETING

New Delhi, India : January 20 - 22, 1993

The Fourth Meeting of SAARC Documentation Expert Committee (SEDC) was held at New Delhi on 20-22 January 1993. The Meeting was attended by delegates from all the SAARC Countries. The Secretariat was represented by Mr. Prabal S.J.B Rana, Director.

The Meeting chaired by Professor T. Viswanathan, Director, Indian National Scientific Documentation Center (INSDOC) reviewed the progress in

the implementation of the recommendations of the last Meeting. It noted that for the preparation of standard formats and concepts for the databank on economic and social indicators of the Member Countries, the Expert Group on Statistics which had been entrusted with the task, Should meet as early as possible. The delegates of the Member Countries presented project proposal on the SAARC Documentation Centre and the paper on Document Numbering System for technical reports and related documents emanating from SAARC both prepared by India.

COUNCIL FOR SAARC FUND FOR REGIONAL PROJECTS

Karachi, Pakistan : February 18, 1993

The Fourth and Fifth Meetings of the Council for SAARC Fund for Regional Projects (SFRP) were held in Karachi and Bombay on 18 February and 24 May 1993 respectively.

These Meetings short-listed for further investigation the following project ideas :

1. Integrated medicinal and herbal cultivation and processing plant in Nepal.
2. Cut flower industry in Nepal.
3. Bulk drug project in Bangladesh.
4. Split-location cement unit in Bangladesh, India and Nepal.
5. Manufacture of drilling equipment in Bangladesh.
6. Rock quarrying project in India and Bangladesh.
7. Manufacture of double-sided printed circuit boards in Bangladesh.

In addition, the Council authorized a market study on the consumption and availability of dolomite in the region and provided a list of consultants to the National Development Band of Sri Lanka for a Regional Conference Hall in Sri Lanka.

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL GROUP (IGG) ON SOUTH ASIAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

Dhaka, Bangladesh, April 10-11, 1993

The Inter-Governmental Group on South Asian Development Fund (SADF) was established during the Seventh SAARC Summit held in Dhaka on

10-11 April 1993. The Group was directed to define in clear terms the size, structure, resources and operational modalities of the proposed Fund. IGG was also asked to examine the complementarities between SADF and the SAARC Fund for Regional Projects.

In pursuance of this mandate, the Meeting of IGG was held in Male' on 11-13 May, 1993. It was chaired by Mr. B.I. Saleem, Director in the Ministry of Finance and Leader of the Maldivian Delegation. All the Member States except Bangladesh participated in the Meeting. SAARC Secretary-General, Mr. I.H. Zaki and Mr. R.M. Roy, Director, SAARC Secretariat also attended the Meeting. At the end of its deliberations, the Group felt that, given the serious nature and complexity of the issues involved in the proposal, a feasibility study by a consultant would be necessary to enable the Group to make proper recommendations. Subsequently, the Members of the Standing Committee have approved the Report of the Group including the recommendations to appoint a Consultant to prepare a feasibility study for SADF.

SEVENTH SAARC SUMMIT

Dhaka, Bangladesh : April 10-11, 1993

The Seventh Meeting of the SAARC Heads of State or Government was held at Dhaka on 10-11 April, 1993. The Summit was attended by the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Her Excellency Begum Khaleda Zia, the King of Bhutan, His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck, the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, the President of the Republic of Maldives, His Excellency Mr. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the Prime Minister of Nepal, the Rt. Hon. Girija Prasad Koirala, the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Nawaz Sharif and the then President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa.

The SAARC Leaders reiterated their commitment to the principles and objectives of SAARC, to the five principles of peaceful co-existence, the UN Charter and non-alignment. They felt that time was now opportune for SAARC to provide a further dynamic impetus to activities in the core-areas of economic, social and cultural cooperation in the SAARC region.

The two-day Summit held in the Bangladesh capital of Dhaka after two successive postponements, served to demonstrate the resilience of the SAARC

process and its inherent ability to surmount unexpected difficulties. The return of the Summit to Dhaka some seven years after its formal inception there in 1985 was a significant occasion for reflection, rededication, and to look forward to the future with renewed determination.

The Summit was preceded by an informal Meeting of Senior Officials, Standing Committee and the Council of Ministers.

The Seventh Summit opened with the Inaugural Session in the International Conference Centre (ICC) in the morning of 10th April and was followed by Retreat on the Maghna river in the afternoon. The concluding session was held in the ICC in the afternoon of the following day. Heads of State or Government took the opportunity of the Summit also to hold bilateral discussions.

In her inaugural address, Bangladesh Prime Minister Begum Khalida Zia, recalling the First SAARC Summit hosted by her country more than seven years before, extended a most warm and cordial welcome to her South Asian colleagues and their delegations.

She said that cooperation in SAARC has developed along many new and important dimensions. We cannot, however, deny that some of our activities were diffused and had limited impact. They are yet to touch the life of our common people whose welfare is our foremost objective.

Our priorities for the future are very clear, she said. Endemic poverty of our people constitutes a major challenge for all our countries. We must form a strong coalition against this complex and challenge.

Our countries must also gradually move towards making appreciable progress in hard-core economic areas. Economic cooperation can only be ignored by our coalition to our detriment.

The Summit, *inter-alia*, decided on the following :

1. Eradication of poverty in South Asia, preferably by the year 2002 A.D. through an agreed Agenda of Action.
2. Necessary steps should be taken to begin the first round of trade negotiations to exchange trade preferences among Member States under the Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA).

3. Determination to continue in future the practice of intra-SAARC consultations on matters of common concern, as was done prior to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
4. Agreement that cooperation among Member States should be strengthened, both through sharing of experiences and in other practical ways, to enhance their capacity to deal with the population problem.
5. Endorsement of the 'Colombo Resolution on Children' adopted by the Second SAARC Ministerial Conference on Children held at Colombo in September 1992.
6. Designate 1994 as the 'SAARC Year of the Youth' to address the problems of the Youth and focus on the broad theme of youth and development.
7. Adoption of the Regional Plan of Action for the Disabled Persons.
8. Endorsement of the recommendation of the Council of Ministers for the establishment of an Inter-Governmental Group (IGG) on South Asian Development Fund (SADF) on an *ad-hoc* basis.
9. An Expert Group of the Member States will examine the various requests for Observer Status at SAARC/SAARC Meetings in all its aspects on the basis of a working paper to be prepared by the Secretariat and made appropriate recommendations to the Nineteenth Session of the Standing Committee.
10. Acceptance of the offer of India to host the Eighth SAARC Summit in 1994.

REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT SIGNED

Dhaka, Bangladesh, April 11, 1993

The framework Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed by the Ministers of all Member States on 11th April 1993 during the Seventh SAARC Summit in Dhaka.

The initiative towards establishing SAPTA was taken during the Sixth SAARC Summit in Colombo in December 1991. This Agreement is an umbrella framework of rules providing for step-by-step liberalisation of intra-regional trade. It envisages periodic rounds of trade negotiations for exchange of trade concessions on tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff lines. It also provides

for direct trade measures. The Contracting States have, however, agreed to negotiate tariff preferences initially on a product-by-product basis.

SAPTA contains provisions giving special and favourable treatment to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in SAARC. The trade concessions extended specifically to LDCs will be non-reciprocal and will be for the benefit of LDCs alone. Additional measures in favour of Least Developed Contracting States are incorporated in Annex-I of the Agreement.

Provisions for safeguard measures and balance of payments measures are incorporated in the Agreement to protect the interests of Member States during critical circumstances. It also defines rules of origin for the products contained in the National Schedules of Concessions to be eligible for preferential treatment.

The first round of trade negotiations has been launched and an Inter-Governmental Group on Trade Liberalisation is expected to meet soon to negotiate exchange of trade concessions. The Agreement will come into force after all seven Member States have deposited their instruments of ratification/acceptance with the Secretary-General of SAARC.

The signing of SAPTA was indeed a landmark achievement at the Seventh SAARC Summit in Dhaka, which will accelerate the expansion of intra-regional trade for the benefit of all Member States. It will pave the way for gradual dismantling of trade barriers among SAARC members and will play a catalytic role in promoting long-term contacts among entrepreneurs and traders in the region.

SECOND MEETING OF THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE SAARC TUBERCULOSIS CENTRE (STC)

Kathmandu, Nepal : April, 21-22, 1993

The Governing Board of the SAARC Tuberculosis Centre (STC) held its Second Meeting in Kathmandu on 21 and 22 April, 1993. The Board reviewed the progress in the implementation of the decisions of the First Meeting. The Board agreed that the networking arrangement on Tuberculosis Control Programmes would be very useful to Member States and to designate the National Tuberculosis Centre (NTC) at Thimi, (Nepal) as the coordinating institution in the proposed networking arrangement between National Institutions of the Member States engaged in this field.

The Meeting, while considering the activities to be undertaken in the year 1993-94, recommended, *inter-alia* the compilation and printing of directory of T.B. hospitals, T.B. training institutes/clinics/centres in the SAARC countries; collection of books, journals, reports, etc., on tuberculosis and chest diseases; to hold a Seminar for Tuberculosis Programme Managers in Nepal; circulation of information on research activities in Member States and issue of STC Newsletters.

The Board also discussed matters relating to Professional and General Services Staff of the Centre, particularly the need to enhance their salaries, allowances and other entitlements in view of the devaluation of the Nepalese Rupee and sharp increase in the cost of living in Kathmandu. It agreed that there was an urgent need to recruit the General Services Staff and Professional Staff (Deputy Director) for the Centre as soon as possible, for its smooth and effective functioning and recommended the enhanced emoluments for the General Services Staff and living allowances of the Professional Staff. The Meeting also approved the Institutional Cost Budget and Programme Cost Budget for the Centre for the year 1993-94.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON METEOROLOGY

Colombo, Sri Lanka : April 26-28, 1993

The Eleventh Meeting of the Technical Committee on Meteorology was held in Colombo on 26-28 April, 1993. The Meeting noted that the Sixth SAARC Regional Award for Meteorology was presented by the High Commissioner of Sri Lanka in India on 15 March, 1993 and took decisions regarding the Seventh to Tenth Awards.

Regarding the State-of-the-Art Reports published so far, the Meeting decided that the recommendations in these Reports should be compiled for consideration at the next Meeting of the Technical Committee.

On the SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC), the meeting considered the qualification and experience required for the professional staff to be nominated to the Centre. It was hoped that the SMRC would start functioning from mid-1994.

On the issue of networking, the Committee noted that there already existed a reliable networking of Meteorological Telecommunication among the SAARC Member Countries, except Bhutan, through New Delhi under the Global Telecommunication System (GTS). The Committee therefore suggested

a feasibility study with a view to improving the Observational and Telecommunication Network in the SAARC Member countries.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND POPULATION ACTIVITIES

Thimphu, Bhutan : April 30 - 2 May, 1993

The Technical Committee on Health and Population Activities held its Eleventh Meeting at Thimphu, Bhutan from April, 30 to 2 May, 1993, under the Chairmanship of Dasho Sangay Ngedup, Director General of Health Services, Royal Government of Bhutan. Representatives of all Member States, with the exception of Pakistan, attended the proceedings. Mr. Humayun A. Kamal, Director, represented the SAARC Secretariat. The Meeting was inaugurated by Mr. Lyonpo C. Dorji, Minister of Planning, who welcomed the delegates on behalf of the Royal Government and reminded them that this was an important forum as health and population were both vital aspects in the socio-economic development of the countries of the SAARC region.

The Technical Committee reviewed the activities since its Tenth Meeting and noted that all Member States had identified their focal points for the establishment of the networking arrangements between National Institutions engaged in the field of eradication of Malaria. In connection with the Meeting of Experts in the field of Malaria to work out the modalities for an effective networking arrangement, the Committee recommended that since the National Institute for Malaria Training and Research at Lahore had already been identified as the co-ordinating institution for networking arrangement, the Government of Pakistan may host the meeting of experts on a priority basis.

While considering the Annual Reports from Member States on the situation of Children, the Committee expressed gratitude and appreciation to the Sri Lankan delegation for making available a standard format for preparing the Annual Reviews of the Situation of Children in SAARC countries. It suggested that the standard format prepared by Sri Lanka may be used as a guide for the preparation of the Annual Reviews. The Committee considered and endorsed the Report of the Second Meeting of the Governing Board of the SAARC Tuberculosis Centre (STC), including the Institutional and Programme Cost Budgets of the Centre for 1993-94.

The Committee also reviewed the implementation of the Plan of Action for observing 1993 as the 'SAARC Year of Disabled Persons', as well as the implementation of the 'Colombo Resolution on Children' adopted by the

Ministerial Conference on Children in Colombo on 16-18 September 1992. In this connection, the Committee noted that some Member States have already revised their National Plans of Action (NPAs) on Children and others are in the process of revising their NPAs in pursuance of the 'Colombo Resolution on Children'.

The Committee welcomed the offer of Nepal to host a 'SAARC Ministerial Conference on Women and Family Health' in Kathmandu in November 1993. It also considered activities for inclusion in the Calendar of Activities for 1993-94.

SEMINAR OF NGOS ON PROBLEMS AND ISSUES AFFECTING DISABLED PERSONS IN SAARC COUNTRIES

Kathmandu, Nepal : May 7-9, 1993

In connection with the observance of the Plan of Action for 'SAARC Year of Disabled Persons 1993', Nepal offered to host a Meeting of NGOs of SAARC countries active in this field to strengthen cooperation among them. In pursuance of this decision, His Majesty's Government of Nepal hosted this Seminar at Kathmandu on 7-9 May, 1993. It was inaugurated by Mr. Govinda Raj Joshi, Minister of Education, Culture and Social Welfare, Nepal. The representatives of NGOs of Member States, except Sri Lanka, discussed the Plan of Action and considered the situation of disabled persons in the SAARC Region.

The Seminar called upon all the concerned Governments of the Member States to improve the quality of life of disabled persons by providing them with opportunities to become self-reliant, dignified and contributing members of the society.

It made a number of recommendations for immediate attention of the Member States which were, *inter-alia*, that Member States should ensure at least 3 per cent of jobs in both private and public sectors be reserved for disabled persons; national rehabilitation funds should be established in each country to facilitate the employment and self-employment of disabled persons; training programmes in human resources development in the field of disability be strengthened through collaborative efforts; the decade of 1994-2003 be declared as 'SAARC Decade of Disabled Persons' and 3rd December should be observed as the 'SAARC Day of Disabled Persons.'

**MEETING OF GROUP OF EXPERTS
TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS
FOR PERMANENT STAFF OF THE SECRETARIAT**

Thimphu, Bhutan : May 18-19, 1993

As per the mandate of the Sixteenth Session of the Standing Committee, a Meeting of the Group of Experts to consider proposals for retirement benefits for the Permanent Staff of the Secretariat. . . . in Thimphu on 18 and 19 May, 1993. The Meeting was attended by delegates from all Member States and from the Secretariat.

The Group of Experts considered proposals for granting gratuity, contributory provident fund and leave encasement to the permanent staff of the Secretariat at the time of their retirement. The recommendations made by the Group of Experts will be considered by the Eighteenth Session of the Standing Committee to be held in Dhaka later this year.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS

New Delhi, India : May 24-25, 1993

The First Meeting of the Technical Committee on Communications was held in New Delhi from 24-25 May, 1993. The Meeting attended by delegates from all the Member Countries was inaugurated by Mr. Sukh Ram, Hon'ble Minister of State for Communications, Government of India and chaired by Mr. S. K. Parthasarthy, Secretary, Department of Posts, India. The Secretariat was represented by Ms. Nima Ome, Director.

On evaluating the benefits from implementation of activities/programmes in the region under the aegis of SAARC, the Committee noted that all the Member States had benefitted substantially from the various programmes. The delegates were of the unanimous opinion that the activities under SAARC should be continued.

On reviewing the progress in the implementation of decisions taken at the last Meetings of the Technical Committee on Postal Services and Telecommunications respectively, it was noted that under Postal Services during 1992, four activities were held and in first half of 1993 three were held. Under Technical Committee on Telecommunications, the Workshop on Improvement of Rural Telecommunications in the SAARC Region, held on 29-30 May 1993.

For the second half of 1993 under Postal Services, four more activities are to be held and under Telecommunications, one. The other highlights of the Meeting are the following :

Postal Services :

Decision to re-examine the issues regarding the proposal for the establishment of a Postal Research and Development Centre and the Introduction of a Professional Degree Course on Postal Management was made. Sri Lanka was asked to prepare two separate detailed papers for presentation to the next Meeting on the establishment of the Centre and Introduction of a Professional Diploma Course instead of a Degree Course.

For submission to the SAARC Council for Fund for Regional Projects, the Committee identified Electronic Tracking and Tracing for EMS as a possible project idea and decided that India would prepare a concept paper.

The two Indian experts who are currently carrying out the two studies on Concessional Mail Tariff and Expeditious Mail Transmission in the SAARC Region made a presentation on the status of their studies carried out so far in Nepal and Pakistan.

Telecommunications :

Discussions were held on the tests on the inter-country links, accounting rates between the Member Countries, concessional tariffs for off pead-traffic.

It was decided that the information regarding training programmes should be circulated among Member Countries through the Secretariat.

Discussions were also held on de-regulation and restructuring of telecom organizations to meet the challenges of the 1990s in its relevance to SAARC countries, present status and future plans.

The next Meeting of the Technical Committee is scheduled to be held in India again in the first half of 1994.

SECRETARY-GENERAL CONDOLES PRESIDENT PREMADASA'S DEATH

In a condolence message following the death of President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka, the Secretary-General, Mr. I.H. Zaki, expressed deep shock and profound sorrow at the tragic loss and paid tribute to the late President's deep commitment to regional cooperation and dynamic leadership during his tenure as Chairman. While noting the late President's long and distinguished career in the service of the people of Sri Lanka and South Asia as

well as the international community, the Secretary-General emphasized on fresh dynamism and impetus injected into the SAARC process during the late President's tenure as Chairman of the Sixth Summit.

In his untimely death, the Secretary-General said, Sri Lanka has lost a great leader and South Asia in outstanding statesman.

The Secretary-General attended the State Funeral of the late President alongwith several other South Asian Government dignitaries, special envoys and diplomatic representatives.

MEETING OF COUNTERPART SCIENTISTS ON CONSERVATION AND EXCHANGE OF GERmplASM

Kathmandu, Nepal : May 24-25, 1993

A Meeting of Counterpart Scientists on Conservation and Exchange of Germplasm was held in Kathmandu on May 24-25, 1993. Delegates from Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka participated in this Meeting.

The Meeting was inaugurated by Mr. P. Amatya, Executive Director, Nepal Agricultural Research Council (NARC), and SAARC Focal Point from Nepal on the Technical Committee on Agriculture.

The Group made several recommendations relating to maintaining duplicate collections of indigenous germplasm, need for training of manpower on various aspects of germplasm conservation — exploration and collection of germplasm, evaluation, documentation and plant quarantine. One of the important recommendations made by the Export Group relates to providing of funds by the 'SAARC Fund for Regional Projects' for undertaking expeditions in the areas of joint explorations and collection of germplasm of agri-horticultural crops and their wild relatives including medicinal and aromatic plants in wake of genetic erosion in some Member States such as Nepal and Bhutan. In addition, the Group felt the need to organise a Regional Workshop/Symposium on Plant Genetic Resources in 1995 and welcomed the proposal of Pakistan to host the same.

MEETING OF COUNTERPART SCIENTISTS ON HORTICULTURE

Shimla, India, June 14-16, 1993

A Meeting of Counterpart Scientists on Horticulture was held in Shimla (India) from 14-16 June, 1993. The Meeting was attended by delegates from

Bhutan, India, Nepal and Pakistan. The main objective of the Meeting was to identify the areas of common interest for cooperation among SAARC countries in the field of fruits and vegetables.

Dr. K.L. Chadha, DDG (Hort.), ICAR, New Delhi (India), chaired the Meeting. The delegates all of whom presented their country reports, were also taken around the laboratories and the museum at the Central Potato Research Institute, Shimla and the potato fields at the Central Potato Research Station at Kufri, H.P (India).

SAARC SEMINAR ON AIDS

New Delhi, India : June 21-23, 1993

The SAARC Seminar on AIDS under the Technical Committee on Health and Population Activities was hosted by India at New Delhi from 21 to 23 June, 1993. The Seminar was attended by representatives of all Member States with the exception of Maldives. SAARC Secretariat was represented by Mr. Humayun A. Kamal, Director. At the inaugural session, Mr. P.R. Dasgupta, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India and Project Director, National AIDS Control Organization, delivered the Welcome Address. The Chief Guest at the Seminar, Minister Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, delivered the Inaugural Address. The delegates at the three-day Seminar noted the inextricable linkage between development and AIDS and strongly stressed the use of all possible advocacy channels to urgently mobilize adequate resources and expertise to combat the epidemic. They were of the opinion that SAARC could be a useful forum for regional cooperation in sharing information through networking arrangements; providing guidelines on common policy issues; and identifying region-specific project approaches. To operationalise such cooperation, the delegates recommended, *inter-alia*, that :

1. All the available SAARC forums be mobilised to launch innovative advocacy campaigns to generate awareness about HIV/AIDS.
2. A ministerial level Meeting be held in 1994 to review the implementation of decisions taken at the SAARC Seminar on AIDS and formulate guidelines for regional cooperation.
3. Possibility of identifying specific regional projects be actively explored by all the Member States and brought up before the appropriate SAARC forum for consideration.

4. Individual Member States submit at quarterly intervals, on a standard format, country specific information to the SAARC Secretariat for distribution to the Member States.
5. Since there is an imperative need to develop a Code of Conduct on the manner in which issues related to HIV/AIDS are to be dealt with in the mass media, this issue be considered by all the Member States in the light of the existing circumstances. In this connection, note was taken of a Code evolved in India by the Press Council.
6. Member States review and develop mechanisms to collaborate with NGOs in all aspects of STD/HIV/AIDS prevention and control, including policy making, planning implementation and evaluation and provide all the required support to such NGOs.
7. In consideration of the seriousness of the epidemic, HIV/AIDS be included as a separate and specific agenda items in the Twelfth and subsequent Meetings of the Technical Committee on Health and Population Activities.
8. A Meeting of National AIDS Programme Managers be held in 1994, to review the progression of the epidemic in the Region; the progress made in the implementation of the earlier recommendations; and to discuss specific issues relating to HIV/AIDS and STD control and prevention programmes.
9. SAVE initiative be used to prepare Radio and TV co-production programmes on HIV/AIDS with technical inputs from WHO and all other relevant agencies.

EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON SAARC REGIONAL FUND

Islamabad, Pakistan, June 28-29, 1993

The Expert Group Meeting for finalizing the Terms of Reference, Sources and Modalities for the SAARC Regional Fund was held in Islamabad on 28-29 June, 1993. The officials dealing with SAARC in the Ministries of Foreign/External Affairs of Member Countries participated in the Meeting. Mr. Arif Ayub, Director from the SAARC Secretariat also attended the Meeting. The Expert Group outlined the projects/programmes which may qualify for funding as follows :

1. Programme costs of SAARC regional institutions and cost of programme components of networking arrangements : in this context, efforts should be made to keep the costs on consultancy and international travel to minimum required levels.
2. Developmental projects of scientific and technical nature.
3. Projects/programmes involving high cost.
4. *Long term training programmes.
5. Projects/programmes of any other nature identified in future by SAARC Member States.

The Fund would be administered by Member States while the SAARC Secretary-General will be responsible for its management and operation. The list of projects/programmes to be financed by the Fund would be finalized by the Standing Committee.

*(Over two weeks for at least two participants from each Member State)

A Select Bibliography of Books and Periodical Literature on South Asia and SAARC

January to June, 1993

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Chronology of Important Events

SOUTH ASIAN REGION

January to June 1993

BANGLADESH

- January 2* Thousands of Bangladeshi Muslims began a long March towards Ayodhya to press for reconstruction of the demolished Babri Mosque on its original site.
- 3* Bangladesh's major opposition parties boycotted the opening of the winter session of the parliament despite a plea for unity from President Abdur Rehman Biswas.
- 6* Bangladesh sent home nearly 1,500 Burmese refugees, the largest group to return since repatriations.
- 21* Bangladesh's parliament condemned the razing of Babri Mosque by Hindu zealots in Northern India and called for its restoration.
- February 18* Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Begum Khaleda Zia, told the Secretary General of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) that Bangladesh would be ready to host a re-convened SAARC Summit.

INDIA

- January 8* The Governor of India's Maharashtra State resigned after attacking Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao for holding a number of portfolios.
- 18* Indian President Shankar Dayal Sharma and Prime Minister Narasimha Rao assured Sri Lankan President Narasinghe Premadasa of India's abiding commitment to strengthen cooperation in South Asian region.
- February 8* Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao said that his sweeping economic reforms programme was neglected in recent months because of Hindu-Muslim tensions in which more than 2,000 people had been killed.

- March 19* Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao expressed gratitude to Prime Minister of Pakistan Mian Nawaz Sharif in response to his message of sympathy for the Bombay bomb blasts.
- April 7* Indian Minister for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, accused Pakistan of not extending cooperation in the investigation of recent bomb blasts in Bombay.
- 10* The Speaker of the National Assembly, Gohar Ayub Khan said that Pakistan was not a terrorist State and there was no camps in the country to train saboteurs.
- 11* The Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart, P.V. Narasimha Rao, agreed to exchange information on the Bombay bomb blasts and hold a high level meeting in this connection.
- 11* The two Prime Ministers, attending the Seventh SAARC Summit, met at the International Conferences Centre in Dhaka.
- 18* Secretary General Foreign Affairs, Akram Zaki, said Pakistan was glad on the statement made by the Indian Minister for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, that Indian investigation did not provide any concrete proof on Pakistan's involvement in the Bombay bomb blasts.
- 19* India implicitly criticised the sacking of the government of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and expressed concern over its implications on relations between the two countries.
- 21* A Foreign Office spokesman said the comments of the Indian Minister for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, on recent political developments in Pakistan amounted to interference in the internal affairs of the country.
- 22* A Foreign Office spokesman strongly refuted the statement made by the Indian Interior Minister, S.B. Chavan, in the Indian Parliament alleging that investigations carried out by the Indian authorities had indicated Pakistan's involvement in the bomb blasts in Bombay.
- May 2* Secretary-General Foreign Affairs, Akram Zaki, welcomed the statement made by the Indian Interior Minister, S.B. Chavan, in the Rajya Sabha on 28 April stating categorically that "so far, there is not concrete evidence to link Pakistan with the Bombay bomb blasts."
- 10* Mr. Pizada told the Indian High Commissioner, S. K. Lambah, that Pakistan wanted a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue.
- 13* The Indian High Commissioner was told in Islamabad that suspects in the Bombay bomb blast case were not in Pakistan.
- 14* A Foreign Office spokesman said, that Pakistan denied an Indian accusation that it was linked to a series of bomb blasts in Bombay.

- May 16* Indian Home Minister, Ramesh Pilot, sees no Pakistan's hand in the Bombay bomb blasts. In his letter to the Indian Prime Minister, he said : "The feeling is that there is a serious nexus between the underground world, some politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats."
- June 23* A Foreign Office spokesman told reporters in Islamabad that the massive build-up of Indian troops is of serious concern to Pakistan.

NEPAL

- January 1* It was reported that the flow of Bhutanese refugees into Nepal, which slowed a few months ago, had increased again.
- March 1* The Nepalese Prime Minister, Mr. G. P. Koirala, said, Nepal was likely to take the matter of thousands of refugees who had crossed over from Bhutan to international forums, if efforts to resolve the issue through bilateral means said.
- April 2* Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala called on foreign diplomats to help seek an end to the problem of refugees from Bhutan.

SRI LANKA

- January 1* Sri Lankan security forces would be training improved weapons on the Tamil Tiger Guerrillas in the 10th year of their war against the separatists.
- 12* Sri Lankan President Rana Singhe Premadasa called for the holding of a postponed regional summit (SAARC) as soon as possible.
- 14* Tamil Rebel Chief Velupillai Prabhakaran called for peace talks to end Sri Lanka's ten-year long civil war.
- 21* Sri Lankan journalists urged the public to join them in a campaign for press freedom and a halt to increasing assaults on journalists.
- February 12* Sri Lanka had relaxed emergency laws used to detain suspected Tamil insurgents and left-wing Sinhalese rebels, apparently to satisfy complaints by human rights groups and aid donors.
- March 4* Industries Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe told that Sri Lankan Government reacted coolly to peace overtures by separatist Tamil Tiger guerillas.
- April 4* President Ranasinghe Premadasa had proposed to convene emergency summit meetings of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) at short notice to discuss major issues and pre-empt possible outside intervention.
- 22* Ranasinghe Premadasa said that he opposed the division of the Island as demanded by Tamil guerillas but hoped their 10-year war would end this year.

Premadasa's death was a personal loss for him. He further said that the late President had great qualities and worked for the development and the well-being of his country and the people.

- 5 It was reported that Sri Lankan Tamil rebels killed four soldiers and wounded seven when they attacked army bunkers in the north of the island.

June 21 Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe met Indian Minister of State for External Affairs R. L. Bhatia.

SAARC

January 8 Sri Lankan Government revealed that summit of South Asian leaders was postponed after the destruction of Bahri Mosque by Hindus in India.

- 9 South Asian summit was to be held in Dhaka had been postponed for a second time because Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao decided not to attend.

April 10 Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif made an impassioned appeal at the Seventh SAARC Summit for a commitment to regional cooperation in order to create a new and balanced framework for peace and progress in the region. He said, "South Asian countries must protect fundamental rights and fright religious fanaticism."

- 11 South Asian leaders ended a two-day summit with a preferential trade pact and a call to turn the region into an economic power house. They also pledged to eradicate poverty in the region by the year 2002 and called for the creation of a development bank to finance jointly sponsored industrial ventures.

11 Maintaining that the contentious political issues between SAARC countries were impediments to the full growth of the organisation, Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif called for allowing the member states to discuss political problems in the SAARC forum "with a view to resolving them peacefully."

- 11 Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif called on Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa and discussed with him bilateral cooperation especially in the trade sector to increase imports from Sri Lanka.

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